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ABSTRACT
This study examines food acquisition behavior and its effects on food
consumption patterns in Sri Lanka. The impact of households' consump-
tion behavior on dietary intake and adequacy is also analyzed. A
marked decline in the percent of the population consuming adequate
calories during the past decade is noted, and attributed to expen-
ditures not keeping pace with prices and an increased skewing of the
income distribution. The increased income which results from higher
farmgate prices was not sufficient to offset losses in purchasing
power, even in the rural sector. This is because small farmers pro-
duce mainly for home consumption. They too are hurt by price
increases in staple foods since they are net consumers.
Direct estimation techniques are employed to estimate food consumption
parameters using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as well as a two-step
approach involving probit analysis to examine the determinants of
market entry, and OLS on a truncated sample to explore conditional
response elasticities once a household is in the market. The parame-
ters then serve as the basis for policy analysis to show that
redistribution of income, as well as economic growth, are required to
reduce hunger in Sri Lanka.
Hypothesis testing was also performed to explore differences in the
marginal propensities to consume (MPC) food and calories from income
earned by males versus females, and income which has different sour-
ces, e.g., non-money income from agricultural sources. The most
important finding is that income earned by women has a higher MPC
calories than by men, although the size of the difference is small.
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Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few years an awareness has developed that the
process of economic development and the nutritional status of popula-
tions are inextricably linked, but in very complicated ways.
Nutritional adequacy, as it affects the quality of human capital,
influences economic performance. Conversely, the extent and form of
economic development conditions the nutritional status of the popula-
tion. This recognition has stimulated an array of nutrition interven-
tion schemes that have been planned and implemented in almost every
country in the world. Most of these efforts have involved public
expenditures or the use of foreign assistance resources in direct ser-
vice programs. Few have either addressed or affected directly econo-
mic policy formulation. Some efforts, however, have involved active
intervention in market prices and other policy variables that affect
directly economic performance and equity.
In order for economists to contribute constructively to addressing
hunger, there is a need for careful research and policy analyses to
understand the complexity of the linkages between the food system as a
whole and the repercussions of that system on marginal and under-
nourished households. To begin to explore the sea of economic linka-
ges which condition nutritional outcomes, a schematic representation
of the determinants of nutritional status is presented in Figure 1.
Nutrition is seen as the end-point of a series of socio-cultural and
economic determinants. A multiplicity of processes and variables
interact in concert to govern the nutrients available to the
HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION
FIG. 1 Model of the Determinants of Nutritional Status
FOOD SUPPLY EFFECTIVE DEMAND FOR FOOD
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individual and the requirements for them.
This flow diagram illuminates the three subsystems that impact
upon nutritional well-being.
1) Food Supply, which controls the aggregate quantity and
quality of nutrients in a country or region.
2) Effective Demand, which depicts those decision variables
that affect the availability of nutrients at the house-
hold level.
3) Intra-household Distribution and Utilization of family
food resources that condition who receives what quan-
tities of nutrients and thereafter how efficiently those
nutrients are metabolized.
While this diagram could be discussed at length, it is designed simply
to provide a framework to assist in conceptualizing the complexity of
the relationships between hunger and the micro behavior of households,
and how that also relates to the macro food economy.
Although hunger is the outcome of enumerable processes and deci-
sions both at the macro and micro levels, the problem is manifested in
consumers facing economic constraints on their purchases. Given a pre-
ference ordering which derives from their knowledge and culture, these
constraints result in a level of dietary intake which jeopardizes
their welfare. Therefore, the starting point for food policy is the
identification of at-risk groups and, subsequently, the analysis of
their micro behavior as consumers. In addition, to whatever extent it
is feasible, an examination of the activities of households as produ-
cers as well as consumers will facilitate a greater understanding of
the overall operation of the food sector, and of the dual role of food
prices in determining incomes and consumption levels of the poor.
The multiplicity and pervasiveness of the linkages between the
food system and the macro-economic environment and micro-level
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consumers suggests the need to focus this research. This will
involve concentrating the analysis on exploring techniques for, and
thereafter empirically testing, hypotheses concerning the relationship
between income, prices, and consumer choices, so as to understand the
determinants of household food acquisition behavior. In focusing on
consumer behavior in general and the factors relating to the effective
demand subsystem in Figure 1, the major concern of this thesis
revolves around developing methodologies to, and thereafter predicting
how, households will respond to changes in the micro food economy.
This insight will facilitate formulating food pricing policies and
transfer programs which will assist the poor. At the same time, the
tradeoffs and costs of reaching the hungry will become apparent.
Thus, an analytic framework is created to move forward in reconciling
the food policy dilemma of reducing hunger in the short-term while not
sacrificing long-term economic growth and productivity.
This thesis draws upon data from Sri Lanka in order to examine
patterns and relationships which guide food consumption behavior. It
is organized into eight more chapters. Following these introductory
remarks, Chapter II provides background information on Sri Lanka.
This is included for the reader unfamiliar with the context, which is
vital to an appreciation of the analysis in subsequent chapters.
Included in the second chapter are some general remarks on how the
process of economic development conditions the nature and extent
of the hunger problem. The experiences in Sri Lanka are framed vis a
vis other countries. In this regard, information is provided on the
historical development of food policy in Sri Lanka. A brief overview
of the evolution of commodity pricing and social welfare policy, and
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the limitations and constraints thereof, focuses the need for iden-
tifying responsible strategies for controlling hunger commensurate
with fueling the engine of development. But how? It is felt that the
answer lies in formulating a coherent food pricing policy based on
sound data. A key element in doing so rests on exploring the rela-
tionship between incomes, food prices, and food consumption, and how
they synchroneously determine the adequacy of the diet.
Therefore, the third chapter embarks upon the requisite analysis
of food consumption patterns and their welfare implications.
Compelling questions include identifying who is not consuming an ade-
quate diet, and what are the demographic and economic factors and
behavioral characteristics which cause or are associated with such
hardships. This first involves examining consumption and expenditure
patterns. This is followed by transforming these data on household
outlays into nutrient intakes, and examining the implications in terms
of dietary adequacy. Answers are sought to questions such as: what
is the percent of hungry households in various income strata; how do
different expenditure patterns between rural and urban households con-
dition dietary inadequacy; and how do the poor and malnourished
distinguish themselves in terms of their consumption bundle and other
socioeconomic characteristics. This is followed by a comparison of
the findings with previous surveys to explore whether and how the
dietary intake in specific, and welfare in general, have changed
during the past decade. The welfare and nutritional implications of
such changes are discussed and explained.
The fourth chapter continues the disaggregated analysis of con-
sumption patterns but focuses attention on the dual role of pricing
-6-
policy as a generator of income through the sale of agricultural pro-
ducts, and the major determinant of consumer welfare as mediated
through effecting real income. The data provided are designed to
explore the short-run tradeoffs between maintaining higher prices to
raise incomes and provide incentives, while encouraging price modera-
tion to enhance consumption. This involves examining which consumers
and producers will be helped or hurt relatively more by changing
prices of staple commodities. In addition, questions regarding occu-
pational characteristics of the poor as contrasted to the well-to-do,
as well as sources of income, are explored in the search for possible
policy options which can most directly assist the hungry.
In exploring the issues in Chapter III and IV, the central theme
is that of disaggregation. This is fundamental in order to understand
relationships between household demographics, poverty and hunger. The
detailed analyses in these chapters, however, raise some compelling
questions which may only be answered by performing econometric
modeling. As Timmer et al remarked, "At some point in consumption
analysis, resort to econometrics becomes inevitable." 1
To amplify, although it is possible to use simple statistical
procedures to examine the composition of the food basket, the nutri-
tional implications of those choices, and how they differ from one
income level to the next, a series of important questions remain.
First is a determination of how consumers respond to marginal changes
in the micro-food economy and their micro-household environment. The
1 P. Timmer, W. Falcon, and S. Pearson, Food Policy Analysis, World
Bank Publication (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983) p.53.
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most important skill of the food policy analyst is to predict how con-
sumption patterns shift in the face of changing prices. Similarly,
predicting changes in the consumption bundle in response to marginal
changes in incomes provides insight into the nutritional consequences
of income growth and distribution. It also elucidates the scope and
magnitude for short-term efforts to raise the level of consumption
among those at greatest risk.
Thus, a theoretical discussion of utility theory and consumer
demand analysis in Chapter V is followed by the specification of
models and an outline of innovative econometric techniques, including
the use of a two-stage probit/ordinary least squares procedure, in
Chapter VI. Chapter VII then presents the results of the models and
parameter estimates. Once again, emphasis is placed on estimating
market demand parameters disaggregated by income class so as to
distinguish between how consumers in different strata of the popula-
tion respond according to changes in food prices and income.
Hypothesized relationships concerning the sign and magnitude of con-
sumption parameters among various population groups are outlined and
tested. In addition, simulations are run to determine the consumption
consequences of price changes and income shifts.
In the eighth chapter, some specific hypotheses are tested which
revolve around how the source of income, and to whom it accrues in the
household, affects food acquisition behavior. In light of the search
for cost-effective means of transferring income or food resources to
the household, the proposition has been put forth that income
controlled by women or from certain sources (e.g., in-kind food or
food stamps) will be expended differently than income earned by males
-8-
or from other basic sources such as wages, salaries, and business pro-
fits. Despite that this has emerged as an idea in good currency,
there is a paucity of evidence concerning the effects of the source
and form of income on consumption patterns. Therefore, new methodolo-
gical ground is broken in a search for answers to this important
policy question.
Finally, the last chapter summarizes important policy issues and
conclusions of the research. It also identifies the need for further
research based on the findings of this study.
-9-
II. SRI LANKA: THE CONTEXT AND THE DATA
THE CONTEXT
Before embarking on developing an analytic framework and testing
specific hypotheses, this chapter is designed to provide the reader
unfamiliar with Sri Lanka with some background information which will
add to the appreciation of the detailed data which follow. It is
stressed that Sri Lanka, the subject of this thesis, represents an
especially interesting challenge for those concerned with food policy
and malnutrition. The previous decades have amply illustrated that
hunger in developing countries like Sri Lanka is largely determined by
governmental choices about the provision of social services and the
ability to fuel a dynamic process of economic growth and simulta-
neously promote equitable distribution of resources. With few excep-
tions (of which Sri Lanka was traditionally considered to be, as
discussed below) it has become clear that most developing countries
will not resolve their hunger problems during this century if they
follow current patterns of development. 1
This may be attributable to a combination of factors, all of which
emanate from the conflicts embodied in promoting short-term welfare at
the expense of economic growth. Economists have long observed that in
the course of economic development there is an increased skewing of
1 S. Reutlinger and M. Selowsky, "Malnutrition and Poverty:
Magnitude and Policy Options," World Bank Staff Occasional Papers
No. 23 (Washington, D.C., 1976) p.7.
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income. 1  Even in countries that have successfully raised per capita
income, the welfare of individuals in the lower deciles of the income
distribution has sometimes deteriorated. 2 Therefore, the question
remains as to what strategies can potentially lead countries out of
the trap of poverty and hunger which is endemic in their populations.
A few poor countries appear to have been relatively effective in
limiting the magnitude of malnourishment. It is interesting to note
that such "success" stories cut across political and economic ideolo-
gies. Most dramatic but least critically examined have been countries
such as China and Cuba, that have adhered strictly to a communist
paradigm of economic development. As described by Field, 3 malnutri-
tion in these countries is not addressed explicitly; rather it is era-
dicated in conjunction with ". . . the wholesale transformation of
society and the economy engineered by the state." Similarly,
Winikoff 4 argues that these countries have not reduced malnourishment
through nutrition policies and programs per se. Rather, improvement
has resulted from the distributional reforms that were undertaken in
conjunction with major social and economic change.
1 S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1972).
2 See I. Adelman, M. Adelman, and C. Taft, Economic Growth and Social
Equality in Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1973); and also W. R. Cline, Distribution and Development:
A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Development Economics,
No. 1 (1975) p.359.
3 J. Field, "The Importance of Context: Nutrition Planning and
Development Reconsidered," in Nutrition in the Community, ed. D.
McLaren (Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1983).
4 B. Winikoff, "Political Commitment and Nutrition Policy," In
Nutrition and National Policy, B. Winikoff (ed.), (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1978).
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Despite the fact that many are enamored with the apparent success
of the communist paradigm, the costs in terms of human liberties are
rarely taken into account. Likewise, recent evidence suggests that
there may be considerable exaggeration in the assertions that the
wholesale transformation of the social and economic system has acce-
lerated an escape from poverty in communist countries. 1
A second set of countries which political economists have pointed
to as exemplary performers have been those nations which have success-
fully followed a neoclassical outward-looking growth strategy. These
countries, successful at reducing malnutrition through their rapid
pace of economic development, are few. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore represent the best examples. They exploited com-
parative advantage, emphasizing domestic savings and foreign exchange
accumulation to spur investment. The outward-looking export promotion
strategy of these small nations is based on a macro policy set (e.g.,
currency devaluation, free capital markets) that fostered rapid growth
in labor-intensive manufacturing.2
Despite the impressive success of a few nations, the replicability
of an export promotion strategy on a worldwide scale is suspect.
Reasons for skepticism include the changing global environment of
increased protectionism and the special social and political tradi-
tions characteristic of these homogeneous and relatively small Asian
nations.
1 N. Eberstadt, "Hunger and Ideology," Commentary 72, No. 1 (1981)
p.40.
2 A. 0. Krueger, Foreign Exchange Regimes and Economic Development:
Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Baldinger,
1978).
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A third model that demands attention has variously been described
as the basic human needs or equity-oriented strategy to economic deve-
lopment. The fundamental tenet of this people-centered approach is
to place priority on a macro policy set concerned less with growth in
the aggregate and more with the assurance of access to education,
food, health care, and so forth. This emphasis on social development
at the expense of growth in the GNP was perhaps best embodied in the
cases of Kerala, India, and Sri Lanka, the subject of this thesis. As
with the communist paradigm, in neither country was there an explicit
nutrition policy, although both had public food distribution systems
and assisted small farmers through support prices. However, what
distinguished Sri Lanka and Kerala is the "... general governmental
political commitment to the poor majority." 1
The people-oriented approach to development, which attracted so
much acclaim during the 1970s in Sri Lanka, unquestionably proved suc-
cessful in achieving "remarkable social progress for a country with a
very modest economic base and relatively low per capita income." 2
High literacy rates, low infant mortality, and long life expectancy
were among the most visible outcomes of a mix of social programs and
development priorities which favored the poor. Morris' 3 classic work
1 D. R. Gwatkin, "Food Policy, Nutrition Planning, and Survival --
The Cases, Kerala and Sri Lanka," Food Policy, 4 (1979), p.4.
2 James D. Gavan and Indrani S. Chandrasekera, The Impact of Public
Foodgrain Distribution on Food Consumption and Welfare in Sri
Lanka (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research
Institute, 1979) p.11.
3 Morris D. Morris, "Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor,"
Pergamon Policy Studies No. 42, Published for the Overseas
Development Council (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979).
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on the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), based on these three
indicators, singled out Sri Lanka as the amost dramatic example of a
country which was able to achieve remarkable life quality results at
startlingly low levels of income." 1 With a PQLI two to three times
higher than other nations with similar GNPs, Sri Lanka during the
1970s achieved a level of basic needs commensurate with countries with
per capita incomes three to four times higher.
The roots of Sri Lanka's monumental accomplishments as measured
during the 1970s indeed are deep. They date back to before indepen-
dence. Isenman 2 notes that the Buddhist heritage and ample endowment
of natural resources, coupled with the commitment of the British colo-
nial government to meeting basic needs and developing the foreign
exchange earning export crops of tea and rubber, were the propitious
mix of inputs which led to a successful social welfare system.
The central pillar of Sri Lanka's accomplishments in basic human
needs was its food policy. Subsidy programs to induce food demand
were a tradition dating back to before independence. The Sri Lanka
quantity rationing scheme for food which existed during the 1960s and
1970s has been referred to by Berg as the "most successful subsidy
program in maintaining adequate levels of calorie consumption." 3 He
1 Ibid, p.104.
2 Paul Isenman, "Basic Needs: The Case of Sri Lanka," World
Development, 8 (1980) pp. 237-58.
3 Alan Berg, Malnourished People: A Policy View, Poverty and Basic
Needs Series, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981), p.37.
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points to the data from the 1969/70 Socio-Economic Surveyl to support
the contention that the subsidy program is the reason calorie intake
was high.
An adequate diet is only one of many possible factors which is
responsible for the low death rates and long life expectancy witnessed
in Sri Lanka. Provision of health care services and promoting
literacy also play a role. In fact, of the per capita yearly expen-
ditures on social services during the 1970s, only half was for the
food subsidy, the remaining for other activities such as school and
primary health care centers. Nevertheless, Isenman 2 provides empiri-
cal support that higher mortality is in fact related to reductions in
the subsidy program, as mediated through higher food prices. It can
be safely asserted that the food subsidy program combined with the
related health and education services indeed explained the exemplary
performance of Sri Lanka in achieving basic needs. But at what cost?
Table 1 presents data on the allotment and price of free and paid
food rations in Sri Lanka between 1943 and 1979. The rice was distri-
buted by a government trading company which not only supplied con-
sumers through its network of cooperative stores but also set a price
floor for producers. In effect, a wedge was driven between the con-
sumer and producer price. The cost of the explicit subsidy was
assumed by the Treasury. The evolution of the scheme reflects various
attempts to control the magnitude of the subsidy. Early attempts to
1 Socio-Economic Survey of Sri Lanka, A Special Report on Food and
Nutritional Levels in Sri Lanka, Department of Census and Statistics,
Sri Lanka, 1972.
2 Op. cit., Isenman, p.241.
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Tabl e 1 -Changes in the allotment and prices of free and paid ration rice and
paid ration wheat, 1952 to 1977
Rice Wheat Prices
Date of Change Free Paid Total Paid Ration Rice Ration Wheat
(pounds/person/week) (cents/pound)
September 1952 0 2.0 2.0 0 12.5a
July 1953 0 2.5 2.5 0 35.Oa
October 1953 0 2.5 2.5 0 27.5a
November 1954 0 4.0 4.0 0 27.5 ...
May 1955 0 4.0 4.0 0 25.0 ...
October 1955 0 4.0 4.0 0 12.5 ...
May 1956 0 4.0 4.0 0 20.0 ...
June 1958 0 4.0 4.0 0 17.5 ...
June 1959 0 4.0 4.0 0 12.5. 2 2 .5 .
April 1960 0 4.0 4.0 0 12.5 ...
December 1966 2.0 0 2.0 0 0 ..-
September 1970 2.0 2.0 4.0 0 37.5 ...
February 1973 2.0 2.0 4.0 0 50.0 ...
October 1973c 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 100.0 70
April 1974 1.0 1 .0d 2.0 0.5 115.0 70
August 1974 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.50 110.0 110
December 1974 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 110.0 110
March 1975 1.0 1.0 2.0 0 110.0
November 1975 1.0 1.0 2.0 0 100.0 ...
1977 1.0 3.0 4.0 0 100.0 ...
Sources: Sri Lanka. Food Commissioner's Department. Personal communication: and Vidya Sagar. "Cereal
Consumption in Ceylon-Pattern and Demand Estimates," Sri Lanka. Ministry of Planning and Employ-
ment and Ministry of Agriculture and Lands. Colombo, March 1971. (Mimeographed.)
anfants and children received less, workers more.
bThe price for the first two pounds was 12.5 cents and for the next 2 pounds 22.5 cents.
cincome-tax payers were no longer eligible for free ration rice.
din the urban areas of rice-deficit districts, two pounds of paid ration rice were issued.
*The estate sector received a larger wheat flour ration of one and a half pounds and the ration in Colombo and some
other urban areas was increased to one pound of ration wheat
Reported in James D. Gavan and Indrani S. Chandrasekera, TheImpact of Public Foodgrain Distribution on Food ConsumDtion
and Welfare In Sri Lanka (Washington, D.C.: International Food
Policy Research Institute, 1979).
-16-
remove the subsidy in 1953 were met by riots and social unrest. The
subsidy was thus maintained and institutionalized more firmly than
ever. Among the changes of special note was the reduction from
receiving four pounds of subsidized rice to two pounds for free in
1966. This partially reflected a desire to stimulate the open market
to provide incentives for paddy cultivation. But more important, it
reflected a concern over the trebling in the cost of the scheme bet-
ween the early 1950s and 1960s. While the changes in 1966 to free
allotments was successful in raising open market demand, it did little
to contain budgeting costs. 1
Another major change was in 1973 when, in an effort to reduce the
fiscal costs of the subsidy, taxpayers (who were presumably the
wealthy households) were no longer eligible for the free rice. In
addition, the price of rationed rice increased, followed by a reduc-
tion in the quantities allotted. This was necessitated by both poor
harvests in Sri Lanka and rising import prices due to the world food
crisis of the early 1970s. At the same time, wheat flour was intro-
duced into the ration scheme to offset the hardships incurred from the
decreased rice rations.2
Various other changes occurred in the ration scheme through the
remainder of the 1970s. But regardless, the fiscal and foreign
exchange costs became a growing liability. Table 2 presents data on
1 Op. cit., Gavan and Chandrasekera, pp. 11-13; and also L. Taylor,
S. Hortin, and D. Raff, "Food Subsidy Programs: A Survey," Report
to the Ford Foundation (New York, 1980).
2 U.S. Agency for International Development, Sri Lanka: The Impact
of P.L. 480 Title I Food Assistance, Impact Evaluation Report No.
39, (Washington, D.C., 1982) Appendix F.
Table 2 -- Government Budgetary Subsidies and Transfers for Food (Rs. Millions) a
1970/71 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 __1976 _1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 _1982
A. Food Subsidy 2012.6 2182.3 1910.1 2259.6 2713.0 2089.9 3154.4 4100.5 3979.6 404.0 91.9 100.0
Rice 1952.5 2008.8 1538.7 1336.6 1732.0 1514.2 2088.7 2021.3 2079.9 - - -
Flour - 86.1 300.6 396.7 480.7 115.9 805.4 1948.9 1529.8 - - -
Sugar - - 61.7 474.1 368.0 155.1 - 237.1 - - -
Infant Milk - 9.8 10.9 20.1 26.2 36.1 33.9 130.3 132.9 404.4 91.9 100.0
Other 34.3 74.5 59.8 62.0 - 55.7 71.3 - - - -
B. Food Stamps - - - - - - - - 869.2 2129.4 1713.8 1510.0
C. Kerosene Stamps - - - - - - - - 246.4 214.8 184.8 177.0
0. Total 3999.4 4361.5 3820.1 4136.7 4886.0 4179.8 6308.8 8201.0 5095.2 2748.6 1989.7 1787.0
E. Total as Percent 14 10 13 16 17 11 16 12 14 7 7 4
of Total Govern-
ment Expenditures
F. Total as Percent 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 6 3 2 2
of GNP
a 1982 current prices, based on Cost of Food Inflator.
Source: General Treasury, and Bank of Ceylon.
Compiled from "Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka," Statistics Department, Central Bank of Ceylon, 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982.
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the percent of total government expenditures, and percent of GNP
represented by food subsidies. The fact that in 1975 fully 17 percent
of the current expenditures were allocated to operating the ration
scheme was a burden too large for even the wealthiest country to
shoulder. While other countries, like Bangladesh and Egypt, have also
been inextricably burdened with similar cost subsidies, 1 the elections
in 1977 brought into government a new administration determined to
reduce the indebtedness and poor financial standing of Sri Lanka.
The first major act in terms of the food subsidy was to improve
its targeting through a means test. This reduced eligibility. While
such a scheme was a step towards containing the subsidy, the fact that
the value of the subsidy, and therefore its cost, was tied to a quan-
tity of food portended continued high levels of governmental transfer
payments.2
In order to reduce the fiscal costs of the ration scheme while
simultaneously not abandoning immediately those at nutritional risk,
the government introduced a food stamp program in September, 1979. It
was designed to replace the quantity rationing scheme. Eligibility
was also determined using a needs assessment based on income. 3 The
major advantage to this scheme, in terms of budgetary considerations,
was that it would not only reduce the number of recipients from close
1 J. David, "The Fiscal Role of Food Subsidy Programs," International
Monetary Fund Staff Paper No. 24, 1 (Washington, D.C., 1977).
2 Personal communications with Neville Edirisinghe.
3 See Survey Report of the Food Stamp Scheme, Publication No. 8, Food
and Nutrition Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Plan
Implementation, (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1981) for a description of
eligibility criteria.
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to 90 percent of the population to around half of the households, but
the value of the stamps was set in nominal terms rather than quan-
tities of food. This eliminated the possibility of runaway fiscal
costs and reduced the potential for an untenable balance of payments
problem which was partially a consequence of the previous rationing
scheme being tied to quantities, rather than a nominal amount of
money. As a characteristic example of the linkages between micro and
macro food policy, the radical changes in the subsidy scheme can be
viewed partly as a response to a major devaluation a year earlier,
which was raising the procurement costs of maintaining the quantity
rationing scheme. 1
The change to food stamps brought about a marked decline in the
percent of the recurrent budget represented by food subsidies (see
Table 2). At the same time, the real value of the stamps has
deteriorated rapidly (see Table 3). This was in keeping with the
implicit policy of phasing out subsidies. As can be seen, by 1982,
just three years after the introduction of the program, the value of
the stamps had dropped to half its original value. To date, all
initiatives to index the stamps to the cost of living or food prices
have failed. This coupled with the fact that in practice newly needy
families are not added to the eligibility roles, has clearly resulted
in the diminution of the potentially beneficial consequences of the
food stamp program.
Thus, despite the notable achievements of the 1960s and 1970s, the
social experiment of large food subsidies has virtually come to an
end. A new government concerned with a low annual rate of economic
1 Op. cit., Taylor et. al., 1980.
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Table 3 -- Declining Value of Food Stamps, 1979-1985
Monthly Household
Income Needed to
Maintain Base Year
(1979) Level of Food
Consumption (Rs./Mo.)
100 200 300
129 258 387
152 304 455
171 342 513
198 397 595
222 444 666
247 493 740
Value of
Food Stamps
(Rs./Month)c
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
% Income
Provided by Food
Stamps if Base Year
Incomes Were:
100 200 300
90 45 30
69 35 23
59 29 20
52 26 17
45 23 15
40 20 14
36 18 12
a The increase in income from 1979-1982 is based on Cost of Living Index for
Food for Colombo.
b The values from 1983-1985 are based on Department of Treasury projected rate
of inflation based on the GDP deflator.
c Based on the average value of food stamps received by all income groups in
1979. Source: Survey Report of the Food Stamp Scheme, F&NPPD, Publication
No. 8, Food and Nutrition Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Plan
Implementation, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1981.
Year
1979a
1980a
1981a
1982a
1983b
19 84 b
1985b
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growth between 1970-1977, coupled with a deteriorating fiscal and
balance of payments situation, sought to redirect a lethargic welfare-
oriented economy to a free market economy based on principles of
liberalization which worked so effectively in the outward-looking
countries such as Singapore and Taiwan. As intimated above, a major
component of this strategy was to cut radically back on subsidies and
thereby redirect food policy.
In light of the process of economic transformation and the atrophy
of the major transfer and redistribution efforts of the government,
the challenge is to determine how to protect the nutritionally at-risk
whose welfare is jeopardized in the short-run by a changing economic
climate. The basis for doing so is to gain a firm understanding of
food acquisition behavior. Specifically, there is a need for food
policy analysis to understand consumer behavior so as to reduce the
tradeoffs between economic growth and reducing hunger.
This involves determining not only the effects of economic changes
on food consumption levels but accepting the challenge of identifying
and reaching nutritionally at-risk households with a limited set of
resources. This means that specific nutrition projects must be more
cost effective. Of greater importance, however, is the need for
general policy formation, especially in commodity pricing, to be
enlightened. This is necessary in order to identify avenues for
assisting the most vulnerable members of society through the process
of economic development. Therefore, the following chapters will
generate key information on food consumption patterns and parameters
for Sri Lanka. In addition, specific hypotheses concerning consumer
behavior, which also have broader global policy implications, will be
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tested.
THE DATA
The data analyzed in this document are the 1980/81 Labour Force
and Socio-Economic Survey. It was conducted by the Department of
Census and Statistics, Ministry of Plan Implementation of the
Government of Sri Lanka; the raw and uncleaned data tapes were
thereafter provided to this author. The survey was conducted in four
rounds between May 1980 and April 1981. It was designed to be
nationally representative. The consumption and expenditure data, the
nexus of this paper, were only collected during a seven-month period,
from the beginning of October to the end of April. The nature of the
sampling frame still assured its national coverage and represen-
tability. However, consumption patterns during five months of the
year which have different seasonal characteristics were not reflected
in the data. To the extent that May through September represents a
season with different consumption characteristics due to lower prices
following the major harvest, this survey would not capture them. The
fact that Deatoni found no significant seasonal patterns in the food
share demand functions estimated for the rural sector using 1969/70
data suggests that excluding May to September did not bias severely
the results which follow.
A further consideration concerning the national representativeness
of the information to be presented is that during the cleaning of the
1 A. Deaton, "Three Essays on a Sri Lanka Household Survey," Living
Standards Measurement Study, Working Paper No. 11 (Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank, 1981) pp. 21-29.
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data, records may have been deleted in a non-random fashion. In the
cleaning process, some 400 household records were eliminated from the
sample of nearly 5,200. The major reason was that around 250 records
were found to be in duplicate, triplicate, or even greater multiples.
The second largest group of households (around 100) were eliminated
because the imputed prices of major commodities, determined by
dividing expenditures by quantity consumed, were greater than three
standard deviations from the mean. Although both the actual expen-
ditures and quantities were within plausible boundaries for these
households, it was impossible to distinguish which was misreported or
mis-entered, thereby resulting in nonsensical prices. The other major
reason for eliminating records was that the data reported in one sec-
tion of the survey on home production, and the value consumed, sold,
and retained during the year were completely unreconcilable with the
data on reported monthly consumption found in another section of the
survey.
A cursory check was performed to determine whether the process of
data cleaning affected significantly the composition of per capita
expenditure levels and other demographic variables in the population.
The means of the sample, by sector, were compared before and after
cleaning. In all three sectors, the mean values for the variables
examined were similar. Most important, expenditures in the cleaned
data set were only slightly higher than in the raw data set. In
total , the cleaning process did not alter greatly the composition of
the sample.
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III. FOOD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS AND DIETARY INTAKE
This chapter discusses food consumption and expenditure patterns
in Sri Lanka. The descriptive information that follows is designed to
begin to identify characteristics of nutritionally vulnerable house-
holds, and how these characteristics relate to consumer choices and
preferences. Emphasis will be given to describing food consumption
and expenditure patterns as the basis for predicting how consumers
respond to changes in their micro economic environment and the macro
food economy. The point of departure for any demand analysis is thus
a descriptive analysis of food acquisition behavior in the population.
The data presented are organized into a number of sections. The
first is a description of expenditure patterns in Sri Lanka. Emphasis
is placed on the share and composition of food expenditures. The
second section focuses on examining the nutritional and dietary impli-
cations of patterns of consumption. Section three compares the data
being analyzed with previous surveys in Sri Lanka, examining the
nature and extent of changes which have occurred during the past
decade.
However, before proceeding it is once again emphasized that
disaggregation is the key to food policy analysis. The most important
level of disaggregation is by income classes. However, in the tables
which follow, the analysis will use expenditures rather than income as
a means of disaggregating households. The reason is that there are
serious reporting problems with income; expenditures are more accura-
tely reported by respondents. Despite the great efforts made to
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construct a measure of total income which included a wide range of
monetary and non-monetary sources, many of which were imputed, the
limitations of the total income variable are apparent through com-
parisons with recorded household expenditures. 1
The correlation coefficient between total yearly household income
and total expenditures is 0.73. However, when one regresses the log
of expenditures on the log of income, the equation is as follows
(t-statistics are in parentheses):
LnTOTEXP = 3.72 + 0.63 LnTOTINC R2 = 0.54
(50.11) (77.02)
where:
LnTOTEXP = the natural log of total yearly household
expenditures
LnTOTINC = the natural log of total yearly household income
At low levels of income, reported expenditures are higher than
reported income. This is expected due to disavings among the poor.
However, the extent of the discrepancy is much more than could be
1 Total household expenditures were computed from the raw data by
aggregating reported expenditures on various items for different
reference periods. These included the following:
ITEM REFERENCE PERIOD
(1) Food and Drink One Week
(2) Liquor and Tobacco One Week
(3) Housing Previous Month
(4) Fuel and Light Previous Month
(5) Clothing and Textiles Previous Six Months
(6) Non-Durable Household Goods Previous Month
(7) Semi-Durable Household Goods Previous Six Months
(8) Household Services Previous Month
(9) Personal Care & Health Care Previous Month
(10) Transport and Communication Previous Month
(11) Recreation, Entertainment
Education, and Cultural
Activities Previous Month
(12) Durable Goods Previous Year
(13) Miscellaneous Previous Six Months
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explained by the possibility of disavings alone. This indicates that
there is also a problem of under-reporting. Note as well that the
slope of the regression line is less than unity, indicating the extent
of under-reporting decreases as income rises. This coincides with
savings becoming increasingly important with rising income. However,
the income and expenditure curves do not intersect until around Rs.
25,000/year. This is well above the 90 percentile of the income
distribution. It implies that only a couple percent of the households
are net savers (the remainder being disavers). While this is not
impossible, especially in a country as poor as Sri Lanka, it is not
likely, especially given the degree of disavings that is implied for
the economy as a whole by these figures. Thus, under-reporting is
considered to play a key role in explaining the discrepancies between
expenditures and incomes.
Under-reporting income is attributable to oversight of in-kind and
informal transfers, as well as that individuals may purposefully
mislead interviewers for any number of reasons. The level of under-
reporting found in these data is comparable to other surveys in deve-
loping countries, 1 and is not surprising given that Sri Lanka has
employed a means test based on reported income as a criteria for
admission to the food stamp scheme. This undoubtably exacerbates the
problem. In response, this analysis will not try to adjust incomes to
compensate for the problem. Previous attempts to do so are considered
1 See, for example, J. Bergsman, "Income Distribution and Poverty in
Mexico," World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 395 (Washington, D.C.,
1980) pp. 2-17.
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largely arbitrary. 1  Rather, expenditures rather than income will be
used to stratify the population for much of the analysis which
follows.
FOOD EXPENDITURE PATTERNS
One of the most basic consumption statistics is the ratio of food
expenditures to total expenditures. This ratio is labeled the food
share. Table 4 presents data on the food share stratified by sector,
as well as by ten expenditure groups. Food accounts for 74 percent of
the total expenditures for the entire population. Of greater
interest, however, is that this figure approaches 80 percent for the
poorest 20 percent of the households. It only falls significantly
below 75 percent for the three upper deciles of the income distribu-
tion. This general pattern holds for all sectors; although the urban
sector outlays relatively less, and the estate sector relatively more
on food commodities.
The data on food share are of great interest for a number of
reasons. First, the extremely high percent of total expenditures
devoted to food is in keeping with patterns of acute poverty and
hunger observed in the poorest countries. The declining ratio of food
to non-food expenditures commensurate with economic development is
well documented. The high food share observed in Sri Lanka clearly
falls at the end of the spectrum. This suggests a serious struggle to
achieve dietary adequacy.
A second interesting point from Table 4 is the relatively stable
1 Bergsman, op. cit., pp.2-17.
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Table 4 -- Average Ratio of Food Expenditures to Total Expenditures
(Food Share), by Expenditure Group and Sectora
Per Capita
Expenditure
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total
Urban
0.799
0.802
0.791
0.777
0.774
0.748
0.727
0.704
0.666
0.516
0.697
Rural
0.798
0.800
0.791
0.777
0.770
0.758
0.749
0.716
0.700
0.597
0.751
Food Share
Estate
0.782
0.795
0.791
0.810
0.772
0.790
0.785
0.774
0.771
0.646
0.779
All-Island
0.797
0.800
0.791
0.782
0.771
0.760
0.749
0.719
0.697
0.561
0.743
a Figures include liquor, tobacco and betel.
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and high food share across rising expenditure levels. One of the best
observed and documented economic relationships, Engel's Law, states
that the proportion of the total budget spent on food declines as
household income rises. Interestingly, this well-substantiated rela-
tionship is only partially applicable to the Sri Lankan context.
By regressing food shares on per capita expenditures, one gets the
following (t-statistics in parenthesis):
LFDSHR = 7.27 + 1.968172LPCEXP - 0.135874LPCEXP2 + 0.06LAEURAT
(28.5) (31.5) (3.5)
- 0.04LHHSIZE + 0.30URB - 0.63EST - O.04URBX
(9.11) (4.3) (4.2) (4.5)
+ 0.09ESTX R2 = 0.51
(4.4)
where:
LFDSHR = logarithm of the food share,
LPCEXP = logarithm of the per capita expenditures on food and
non-food items,
LPCEXP2 = (LPCEXP)2 ,
LHHSIZE = logarithm of the household size,
LAEURAT = logarithm of the ratio of adult equivalency units to
household size,
URB = dummy variable to shift the intercept of the Engel
curve which equals one when an observation is from
the urban sector, and zero otherwise,
EST = dummy variable to shift the intercept of the Engel
curve, which equals one when an observation is drawn
from the estate sector, and zero otherwise,
URBX = URB * LPCEXP
ESTX = EST * LPCEXP
The use of the log-log quadratic functional form allows for con-
siderable flexibility in the shape of the Engel curve. Through some
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algebraic manipulation, one can determine that the expenditure elasti-
city of food share is in fact positive among the poorest of the poor.
It does not become negative, as predicted by Engel's Law, until per
capita yearly household expenditures reach around Rs. 1400 in the
rural sector. This maximum, which is the turn-around point where the
Engel function assumes its expected form, is lower for the urban sec-
tor and higher for the estate sector. The numbers are Rs. 1200 and
Rs. 1900, respectively, confirming that marginal increases in expen-
diture levels will result in a relatively higher amount of additional
food expenditures in the estate than rural sector, and a relatively
smaller increment in food expenditures in the urban than rural sector.
In total, nearly 10 percent of the population defy Engel's Law.
Similar findings have been reported for India and Nigeria. 1 There
are two explanations for such an observation. The first is that there
are certain fixed expenditures, such as rent, transport to work,
health care, and clothing which the family must purchase. These are
non-compressable. Thereafter, as more income becomes available, poor
households can and do allocate most additional resources to purchase
food in order to achieve unmet dietary requirements.
The second reason revolves around choice of calorie sources.
Specifically, a modifying factor to Engel's Law is a shift in
sources of calories to higher quality protein and refined foods com-
mensurate with the rise in income. This is referred to as Bennet's
1 M. Lipton, "Poverty, Undernutrition and Hunger," World Bank Staff
Working Paper No. 597 (Washington, D.C., 1983) pp. 35-49.
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Law. 1  The result is a higher price paid per calorie. This is
illustrated in Table 5, which depicts how the calorie price rises with
total expenditures, even between the first and second decile of the
income distribution. In addition, one can note that in the urban
sector the calorie price is higher than the rural or estate sectors.
This higher calorie price, as will be discussed below, reflects
largely a shift in the consumer bundle towards higher cost and more
prestigous foods, although it does to some extent pick up the fact
that consumers face slightly higher prices in the urban than rural
marketpl ace. 2
COMMODITY AGGREGATION
There was an obvious need to aggregate the more than 220 food com-
modities reported in the survey into groupings in order to perform
further analysis. The object of such aggregation is to group, as
closely as possible, the 220 foods into homogeneous goods. This was
done by placing together commodities which were assumed to be close
substitutes and which have similar nutrient value. The importance of
the commodity aggregation will be most obvious when estimating con-
sumption functions. However, since estimation techniques will not
depend on the assumption of an additive utility function (see Chapter
V), the major potential pitfall of aggregation is mitigated.
Fourteen food groups were created which will be used not only to
1 Thomas Poleman, "Quantifying the Nutrition Situation in Developing
Countries," Food Research Institute Studies 18, No. 1 (1981).
2 See Appendix C for prices of major commodities.
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Table 5 -- Average Calorie Price by Expenditure Group and Sector
Per Capita
Expenditure
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total
Urban
2.31
2.54
2.62
2.65
2.90
2.85
2.97
3.28
3.52
4.45
3.24
Calorie Price
Rural
2.10
2.22
2.33
2.39
2.43
2.50
2.58
2.76
2.86
3.70
2.55
(Rs./Calorie x
Estate
2.14
2.14
2.34
2.38
2.42
2.33
2.56
2.46
2.83
3.58
2.46
1000)
All-Island
2.14
2.24
2.37
2.42
2.51
2.54
2.65
2.84
3.03
4.01
2.67
-33-
examine consumption patterns but also to estimate parameters in the
following chapter. They are: rice, wheat, coconut, bread,
condiments, pulses, other grains, meat, fish, sugar, oils, yams,
fruits, milk products, and vegetables. Because of the assumed poor
reporting of liquor consumption and meals consumed away from home,
these as well as some other incidental commodities were grouped in a
final category, others. Commodity groups were generally aggregated by
adding unit weights consumed of the goods. In some cases, such as
milk products, the various goods that make up the group (e.g., whole
milk, milk powder, yogurt) were aggregated on the basis of calorie
equivalents.
Given the commodity groups, the first issue to be examined con-
cerns the general composition of the food basket. It is imperative to
understand the structure of consumption in order to understand the
potential for commodity policy to influence overall food and nutrient
consumption.
Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide data on the mean budget share that each
commodity group comprises, the value (in Rupees) of yearly expen-
ditures on the commodity, and the percent of households consuming the
individual good. This latter figure on the percent of consumers in
the market for an individual good will be especially important in
estimating consumption functions discussed in Chapter V. In addition,
Tables 9, 10, and 11 show data on the quantities consumed and the
share of calories and protein by commodity groups. A number of impor-
tant findings, which will condition the remainder of the analysis, are
apparent. First, Sri Lanka is an example of a food economy in which a
single staple plays an overwhelming role. Rice is the major food in
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Table 6 -- Budget Shares, Percent of Consuming Households and Value of Expenditures Annually for
15 Food Commodity Groups, Urban Sector
Expenditure Deciles
Food Below 1414- 1739- 2037- 2270- 2583- 2919- 3389- 4048- Above
Category 1414** 1739 2037 2270 2583 2919 3389 4048 5202 5202 Average
Rice MB* 26.6 23.3 23.2 21.8 19.6 19.5 17.5 15.5 12.7 7.8 16.8
%H 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.2 96.1 98.9
Rs. 308.4 370.0 440.5 468.6 475.7 531.5 543.6 562.8 572.5 583.4 507.4
Wheat MB 1.43 1.95 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.1 .9 .9 .8 .5 1.1
%H 26.3 26.8 22.5 26.9 36.0 22.6 20.5 25.0 21.4 26.8 25.4
Rs. 16.4 30.4 29.3 39.1 48.7 29.1 29.7 31.7 34.9 35.2 32.9
Coconut MB 7.32 6.51 6.3 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.2 2.7 5.0
%H 97.5 98.5 94.4 100.0 97.6 98.8 98.8 99.0 98.4 95.4 97.4
Rs. 85.3 103.7 118.9 122.0 139.3 152.8 166.1 181.0 190.3 207.1 158.9
Bread MB 8.5 8.1 6.5 7.0 5.7 5.0 5.3 4.7 4.3 2.9 5.3
%H 91.3 85.1 80.3 90.5 81.4 77.4 90.9 91.3 86.3 91.7 87.3
Rs. 101.3 130.4 124.2 150.5 140.0 137.4 165.8 174.4 192.9 229.7 167.3
Condiments MB 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.1 2.9 4.6
%H 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.5 99.2
Rs. 71.4 96.2 109.3 113.2 119.9 144.6 158.7 169.0 186.4 234.6 156.8
Pulses MB 1.3 .9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.4
%H 32.5 49.3 52.1 65.1 69.8 60.7 62.5 79.8 72.5 77.1 65.3
Rs. 15.1 15.5 29.7 33.4 37.9 43.5 42.2 70.2 63.9 98.5 54.1
Other
Grains MB 0 0 0 .1 0 .1 .1 .01 .02 .07 .03
%H 0 0 0 1.6 0 1.2 2.2 .9 1.5 6.3 2.1
Rs. 0 0 0 .9 0 .2 2.8 .5 1.1 6.7 1.9
Meat MB .8 1.3 .6 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.3 1.7
%H 13.7 25.3 15.5 33.3 37.2 32.1 35.2 41.3 45.0 58.5 37.9
Rs. 9.4 20.9 12.8 33.3 47.1 34.7 61.6 72.9 81.3 20U.7 76.6
Fish MB 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.8 6.2 7.8 7.3 6.8 7.4 5.3 6.4
%H 82.5 89.5 90.1 95.2 93.0 96.4 93.2 92.3 95.4 91.2 92.0
Rs. 60.0 89.8 117.7 145.9 150.4 212.3 226.5 249.4 335.7 431.1 242.4
Sugar MB 6.3 6.8 6.5 6.2 7.2 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.6 3.8 5.7
%H 96.2 100.0 98.6 98.4 98.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.5 99.3
Rs. 76.4 108.4 124.4 132.3 173.9 171.8 198.4 213.4 251.4 299.4 198.0
Oils MB 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7
%H 67.5 85.0 84.5 85.7 88.3 85.7 94.3 91.3 93.8 92.2 88.1
Rs. 18.8 28.1 35.1 34.4 48.6 39.7 50.2 61.6 83.1 146.1 68.6
Yams MB .8 .9 .8 .8 .8 .8 .9 1.0 1.0 .8 .9
%H 33.7 46.2 42.3 60.3 52.3 60.7 64.7 73.1 79.4 80.9 63.8
Rs. 9.3 15.5 16.1 18.3 20.2 23.5 30.8 37.6 47.6 66.7 35.0
Fruits MB .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 1.2 1.2 1.5 .9
%H 6.2 20.8 21.1 31.7 33.7 44.0 47.7 65.3 63.3 79.5 48.6
Rs. 1.5 4.4 6.5 9.3 12.3 16.5 21.2 45.3 56.6 131.3 45.8
Milk MB 1.3 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.3 3.6 3.1 2.8
%H 18.7 38.8 46.5 47.6 51.2 53.5 64.8 74.0 78.6 85.8 61.9
Rs. 17.1 34.4 54.7 55.5 66.6 67.9 81.6 122.6 163.9 256.9 119.1
Vegetables MB 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.2 4.5 4.6 4.3 2.9 4.3
%H 98.7 98.5 98.6 100.0 97.7 97.7 96.6 100.0 99.3 96.1 98.0
Rs. - - - - - - - - - - -
Other MB 8.3 9.8 10.5 9.9 12.0 10.8 11.2 11.6 12.4 9.3 11.1
RH - - - - - - - - - - -
Rs. - - - - - - - - - --
* MB - Mean Budget Share (%)
%H = Percent of Household Consuming This Good
Rs. = No. of Rupees Per Capita Per Year on This Commodity
** Rupees per Capita Per Year
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Table 7 -- Budget Shares, Percent of Consuming Households and Value of Expenditures Annually for
15 Food Comodity Groups, Rural Sector
BeTow 1414- 1739- 2037-
1414** 1739 2037 2270
Expenditure Deciles
227- 2 9198-9
2583 2919 3389
3389- 4048- Above
4048 5202 5202
MB* 31.6 30.0 27.9 26.9 25.6 24.9 22.9 20.9 18.5 12.8
5H 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 97.7
Rs. 365.9 476.5 530.6 580.6 621.8 682.4 718.5 764.9 832.3 901.7
Wheat MB
%H
Rs.
Coconut MB
%H
Rs.
Bread MB
%H
Rs.
Condiments MB
%H
Rs.
Pulses MB
OH
Rs.
Other
Grains
Meat
Fish
MB
%H
Rs.
MB
%H
Rs.
MBR
%H
Rs.
Sugar MB
%H
Rs.
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 .9 1.0 .5 1.3
24.9 30.2 29.1 29.4 27.4 24.2 27.3 22.7 29.7 20.5 26.7
17.0 24.8 29.2 35.9 36.7 37.1 41.7 32.7 44.2 32.5 32.9
8.3 7.4 7.1 6.8 6.9 6.5 6.3 5.7 5.5 4.2 6.6
96.8 96.6 97.6 96.3 98.0 98.5 96.9 100.0 94.8 96.5 97.3
95.2 118.9 135.1 148.5 167.9 179.4 198.6 210.3 249.6 292.7 174.7
3.2 3.1 3.6 2.9 3.1
53.7 54.6 60.7 60.1 61.0
38.5 50.1 68.4 64.3 77.3
2.7 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.1
59.3 54.9 62.3 64.8 69.6
76.1 78.2 100.1 101.9 139.6
6.0 6.5 5.8 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.4 5.3 4.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.2 99.4 96.9
70.1 102.9 111.0 129.8 149.3 162.7 185.0 198.8 238.4 296.8
2.9
59.7
77.1
5.7
99.7
158.9
.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.5
30.3 48.3 54.9 55.5 61.6 63.2 68.1 71.1 78.3 81.7 60.3
11.4 22.9 27.5 33.3 40.0 44.4 57.3 60.4 85.2 119.2 47.5
.3
5.8
3.7
.3
6.2
3.8
.4
7.8
6.0
.4
7.1
5.3
.3
3.9
5.7
.4
9.4
8.1
.2
4.5
4.8
.2
5.1
3.6
.04 .2
2.2 3.9
1.2 7.0
.05 .03 .04 .18
3.2 1.8 3.8 4.3
2.2 1.3 3.0 3.9
.5 .6 .6 .8 .8 1.2 1.2 .7
10.2 15.3 15.2 15.7 17.7 24.1 29.6 14.5
11.7 16.4 18.5 25.9 31.1 53.2 93.1 24.4
3.7 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.4
76.6 87.Q Q3.& 02.A 01.
43.8 72.5 97.0 113.1 133.5
6.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.9
98.1 99.7 99.4 98.5 99.7
70.2 101.8 120.4 136.4 144.7
5.4 6.0 6.202.0 92.6 94.2
148.7 189.5 228.9
6.4 5.9 5.6
100.0 99.7 99.2
177.7 188.5 204.3
6.6 5.9
98.2 95.0
301.4 425.1
5.4
91.3
165.7
5.5 4.4 5.9
99.3 96.9 99.2
249.9 312.5 165.7
Oils
Yams
MB
%H
Rs.
MB
%H
Rs.
Fruits MB
%H
Rs.
RMB
%H
Rs.
Vegetables MB
%H
Rs.
Other MB
%H
Rs.
1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.4 1.5
60.3 70.3 77.7 71.7 83.0 81.7 82.0 82.5 82.1 86.6 77.9
14.8 22.5 29.3 31.6 40.8 46.9 51.2 58.6 73.5 102.4 44.9
1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2
43.6 46.3 56.0 57.3 59.6 62.4 62.4 70.8 76.5 77.2 60.9
15.4 18.9 21.3 25.6 27.4 32.7 40.5 48.0 62.7 89.1 36.2
.3 .3 .4 .4 .5 .5 .7 .7 1.0 1.2 .6
15.8 23.6 26.2 29.0 34.7 38.2 40.7 44.6 54.7 66.2 36.2
3.6 5.6 7.4 10.4 13.9 14.8 22.9 25.4 43.7 94.8 21.9
.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.4
16.3 21.8 27.7 33.3 32.4 38.2 42.4 50.4 52.9
11.2 19.7 28.9 36.7 36.7 51.4 67.1 87.5 109.9
2.3
64.6
170.7
6.5 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.1
98.7 99.5 99.7 99.7 99.2 99.7 99.4 99.4 99.4 96.9
7.8 13.4 9.5 9.1 9.6 9.9
1.8
36.9
57.8
5.5
99.3
10.4 10.6 10.5 12.4 9.6
* MB - Mean Budget Share (5)
%H - Percent of Household Consuming This Good
Rs. - No. of Rupees Per Capita Per Year on This Commodity
* Rupees per Capita Per Year
Food
Category Averae
24.7
99.6
635.3
Averaae
Ri ce
MilIk
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Table 8 -- Budget Shares, Percent of Consuming Households and Value of Expenditures Annually for
15 Food Commodity Groups, Estate Sector
Expenditure Deciles
1739- 2037- 2270- 2583- 2919-
2037 2270 2583 2919 3389
3389- 4048- Above
4048 5202 5202 Average
Ri ce MB*
RH
Rs.
Wheat MB
%H
Rs.
Coconut MB
%H
Rs.
Bread MB
%H
Rs.
Condiments MB
%H
Rs.
Pulses MB
%H
Rs.
Other
Grains
Meat
Fish
MB
%H
Rs.
MB
%H
Rs.
MB
%H
Rs.
Sugar MB
5H
Rs.
28.2 26.7 31.0 25.7 26.2 23.5 23.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
339.7 422.1 588.4 554.3 646.8 648.1 726.3
9.3 13.7 6.5 9.9 5.9 7.3 7.2
71.9 84.3 61.4 77.7 55.9 76.4 75.4
113.3 211.8 124.1 214.0 146.5 200.9 225.7
20.3 18.1 13.4
100.0 100.0 100.0
744.6 831.4 946.8
8.4 6.3 1.7
75.5 76.9 48.2
309.4 290.2 116.9
7.3 6.7 5.9 6.2 6.3 5.7 6.3 5.7 6.4 4.6
100.0 100.0 95.4 100.0 86.4 100.0 100.0 99.3 94.1 96.5
35.4 105.8 111.1 133.3 154.0 159.7 196.3 213.3 300.0 345.0
2.3 .4 .6 2.4 1.2 3.2
20.5 11.7 18.2 45.7 33.9 72.7
24.8 6.7 12.8 51.7 29.1 89.5
24.2
100.0
630.5
8.0
71.6
199.7
6.1
97.5
170.2
1.9 2.9 1.8 1.4 1.9
57.8 55.1 38.4 62.1 42.1
59.4 104.4 83.8 93.7 54.1
5.4 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.7 5.4 6.3 6.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
64.2 80.5 107.0 119.4 142.6 146.9 197.1 230.3
7.4 4.6 5.7
100.0 100.0 100.0
346.5 336.4 165.5
1.1 2.4 1.4 2.6 2.3 2.6 1.6 1.9 3.4 1.5
48.7 68.6 50.0 62.9 72.8 87.3 87.7 65.3 92.3 68.9
13.9 38.8 27.4 55.7 59.7 70.8 49.0 71.6 159.1 102.7
0
0
0
.3
5.1
5.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.2
5.5
6.2
0
0
0
.03 0
2.0 0
1.2 0
0
0
0
2.2
70.8
61.9
.02
.8
.8
.8 .6 1.3 .6 .8 .9 1.3 .9 .8
15.9 8.6 18.6 12.7 15.7 12.2 15.3 17.4 11.9
16.1 13.4 32.4 16.8 25.4 33.3 56.0 60.9 23.5
2.1 2.4 2.5 3.6 3.9 3.3 3.5
71.8 74.5 A. A P?.7 8".8 81.8 87.7
23.5 37.2 47.9 78.7 97.7 92.8 112.0
5.2 5.2 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.8 5.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
61.2 81.7 106.7 120.4 151.3 159.7 165.3
5.4
91.8
201.2
4.6
87.1
217.8
5.6 4.8
100.0 100.0
204.3 225.5
6.6
93.1
496.4
3.7
81.7
121.9
5.7 5.5
100.0 100.0
420.1 157.3
Oils
Yams
MB
%H
Rs.
MB
%H
Rs.
Fruits MB
%H
Rs.
Milk MB
%H
Rs.
Vegetables MB
%H
Rs.
Other MB
%H
Rs.
1.3 1.8 2.1 2.6 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.0 1.6 2.2
74.4 90.2 79.5 86.4 79.7 98.2 94.7 91.8 82.0 72.4 86.0
15.7 29.0 40.8 57.5 38.7 70.1 80.4 97.5 93.7 111.5 51.5
.4 .4 .8 .6 .4 .9 .8 1.2 .6 .8 .7
15.4 37.3 54.5 40.7 33.8 69.1 45.6 55.1 35.9 55.2 44.3
5.0 6.9 15.4 12.5 10.6 24.2 26.0 44.4 25.9 57.9 20.9
.02 .1 .09 .2 .3 .2 .2 .4 .5 .9 .3
2.5 21.5 9.1 17.3 27.1 20.0 14.0 20.4 38.5 48.3 20.7
.2 2.6 1.3 3.3 6.5 3.9 5.2 14.0 22.4 68.4 9.8
2.3 .8 1.3 1.2 1.2 2.5 1.1 1.9 1.9 3.7 1.7
38.4 23.5 29.5 23.4 25.4 60.0 26.3 34.6 51.2 82.7 36.4
27.3 13.2 25.9 27.1 29.9 71.4 36.6 71.9 88.1 288.5 56.0
5.5 5.6 6.3 6.3 5.3 4.7 5.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
7.5 8.1 8.5 8.0 9.6 10.6 12.0
5.2 5.7 6.1 5.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
8.8 12.3 11.1 9.4
* M = Mean Budget Share (%)
%H = Percent of Household Consuming This Good
Rs. - No. of Rupees Per Capita Per Year on This Commodity
* Rupees per Capita Per Year
Food
Categoryv
Below 1414-
1414** 1739
Cateaorv
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Table 9 -- Quantities Consumed Annually. and Percent of Total Calories and Protein Provided By
15 Food Commodity Groups, Urban Sector
Expenditure Deciles
Food Below 1414- 1739- 2037- 2270- 2583- 2919- 3389- 4048- Above
Category 1414" 1739 2037 2270 2583 2919 3389 4048 5202 5202 Average
Rice
Iy (lb) 124.8 157.1 178.9 188.7 191.4 218.4 216.3 221.9 226.4 223.9 201.8%CAL 47.2 46.6 47.4 45.8 43.1 46.4 42.9 42.0 39.6 33.4 41.8
SPRO 44.0 43.0 42.8 40.4 37.7 40.6 37.2 35.8 33.8 27.5 36.5
Wheat
Oiy (1b) 7.2 13.2 11.8 17.8 20.3 11.6 12.7 13.2 13.8 14.5 13.7
%CAL 2.7 3.5 2.9 3.6 4.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.6
%PRO 3.6 4.6 3.7 4.5 5.6 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.5 3.3
Coconut
ty7(no) 45.9 55.0 60.4 67.4 72.5 79.8 84.7 90.3 96.7 101.1 80.8%CAL 16.8 16.1 15.4 15.7 15.8 16.6 16.5 16.6 16.4 15.0 15.9%PRO 7.5 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.6 5.6 6.5
Bread
Qty (lb) 46.7 59.9 56.8 70.5 65.4 63.5 76.9 80.8 89.1 105.5 77.3%CAL 13.0 13.4 11.1 12.7 11.5 10.2 11.4 11.4 12.0 12.4 11.9SPRO 17.3 17.4 14.6 16.2 14.4 12.5 14.4 14.0 14.6 14.6 14.8
Condiments
ty-7(oz) 269.3 324.6 381.4 384.0 391.0 466.2 537.9 533.0 567.7 697.2 497.9%CAL 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.2
%PRO 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9
PulsesQty (lb) 2.3 2.3 4.5 5.1 6.2 6.7 6.1 11.1 9.5 14.0 8.0%CAL 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.6 2.0 1.5SPRO 2.4 1.8 3.1 3.2 4.1 3.8 3.1 5.2 4.3 5.1 3.9
Other Grains
ty (b) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.62 0.53 0.17 0.17 1.55 0.49SCAL 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.4 1.8 1.5 2.0 3.1 1.6%PRO 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.9 3.2 1.6
Heat
Ty (l b) 1.7 2.9 1.7 4.7 6.7 4.5 8.3 9.8 10.1 23.0 9.6%CAL 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0%PRO 1.9 2.5 1.4 3.4 4.2 2.8 4.6 5.1 5.4 9.3 .9
Fish
Wy (1b) 14.8 17.5 25.1 25.1 27.4 35.7 38.4 35.8 41.4 45.0 33.5%CAL 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.9
%PRO 11.7 11.0 12.7 12.4 12.9 15.15 14.5 12.7 13.2 11.5 12.7
Sugar
Qty (oz) 174.9 240.9 267.9 298.2 374.7 371.2 439.2 453.6 533.1 641.7 427.5%CAL 5.2 5.7 6.3 6.6 7.8 6.9 7.2 7.2 8.5 9.9 7.6
%PRO 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.8
Oils
wy (oz) 2.0 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.7 4.2 5.2 5.6 7.0 9.1 5.5%CAL 3.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 4.6 3.8 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.9 4.6
%PRO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Yams
0y (1b) 6.9 8.3 7.6 8.4 9.5 9.4 12.9 13.5 14.1 18.9 12.3%CAL 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
%PRO 0.4 0.4 0.31 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.45 3.8
FruitsQty (1b) 3.0 3.6 2.9 5.1 8.0 11.1 12.7 24.5 21.0 69.1 23.7%CAL 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.0%PRO 0.1 0.11 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.4 0.5
Milk
otly - - - - - - - - - - -SCAL 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.9 2.6SPRO 2.4 3.5 5.2 4.6 6.1 5.4 6.2 7.7 8.8 10.6 6.9
Vegetables
y 32.1 36.5 44.9 46.8 55.6 65.5 62.9 68.1 80.7 89.1 64.2%CAL 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3
%PRO 2.0 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.9 5.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Others
-Wy- - - - - - - - - - - -SCAL 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8
%PRO 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3
*Rupees per capita per year
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Table 10 -- Quantities Consumed Annually, and Percent of Total Calories and Protein Provided by
15 Food Commodity Groups, Rural Sector
Expenditure Deciles
Food Below 1414- 1739- 2037- 2270- 2583- 2919- 3389- 4048- Above
Category 1414** 1739 2037 2270 2583 2919 3389 4048 5202 5202 Average
Rice
Vy (1b) 155.4 201.2 218.4 234.1 254.2 274.3 294.1 307.4 340.5 354.1 258.8SCAL 53.9 53.3 51.6 51.0 50.8 50.5 48.8 48.3 46.8 41.3 50.0
%PRO 54.6 52.8 50.1 48.9 48.7 48.4 45.6 45.0 42.9 37.3 47.8
Wheat
Qy (1b) 7.6 10.6 12.6 15.2 15.3 15.9 17.7 13.8 18.5 13.9 14.0
%CAL 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.6 1.6 2.7
%PRO 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.7 2.9 3.3 2.1 3.6
Coconut
tyT (no) 56.2 71.4 81.3 87.6 97.1 105.1 116.6 122.7 144.7 168.4 102.3
%CAL 18.9 18.4 18.5 18.3 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 19.1 18.8 18.7
%PRO 9.1 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.3 8.0 8.4
$read
y (1b) 17.7 23.1 31.5 29.4 35.1 34.7 35.9 45.8 46.8 63.3 35.3
CAL 4.5 4.6 5.7 4.9 5.3 4.8 4.5 5.6 4.9 6.2 5.0
%PRO 6.4 6.3 7.8 6.6 7.1 6.5 5.9 7.2 6.3 7.7 6.8
Condiments
Uty (oz) 255.5 342.6 375.3 430.3 484.3 524.4 583.9 624.9 738.4 913.5 511.1
%CAL 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.1
%PRO 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.3
Pulses
4ty (lb) 2.2 4.3 5.0 5.9 6.9 7.9 10.3 10.5 14.1 19.0 8.2
%CAL 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.4
%PRO 2.2 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6 4.5 5.2 5.9 4.0
Other Grains
Uty (1b) 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.5 2.3 0.85 6.3 1.0 0.57 1.7 2.9
%CAL 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.2
SPRO 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.1 0.8 2.3 1.2
Neat
y (lb) .71 .91 1.4 1.8 2.5 2.8 3.8 4.8 7.5 12.4 3.5
%CAL .1 .2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.4
%PRO .7 .7 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.1 4.4 1.8
Fish
Wty (1b) 9.4 14.3 17.6 21.1 23.5 25.6 33.4 33.4 44.6 55.0 26.6
%CAL 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.2
%PRO 8.1 9.4 10.6 11.3 11.1 11.4 12.7 12.4 13.5 13.5 11.3
k (oz) 150.9 220.6 269.5 297.9 316.8 379.5 433.1 439.3 539.9 681.3 360.0
%CAL 4.3 4.9 5.6 6.1 5.6 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.8 7.8 5.9
%PRO 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.8
Oi s
1Fy (oz) 1.6 2.3 3.0 3.2 4.0 4.7 5.0 5.7 7.1 9.2 4.4
CAL 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.6 3.4
%PRO - - - - - - - - - - -
Yams
0y (lb) 19.0 18.7 16.3 19.3 17.7 20.0 21.4 21.4 25.8 30.8 20.7
%CAL 2.0 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3
%PRO 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8
FruitsUty (lb) 4.9 5.5 9.0 8.4 10.9 12.1 19.5 24.0 32.2 52.9 16.6%CAL 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 2.1 0.7
%PRO 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.4
Milk
%CAL 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.1
%PRO 1.7 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.8 4.0 4.7 5.2 6.3 3.6
Veiitables
y (Ib) 46.2 62.5 67.6 74.2 78.9 84.1 99.2 95.0 111.3 148.4 84.3
%CAL 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.5
%PRO 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.5
Others
%CAL 2.4 3.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2
%PRO 3.3 3.0 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.7
**Rupees per capita per year
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Table 11 -- Quantities Consumed Annually, and Percent of Total Calories and Protein Provided by
15 Food Comodity Groups, Estate Sector
Expenditure Deciles
Food Below 1414- 1739- 2037- 2270- 2583- 2919- 3389- 4048- Above
Category 1414" 1739 2037 2270 2583 2919 3389 4048 5202 5202 Average
Rice
tFy (Ib) 140.7 181.8 236.3 222.5 264.9 282.7 289.5 332.5 299.6 415.5 259.1
CAL 48.7 49.1 55.8 46.7 49.8 47.1 47.0 43.6 38.1 42.6 47.5
%PRO 44.6 45.8 54.6 43.6 46.4 43.7 44.6 39.2 33.8 38.2 54.6
Wheat
Wyi (lb) 51.2 73.4 46.9 75.5 62.1 78.1 77.0 120.9 124.3 36.7 75.2
CAL 17.0 19.6 10.3 15.3 11.6 12.9 11.4 14.8 14.6 4.5 13.6
%PRO 22.4 25.4 13.9 20.0 15.4 16.7 15.7 19.1 18.4 5.7 3.9
CoconutQty (no) 45.9 54.1 68.1 71.3 86.4 87.7 103.7 113.3 128.8 171.9 87.7%CAL 15.6 14.2 15.1 14.4 15.0 14.1 16.0 15.0 16.3 17.4 15.1
%PRO 6.7 6.3 7.1 6.4 6.9 6.1 7.1 6.3 7.1 7.1 6.7
Bread
ty (1b) 9.7 5.1 7.6 22.7 16.5 29.7 26.8 47.9 38.1 54.7 23.9
%CAL 2.4 0.9 1.2 3.6 2.3 3.7 3.3 6.7 3.4 4.9 3.0
%PRO 3.3 1.3 1.8 4.6 3.1 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.7 6.1 4.0
Condiments
Cty (oz) 232.2 302.3 326.6 386.7 436.5 478.9 514.8 580.0 774.3 903.1 462.2
%CAL 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.2 1.9
%PRO 3.9 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.4 4.0 3.7
Pulses
ty (lb) 2.0 7.3 4.5 8.7 8.7 10.5 8.6 15.5 18.5 19.0 9.7
%CAL 0.6 1.8 1.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.6
%PRO 1.7 4.9 3.0 4.9 4.6 5.0 3.8 5.1 6.0 5.6 4.5
Other Grains
Qty (1b) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.75 0.0 0.41 0.0 0.0 0.13
%CAL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
%PRO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
Meat
--Oy (lb) 1.4 0.0 0.99 1.8 1.5 2.8 3.8 6.1 9.3 5.2 2.9
CAL 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.3
%PRO 1.9 0.0 7.3 1.3 1.1 1.8 2.2 2.2 3.8 3.4 1.6
FishGiy (lb) 3.9 5.5 7.3 11.4 16.6 14.5 19.4 22.0 26.3 54.3 15.9
%CAL 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.4 1.3
%PRO 3.6 5.1 5.0 6.4 8.6 6.1 7.3 7.9 9.3 13.5 7.0
Sugarty (oz) 140.8 172.1 226.1 249.7 306.4 345.3 371.8 433.3 494.4 870.0 328.6
%CAL 3.6 3.4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.7 5.4 5.9 6.6 10.0 4.9
%PRO 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.3 2.4 0.6
oils
y (oz) 1.4 2.9 3.3 5.3 4.4 7.6 7.3 7.8 10.8 13.8 5.9
CAL 2.2 3.2 3.3 4.8 3.5 5.4 4.8 4.4 5.8 6.0 4.3
bPRO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Yams
y (lb) 14.0 5.3 14.8 9.9 9.3 18.1 15.3 24.5 22.4 18.5 14.5
CAL 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8
%PRO 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Fruits
ty (lb) 3.5 3.1 3.1 8.1 14.0 2.5 9.4 4.5 14.2 28.8 8.0
CAL 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2
%PRO 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1
*ilk
ty - - - - - - - - - - -%CAL 1.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.6 2.6 1.2
%PRO 5.2 1.8 2.8 2.9 2.7 5.2 3.8 3.3 3.9 7.9 3.6
51.0 60.2 73.0 93.9 91.3 98.5 112.9 81.5 135.5 175.2 92.6
CAL 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.6 4.1 1.6 1.4 0.7 2.1 1.2 1.8
%PRO 2.9 2.1 2.8 2.8 4.1 2.5 2.7 1.5 2.8 2.2 2.7
Others
~ y 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAL 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 3.2 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.4
%PRO 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.7 3.3 2.7 2.8 2.5 3.0
**Rupees per capita per year
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the diets of all Sri Lankans, regardless of sector or income levels.
In the rural sector, where nearly 80 percent of the population lives,
the next most important commodity in terms of budget share and calorie
contribution is coconuts. Like rice, coconut is included in the food
basket of virtually all Sri Lankan households. The importance of this
finding concerning the dietary importance of rice and coconuts is
emphasized because policy concerning these commodities will not only
determine overall levels of nutrient intake, but because rice and
coconuts are the two most important agricultural commodities produced
in Sri Lanka. Thus, they directly link the production and consumption
ends of the food system. Their dual role in policy formation is
therefore emphasized, and will be discussed in greater detail in the
next chapter.
Besides rice and coconuts, some other commodities make up impor-
tant proportions of the household food basket. Amongst these are
bread (especially for the urban sector), wheat flour (especially for
the estate sector), and sugar, which along with rice and coconuts
represent more than 80 percent of the household calorie intake (see
Tables 9 to 11). Note, however, that these commodities make up a much
smaller share of total food expenditures (see Tables 6 to 8). This
indicates that while they are the major source of calories, other food
commodities, whether it be protein-rich animal foods or vitamin and
mineral-rich condiments and fruits, also play an important role in the
Sri Lankan diet. The sole consideration in food purchases is
obviously not just to consume an adequate number of calories.
Despite the fact that previous analyses of food consumption para-
meters in Sri Lanka have aggregated bread and wheat into a single
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commodity group, 1 the fact is that the patterns of consumption of
these commodities are different. Wheat flour which is used to make
chapatis among the ethnic Tamils represents an important expenditure
item in the estate sector. This is not the case in the urban sector,
where bread is an increasingly important staple commodity and wheat is
of marginal importance. The move to the city is also accompanied by
an increase in bread consumption relative to rice. Changing tastes
and preferences which accompany urbanization is due to a combination
of factors. These include the convenience of ready-to-eat bread, emu-
lation of Western diets, and greater access to baked products.
Condiments, including chillies, onions and garlic are also an
especially interesting food group because they are the fourth largest
food expenditure item on an All-Island basis (behind rice, coconuts,
and sugar). However, relative to their share of total food expendi-
tures, they provide a disproportionately small share of calories and
protein in the diet. Culturally determined patterns of highly sea-
soned food remains an important food policy consideration in Sri Lanka.
Other important findings include the fact that with rising income
there is an expected increase in the quantity of consumption, as well
as budget shares, of high-quality protein-rich foods (meat, milk, and
most important, fish). For example, notice how the consumption of
meat products increased almost thirty-fold over the income range in
the rural sector; or how the budget share increased by 400 percent.
Similarly, the budget share for milk increases by nearly 200 percent
1 M. Yetley and S. Tun, "Household Demand Analysis for Assessing
Nutritional Impact of Development Programs," IED Staff Report
(Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1981), pp. 35-50.
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from the lowest to highest income groups in the urban areas, as the
percent of households which are consumers rises from less than 20 to
almost 90. Similarly, at all levels of income, more of these high
quality, low calorie efficient foods (based on calories provided per
rupee) are consumed in the urban areas. For example, three times more
meat is consumed in the urban than rural sector. The partial excep-
tion is fish consumption, which is only slightly higher in the urban
areas than rural areas. This once again explains the higher calorie
price observed earlier, and portends a greater risk of calorie inade-
quacy for low-income urban consumers.
A further point to be made in regard to the data is that for vir-
tually all commodity groups a larger absolute quantity is consumed by
households at the higher end of the income distribution. Thus, any
moderation of commodity prices for major staple foods (e.g., rice,
flour, oil, sugar, etc.) will in fact result in a larger absolute
transfer of income to the rich than the poor. Although the poor will
be helped more, relative to their needs, there would be a high econo-
mic cost in reaching those in need through an untargeted food subsidy.
This suggests searching for self-targeting commodities, such as low-
quality wheat flour or a mixture with cassava which will only be
acceptable by the poor.
Some potentially disconcerting findings in regard to the consump-
tion of "poor people's food" are also noted. First is the extremely
low level of consumption of pulses, a potentially low-cost protein
source. Likewise, yams (i.e., roots and tubers), which represent a
potentially low-cost calorie source with inferior properties which are
self-targeting to the poor, are consumed in only small quantities. In
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fact, if costly white potatoes, which are rapidly becoming a favored
commodity, are excluded from this category, its value in terms of
dietary contribution and budget share becomes negligable, even among
the poor. Also, there are only minute amounts of other cereals (i.e.,
corn, millet, sorghum) consumed in the rural sector and virtually none
in the urban and estate sectors. This leads one to conjecture that
the potential for coarse grains, both as an income source to poor far-
mers on marginal lands and as a self-targeting poor people's food, has
not been exploited.
An examination of the relative prices of starchy staples and the
calories per rupee they supply, however, makes it apparent that
consumers are acting rationally and wisely in terms of nutrition by
not diversifying their diet to other starchy staples such as coarse
grains and roots and tubers (see Table 12). It is unreasonable to
expect or suggest that a consumer choose to consume manioc or sweet
potato over rice or wheat, given the nature of their preference
ordering, especially when rice and wheat supply more calories per
rupee expended. In fact, when one considers the low amount of protein
per rupee from sweet potato and manioc, it is apparent that consumers
are making the correct decision based on nutritional considerations.
Therefore, any diversification of the diet or introduction of self-
targeting subsidy schemes will clearly have to be preceded by an
adjustment in relative market prices.
To amplify, during the early 1970s the performance of the sub-
sidiary food crop sector was aided by protectionist policies which
embargoed imports of these commodities. One of the consequences of
the liberalization of the economy in the late 1970s was to allow
-44-
Table 12 -- Calories per Rupee Supplied by Starchy Staples
Pri cea
(Rs./100 gms)
1981
Calories
per 100
grams
Protein
(gr.) per
100 gms.
Calories
/Rupee
1981
Protein
(gr.)/Rupee
1981
Rice
Wheat
Kurakkan
(Millet)
Sweet Potato
Manioc
Cowpea
Green Gram
a Calculated from prices given in:
Prices, 1979-1981, Department of
Plan Implementation, Colombo, Sri
Bulletin of Selected Retail
Census and Statistics, Ministry of
Lanka, 1982.
b Assumes only 85 percent of original weight is edible.
0.62
0.58
0.53
0.371
0.249
1.22
1.62
346
348
341
102b
133b
323
348
7.5
11
9.5
1.02
1.10
24
24
563
600
643
271
534
267
215
12.10
18.97
17.92
2.74
4.44
19.67
14.81
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imports of cheaper minor food crops. Eroding profit margins coupled
with other factors such as non-availability of institutional credit
for small farmers (partially due to the withdrawal of Central Bank
guarantees to commercial banks lending to small farmers), and the
conversion of existing chena (unirrigated highland) into paddylands as
a result of the Mahaweli development scheme have discouraged produc-
tion of subsidiary food crops. In addition, almost all agricultural
research has been focused on rice, neglecting other food crops. In
combination, these factors had a deleterious impact on the production
of coarse grains and roots and tubers during the late 1970s and early
1980s, the period covered by the survey. 1 There is some preliminary
evidence that trends such as a halving of the tons of cassava produced
between 1977 and 1980 are reversing. However, the paucity of infor-
mation on this crops is considered another example of the "benign
neglect" that policy makers have exhibited towards this sector. 2
There is a clear need to explore more fully the potential for sub-
sidiary crops as a source of income for the poor; of more importance
is the need to consider the possibility of subsidizing self-targeting
foods such as cassava or other roots and tubers as a way of reaching
the hungry. Measures to encourage increased production through price
support schemes for such commodities and agricultural research and
extension to enhance the economic viability of their production need
further exploration.
1 R. Ratnayake, Subsidiary Food Crops in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Sri
Lanka: Department of Treasury, 1980).
2 E. Thorbecke and J. Svejnar, "Effects of Macroeconomic Policies on
Agricultural Performance in Sri Lanka," prepared for the OEDC
Development Center (Paris, 1984) pp. 100-103.
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NUTRIENT INTAKE
This section examines the implications of consumption patterns on
dietary intake. Before doing so, two important limitations are empha-
sized. First, the level of analysis will be the household.
Throughout it will be assumed that nutrients available will be distri-
buted equitably to all family members. This is done understanding the
shortcomings of this approach. In fact, households often favor cer-
tain members who have preferential access to food. There is evidence
of systematic patterns within cultures which dictate which household
members are likely to be favored or discriminated against in the
distribution of limited food resources. Limited empirical data indi-
cates that despite women and children being at greater nutritional
risk, they may often be discriminated against because their economic
contribution is perceived to be less than males and adults. 1
According to Rogers, 2 the evidence of discrimination against women and
children comes mostly from Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where women's
economic roles are more explicit, the literature reports a more ambi-
guous and varying picture where women often consume a proportional
amount of calories in respect to their requirements. Despite it being
unrealistic to assume perfectly equitable intra-household distribution
of resources, the generalization that men and male children are always
favored defies the evidence.3 Therefore, the analysis will proceed
1 B. Rogers, "The Internal Dynamics of Households: A Critical Factor
in Development Policy, (Medford, MA: Tufts University, 1983)
pp. 18-20.
2 Ibid., pp. 18-22.
3 Op. cit., Lipton, pp. 50-57.
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acknowledging the drawbacks of using the household as the unit of ana-
lysis.
A second limitation of the data which follow is that there is
considerable inter and intra-individual variation in the requirement
for nutrients. Some of this is a function of genetic factors; other
variation results from exogeneous factors such as level of physical
activity, health status, climate, and so forth. 1 Despite this known
variability, it will once again be assumed that certain population
norms can be applied to all households. These standards may not be
appropriate for judging the well-being of an individual. They are
useful, however, for examining the status of population groups.
Calorie and Protein Intake
The first step in the analysis involves the conversion of the
units in which the quantities of commodities consumed are reported
into nutrient equivalents which can be used to examine the nutritional
implications of dietary consumption. Each household consumption
record included over 200 potential food commodities. As a first step,
the calorie and protein equivalents of each of these commodities per
unit was determined. These were then multiplied by the quantity con-
sumed and summed over all the commodities to determine household
calorie and protein intake.2
1 World Health Organization, Energy and Protein Requirements, (Draft)
Report of a Joint FAO/WHO/UNU Meeting (Geneva, forthcoming)
pp. 46-71.
2 Specifically, the following formulas were used (see next page):
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With the specific data converted into calorie and protein values,
it is possible to examine the levels of nutrient intake and identify
population groups at greatest risk. Household calorie intake is often
divided by household size to determine per capita values. This method
will provide a biased value to the extent that the age and sex com-
position of the households are not the same. Given that poorer house-
holds are larger and have a greater number of children relative to
adults, the use of per capita calorie and protein estimates would
2 continued from previous page:
and
where
The v
220
Dcj = .Qi j x Vi x Ei x Ci
1=1
220
Dp = I Qij x Vi x Ei x Pi
1=1
Dcj = Calorie consumption for household j,
Qij = Quantity of commodity i reported to be consumed by
household j in a given week in the units used in the
questionnaire (e.g., pounds of rice, number of coco-
nuts, bottles of vegetable oil).
Vi = Factor to convert the quantity reported into units for
which there are available nutrient equivalents in food
consumption tables (e.g., no. of coconuts multiplied by
3.408 equals the number of ounces or pounds of coconut
consumed).
Ei = The percent edible portion of commodity i (e.g., 80
percent of the carrot, 100 percent of wheat).
Ci = Calorie value per unit given in Sri Lankan food con-
sumption tables.
Dpj = Protein consumption for household j.
Pi = Protein value per unit given in Sri Lankan food con-
sumption tables.
alues for Vi, Ei, C1, and Pi are given in Appendix A.
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result in a bias which overstates the population variance in nutrient
distribution. Poor households would look worse off then they are, and
wealthy households relatively better off than in reality.
The solution was to compute adult equivalency units for each
household. Each family member was transformed into a fraction of an
adult equivalent unit (AEU) based on their age and sex. The basis for
doing so were the 1973 FAO/WHO recommended calorie requirements for
moderately active persons. These AEU values are found in Table 13.
For example, female children between three and four years old repre-
sent 0.51 AEU. The AEUs for each household were summed across house-
holds and serve as the denominator, with household calorie intake as
the numerator, in calorie values reported henceforth.
This procedure still has a major drawback which should be
recognized. The FAO/WHO standards assume that adult members of the
household are of a normal body weight. To the extent that the adult
suffered from stunting during childhood, the assumption that an adult
should be regarded as an adult equivalent unit is incorrect. Ideally,
if body weight were available, each individual's requirements would be
computed taking them into account, rather than just sex and age.
Since the data were not available, and undoubtably stunting is
widespread, it should be recognized that for most households in Sri
Lanka, dietary requirements based on the household's achievement of
100 percent of calorie intake per AEU are overstated.
This is discussed further in the next section on calorie adequacy.
However, the use of the calorie and protein intake data per AEU is
instructive for the purpose of making comparisons among population
Table 13 -- Table for Calculating Adult Equivalent Consumption Unit:
Based on the Recommended Energy Requirements by Moderately
Active Persons Given by the FA0/WHO
Age (year)
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-12 13-15 16-19 Adult
Male 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.87 0.97 1.02 1.00
Female 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.77 0.73
Source: P. Trairatvorakul, "Rice Price Policy and Equity Considerations in Thailand,"
Draft Report (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1983) pp. 7-17.
CD
I
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groups. For example, calories and protein intake per AEU, by expen-
diture deciles and sector, are reported in Tables 14 and 15. There
is a marked increase in calorie and protein intake with rising per
capita expenditures. For a given expenditure group, the estate sector
has the highest level of calorie and protein intake, followed by the
rural sector, with the urban sector having the lowest average level of
intake. This can be attributed to the data presented above that the
food share is highest in the estate areas, and that the calorie price
is highest in the cities because they consume a different bundle of
goods. It is also worthwhile considering that to some extent this
inter-sectoral difference reflects an adaptation to the relatively
higher energy needs of the estate sector. Almost all workers on the
plantations are engaged in occupations with high levels of physical
activity. In addition, the number of laborers per household is higher
than the other sectors. The higher altitude and colder climate in the
estates also increases energy requirements significantly.
Furthermore, the evidence of a poor sanitary environment and lower
levels of education than in other sectors, combined with less access
and utilization of primary health care services, result in a greater
sharing of nutrients with parasites. Thus, higher activity levels, a
different climate, and poorer utilization of available nutrients than
found elsewhere undoubtably combine to raise dietary requirements in
the estate sector. Thus, caution is advised in interpreting the
health and nutritional consequences of the consumption data.
It is also interesting to note (from Tables 14 and 15) that the
rate of increase in protein intake, which accompanies higher expen-
ditures levels, is more rapid than for calories. This is supported by
-52-
Table 14 -- Average Daily Calorie Consumption per Adult Equivalency Unit,
by Expenditure Group and Sector
Per Capita
Expenditures
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average Calories Consumed Per Adult Equivalency Unit
Urban Rural Estate All-Island
1477
1853
2099
2282
2375
2517
2678
2816
3082
3372
2629aTotal
1613
2076
2309
2525
2696
2914
3211
3339
3765
4248
2807a
1564
2088
2322
2717
2864
3314
3272
3935
4269
4104
2994a
1587
2047
2280
2525
2661
2890
3124
3286
3627
3877
a If household size rather than AEUs were used as the denominator,
the mean calorie intake for the urban, rural, estate, and all-
island populations would be 2096, 2257, 2400, and 2240, respec-
tively. As a general rule of thumb, AEU values are 25 percent
higher than per capita values. In cases where data on household
composition are not available, this conversion factor can be used
instead.
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Table 15 -- Average Daily Protein Consumption per Adult Equivalency Unit,
by Expenditure Group and Sector
Per Capita
Expenditures
(Deciles)
Average
Urban
Proteins (gms)
Rural
Consumed Per Adult Equivalency Unit
Estate All-Island
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
34.7
44.2
50.9
56.1
59.5
63.2
67.6
72.6
78.9
90.0
34.9
46.3
52.2
57.8
61.9
66.7
75.8
78.5
90.3
103.4
37.3
49.9
52.4
65.7
68.0
78.2
74.8
54.1
104.3
103.5
67.0 65.0 71.0
35.1
46.4
52.0
58.9
62.2
67.4
74.3
78.8
88.9
97.9
66.1Total
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the simple log-log quadratic calorie and protein demand functions in
Table 16. The variable definitions are found in Appendix B. The
household size variables, the ratio of adult equivalents to household
size, the price index, the number of income earners, and the dummy
variable for farmers, are simply included to control for differences
in the composition of households. Although these models will be
explained and redefined considerably in the following chapter, they
are included at this juncture to show that increases in expenditure
levels are accompanied by a larger increase in protein than calorie
intake, and that lower-income households have considerably higher
nutrient elasticities than those at the high end of the income distri-
bution. Specifically, this is illustrated by computing the expen-
diture elasticities of demand for calories and proteins for five
income levels and three sectors (see Table 17). For both equations,
the elasticities for the lowest expenditure group are high and fall
dramatically at the upper end of the income distribution. However,
the protein elasticities are higher than the calorie elasticities for
all expenditure groups in all sectors. 1 Thus, any marginal increases
in income will be accompanied by a relatively greater increase in pro-
tein than calorie intake. The implication of this for food policy in
general and consumption analysis in specific is worth pondering.
During the 1960s, eliminating protein deficiency was the driving
force behind those interested in world hunger problems. Gradually, an
1 The significance of the ESTX and URBX dummy variables indicate that
the calorie intake of those in the estate sector is significantly
more, and the urban sector is significantly less, responsive to
income changes than the rural sectors. These data further add cre-
dence to the fact that the urban poor are more nutritionally
vulnerable than those in the rural and estate sectors.
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Table 16 -- Demand Functions for Calories and Protein
Dependent Variable
Independent
Variable Ln(Calories/AEU) Ln(Protei n/AEU)
Intercept
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
AEURAT
HHSIZE
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
HHSX
EARNERS
D1
PRINDEX
R2 = 0.71
-6.98
3.41
(28.9)
-0.17
(24.2)
-0.98
(26.74)
0.4
(6.69)
0.48
(4.58)
-0.70
(3.14)
-0.08
(5.87)
0.10
(3.59)
0.14
(6.69)
0.00
(0.08)
-0.01
(1.51)
-0.64
(29.0)
-12.24
3.73
(30.60)
-0.18
(25.31)
-1.21
(32.06)
0.17
(7.68)
0.57
(5.31)
-0.46
(2.0)
-0.08
(7.68)
0.07
(2.55)
-0.02
(7.68)
0.00
(0.83)
0.00
(0.93)
-0.67
(29.40)
R2 = 0. 68
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Table 17 -- Expenditure Elasticities for Calories
Expenditure Class
Lowesti Lowb Middlei Highd Higheste Average
Urban 0.82 0.67 0.59 0.52 0.21 0.58
Rural 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.29 0.66
Estate 1.00 0.85 0.77 0.64 0.39 0.76
Expenditure Elasticities for Protein
Expenditure Class
Lowest Low Middle High Highest Average
Urban 0.93 0.82 0.73 0.59 0.30 0.71
Rural 1.01 0.90 0.81 0.67 0.38 0.79
Estate 1.08 0.98 0.89 0.75 0.58 0.87
a 1st decile of the expenditure distribution.
b 3rd decile of the expenditure distribution.
c 5th decile of the expenditure distribution.
d 7th decile of the expenditure distribution.
e 10th decile of the expenditure distribution.
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evolution of thinking led to an idea in good currency during the 1970s
that energy, not protein, was the most serious dietary problem in
developing countries. 1 This change was a result of the FAO/WHO Expert
Committee lowering dietary protein requirements in the early 1970s.
It led to the contention that protein deficits will disappear during
the course of achieving adequate energy balance. As with all dogma,
the wisdom of the 1970s is now being challenged in light of recent
research which suggests that adult protein requirements have been set
too low.2  However, regardless of whether protein deficiency is or is
not a more serious dietary- problem than calories, it is apparent that
economic measures to increase calorie consumption will synchroneously
eliminate protein deficiencies. Simply, as a consequence of the
higher marginal propensity to consume protein than calories, any addi-
tional food expenditures will bring about a faster rate of increase in
protein than calorie consumption. Therefore, the remainder of the
analysis will be centered around the effects of food consumption beha-
vior on calorie intake, understanding full well that protein deficits
cannot be ignored; although it is presumed they too will disappear in
the course of raising levels of energy intake.
Dietary Adequacy
To begin the process of examining the adequacy of diets in Sri
Lanka, cut-off points which delineate deficient households are
required. As intimated above, these cut-off points are a source of
1 D. McClaren, "The Current Protein Fiasco," The Lancet 2 (1974).
2 Op. cit., WHO, pp. 46-71.
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considerable controversy. While the recent FAO/WHO/UNU Expert
Committee have reached concensus on recommended calorie and protein
requirements, the appropriate calorie figures remain a source of con-
tention. 1 This disagreement is most severe concerning the issues of
inter and intra-personal variation in dietary requirements, 2 and the
ability to adapt to, and hence the functional consequences of not
achieving, recommended levels of intake. 3 Given the need to avoid
becoming embroiled in such a debate, the 1973 FAO/WHO standards of
2530 calories for a male adult were used in the context of this study.
However, in light of the continuing controversy concerning issues
related to inter and intra-household variation in requirements, dif-
ferent percentages of the requirement are used as cut-off points in
the analysis which follows.
In Figures 2 through 4 and Table 18, the percent of households not
consuming adequate amounts of calories are presented by expenditure
levels. Two levels of calorie adequacy are presented. The first is
those not achieving 100 percent of the 1973 FAO/WHO recommended
allowances; the second is those not achieving 80 percent of the
allowances. Given the discussion in the previous section on the fact
that the FAQ/WHO requirements assume that there has been no stunting
of growth in the population, which would lower requirements, the 100
1 Op. cit., Lipton, pp. 4-34.
2 T. Srinivasen, "Malnutrition: Some Measurement and Policy Issues,"
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 373 (Washington, D.C., 1980);
and P. Sukhatme and S. Margen, "Autoregulatory Homeostatic Nature
of Energy Balance," American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 35
(1982) pp. 355-365.
3 G. Beaton, "Energy in Human Nutrition: Perspectives and Problems,
Nutrition Reviews, 41 No. 11 (1983) pp. 325-340.
Figure 2 -- CALORIE ADEQUACT VS. PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE
URBAN SECTOR
A = Calorie Adequacy < 100 percent FAO/WHO Requirement
B - Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent FAO/WHO Requirement
C = Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent of FAO/WHO Requirement and Food Share 1 0.8
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Figure 3 -- CALORIE ADEQUACY VS. PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE
RURAL SECTOR
A = Calorie Adequacy < 100 percent FAO/WHO Requirement
B = Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent FA0/WHO Requirement
C - Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent FAO/WHO Requirement and Food Share > 0.8
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Figure 4 -- CALORIE ADEQUACT VS. PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE
ESTATE SECTOR
A = Calorie Adequacy < 100 percent FAO/WHO Requirement
B = Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent FAO/WHO Requirement
C = Calorie Adequacy < 80 percent FAO/WHO Requirement and Food Share > 0.8
CALADE
100 A
95
90 +
e5
so
70 +
A
65
60 +_-
I B - ---.------.-- - -___ -- -
~B
50
so +
- A
40 + A
35
A
30A
25+
20
A
10 B A
5 +
0 + C
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
. -- .PER~ CAPI TA EXPEND1TUfE
NOTES 3 OS HAD NISSING VALUES OR WERE OUT OF RANGE
Table 18 -- Percent Households Not Achieving 80
<100% Regs.
97.9
88.6
72.8
48.7
40.5
22.5
15.6
10.2
4.3
5.7
42.9
RURAL
<80% Reqs.,
and Food
<80% Regs. Share > 0.8
83.6 41.4
48.1 19.7
24.9 8.5
14.8 3.4
7.1 1.4
4.8 0.6
2.6 0.3
1.8 0.6
0.3 0
3.1 0.7
20.4 3.7
a Based on 1978 FAO/WHO Recommended Daily Allowances
URBAN ESTATE
Per Capita
Expenditure
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total
<100% Regs.
100
95.5
88.7
70.3
65.9
54.8
44.3
33.0
17.8
18.5
49.9
<80% Regs.
95.0
67.2
43.7
31.3
24.7
16.7
5.7
11.3
3.1
5.9
24.5
<80% Reqs.
and Food
Share >0.8
45.0
26.9
18.3
6.3
5.9
2.4
0
0.9
0
0
8.07
<100% Reqs.
100
94.1
61.4
28.4
39.0
1.8
3.5
2.0
0
0
32.6
<80% Regs.
84.6
31.4
18.2
6.2
6.8
1.8
0
0
0
0
13.3
<80% Reqs.
and Food.
Share > 0.8
28.2
11.8
4.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.8
and 100 Percent FA0/WHO Dietary Requirementsa
C M
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percent threshold undoubtably overstates real needs in Sri Lanka.
Since it is not possible to quantify real requirements because of lack
of data on weights, the 80 percent cut-off point should be considered
an equally valid point of reference. It is expected that in reality
the true requirements fall somewhere in between. But once again, the
main purpose herein is to enable comparisons between population
groups, not to provide an unambiguous number on the percent of hungry
people. As can be seen, virtually all the households in the lower
range of outlays do not consume an adequate level of calorie intake
according to both of these standards. This figure falls dramatically
in all three sectors with rising per capita expenditure levels.
However, in the urban sector it remains close to 20 percent for even
the wealthiest households.
Nationally, less than half the percentage of households with
calorie adequacy below 100 percent are also consuming less than 80
percent of the recommended allowances. What is interesting, however,
is that among poorer households, the number below 100 percent and 80
percent of calorie requirements is similar; as expenditures increase,
these figures diverge. The rate of decrease in households achieving
less than 80 percent adequacy is much more rapid. This once again
suggests that rising expenditures are accompanied by strenuous efforts
to increase calorie consumption above the 80 percent threshold. The
drive for households to reach FAO/WHO requirements does not seem
nearly so powerful. This intimates that either households do not
behave in a way that's best for their nutritional well-being, that
other expenditures on shelter, clothing, and transport are of com-
parable importance, or that the estimated dietary requirement for
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energy may in fact be too high.
Traditionally, economists use a food adequacy standard (FAS) to
measure poverty.1  The FAS is normally set at a level of income or
outlay which enables the household to purchase a diet which will be
sufficient for growth, work, recreation, immunological competence, and
basal metabolic activities. Nonetheless, poverty and malnutrition are
not synonymous. Some poor households do achieve calorie adequacy by
a combination of extremely efficient expenditure patterns and food
choices and/or reducing requirements through less infection, fewer
pregnancies, and other measures. Conversely, there are many house-
holds which have adequate resources but expend them inefficiently in
terms of achieving dietary adequacy. Lipton 2 discusses the complex
relationship between dietary adequacy and poverty. He proposes a new
distinction between "moderately poor" and "ultra-poor." The latter is
of special interest. It provides an index of households which are
unambiguously and seriously undernourished due to being caught in the
poverty trap. Specifically, "ultra-poverty" is defined as households
who spend 80 percent of their incomes on food (i.e., food share > 0.8)
and achieve less than 80 percent of the daily calorie requirements.
Given that a household faces other fixed expenditures, this group of
households spend virtually all available resources on food. Despite
such efforts, they do not achieve a sufficient number of calories.
These are the households which not only suffer the discomfort of
hunger pains, reduced working capacity and mental alertness, but also
1 N. Ahluwala et. al., "Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries,"
Journal of Development Economics September 1979, p.459.
2 Op. cit., Lipton, pp. 35-49.
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suffer serious health consequences. Moreover, they have virtually no
short-term recourse other than assistance from outside the household
to resolve their situation.
Eight percent of the Sri Lankan households in the urban and rural
sectors fall in this category of the ultra-poor (see Table 18). The
figure is around four percent in the estate sector. Interestingly,
considerably less than half of those households that consume below 80
percent of the requirement spend greater than 80 percent of their
resources on food (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). Some of the households
with calorie adequacy of less than 80 percent and food share less than
80 percent may have fixed non-food expenditures which are higher than
usual and vital to their well-being (e.g., health care costs,
transport to work). However, many others could reduce their level of
hunger by increasing outlays on food, if tastes and preferences could
be influenced.
Among the interesting questions concerning the ultra-poor is how
they are distinguished from what we will label as the nutritional at-
risk or moderately poor -- those households consuming less than 80 per-
cent of their calorie requirements, but spending less than 80 percent
of their incomes on food. The purpose in doing so is to explore
whether there are true discontinuities between the two groups, and
whether in fact it is a useful distinction.
In Table 19, one can note the significant differences between the
two populations in regard to a number of economic, demographic, and
social variables. The level of per capita expenditures among the
moderately poor is nearly a third higher than the ultra-poor, as is
the number of households falling in the lowest quartile of per capita
-66-
Table 19 -- Differences of Means Tests for the Ultra-Poor and the
Moderately Poor Who are Nutritionally At-Risk
Variable
1. Calorie per AEU
2. Per Capita Yearly
Expenditure
3. Household Size
4. Mother's Education
5. Father's Education
6. Amenities Index
7. P.C. Food Expendi-
ture
8. Foodshare
9. Total Land Holdings
10. Paddy Land Holdings
11. Highland Holdings
12. Percent Households
Headed by Female
13. Percent Households
with PCEXP <
R.167/month
14. Food Expenditures/
Calories
15. Household Size/
Income Earners
16. Number of Children
< 5 Years Old
Ultra-Poor
N=381
Mean Std
1629.4 291.98
1482.93
6.36
1.69
1.83
5.72
1251.60
.84
.78
.23
.55
0.15
649.15
2.30
0.88
0.97
1.82
590.99
.03
2.80
1.62
1.38
0.36
88.98 31.36
.98
4.49
.70
.60
2.32
.81
Nutritionally
At-Risk
(moderately poor)
N=613
Mean Std
1613.5 302.04
1942.25
5.92
1.92
2.06
7.11
1329.40
.71
.73
.24
.49
0.17
69.17
1.06
4.14
.60
1279.83
2.49
1.05
1.16
2.31
712.73
.08
1.44
.94
.83
0.38
46.22
0.87
2.25
T-Statistic
0.042
-7.32*
2.83*
-3.69*
-3.42*
-10. 55*
-1.86
13. 54*
0.33
-0.09
0.75
-0.91
8.04*
-1.75
2.34*
.85 1.94*
* Significant at 5 percent level.
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expenditures. As expected, the food share is markedly higher for the
ultra-poor, averaging around 84 percent. The moderately poor who are
nutritionally at-risk, on the average, use only 71 percent of their
total expenditures for food. The ultra-poor pay less rupees per
calorie, although the difference between them and other nutritionally
at-risk households is not statistically significant. The ultra-poor
also have significantly larger families, more children under five
years of age, and score lower on an amenities index. 1 They also have
a larger dependency ratio (i.e., household members/income earners)
than the moderately poor who are nutritionally at-risk.
Of perhaps the greatest interest, however, is that there is no
significant difference between the mean calorie intake of the two
groups. It therefore appears that there is a minimum calorie level
below which households will do everything possible given their re-
sources to raise their intake. Once this level is achieved there
indeed may be a slackening of efforts to increase calorie intake,
despite that it is insufficient according to accepted standards. This
corroborates the concept of an inflection point in the food-share Engel
function discussed earlier. From a policy perspective, this suggests
the need to distinguish between the ultra-poor and moderately poor who
are nutritionally at-risk. In the case of the former, income and
price-related interventions are clearly required. For the latter,
there may be considerable scope for education- and behavior-related
1 The amenities index was created on the basis of the household's
floor area, source of drinking water, type of cooker (e.g., gas,
kerosene, or electric), access to toilet facilities, and household
appliances (e.g., radios and refrigerators). Scores were assigned
according to these amenities, which were summed up for individual
households.
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projects.
COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS SURVEYS
Before proceeding with further data analysis, it is instructive to
compare some of the results presented above with those from previous
surveys. In Table 20, data on food share by expenditure deciles is
presented. Among the households in the lowest expenditure deciles,
the food share is higher than those found in 1969/70. This difference
increases with the upper expenditure deciles. These data represent a
poignant indicator of a deterioration in welfare across the entire
range of incomes. The fact that the food share among the poor has not
increased as much as those in the upper income deciles is regarded as
an indicator that their non-food expenditures are compressed to their
limit: further losses in real income eat directly into their food
basket.
To test this idea, in Table 21 there is a comparison of per
capita (as opposed to per adult equivalency unit) calorie and protein
intake of the 1980/81 survey with the 1969/70 and 1973 surveys, by
sector. In addition, the starchy staple ratio and the share of
calories from animal sources is included. There is only a small
decline in overall per capita calorie consumption between 1969/70 and
1980/81. Both figures appear higher than those in 1973, a year in
which world food shortfalls and food insecurity in Sri Lanka was
acute. Despite only marginal decreases in average calorie intake, the
data in the next three columns, like that on food shares reported
earlier, tell a story of consumers adjusting their food basket to
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Table 20 -- Comparison of the Food Share,a 1969/70 and 1980/81
Per Capita
Expenditure
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
TOTAL
1969/70b,c
75.3
73.4
70.3
70.1
67.6
66.0
62.2
60.8
55.8
45.2
64.72
Excludes liquor, tobacco, and betel.
Includes the imputed value of the food subsidy.
Source of 1969/70 data: Visaria, 1981.
1980/81
76.1
75.9
74.6
73.6
72.8
71.4
69.8
67.4
64.3
51.8
69.8
a
b
c
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Table 21 -- Per Capita Calorie and Protein Consumption by Sector,
1969/70, 1973, 1980/81
Total
Calories
All Sectors
1969/70a
1973a
1980/81
2264
1936
2239
Total
Protei n
53.8
44.2
52.8
Percent
Calories
from
Cereals
53.3
59.1
Percent
Proteins
From
Animal
Sources
21.9
18.0
Urban
1969/70
1973
1980/81
2161
1951
2095
52.2
45.1
53.4
51.9
57.9
25.3
24.5
Rural
1969/70
1973
1980/81
Estate
1969/70
1973
1980/81
2268
1837
2257
2459
2345
2400
51.2
43.0
52.3
61.6
57.5
56.9
53.6
58.9
56
64
20
16.7
15.3
12.2
a Source of 1969/70 and 1973 data: J.D. Gavan and I.S.
"The Impact of Public Foodgrain Distribution on Food
and Welfare in Sri Lanka," (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI,
Chandrasekera,
Consumption
1979) p.17.
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harsh economic times. Lower levels of protein intake, a rising
starchy staple ratio, and a decrease in high quality proteins from
animal sources indicate that a shift toward less expensive and less
preferred energy sources has taken place. This is viewed as an effort
to maintain adequate levels of calorie intake in times of adversity
and more constrained budgets.
The data on mean nutrient intake do not provide a good indication
of the relative well-being of households falling in individual expen-
diture groups. Given that this study is concerned primarily with the
poor and specifically those households with inadequate dietary intake,
it is therefore important to look beyond average consumption figures.
This involves examining the extent to which individual households fail
to achieve dietary adequacy. Doing so precedes any attempt to
understand why.
It is instructive to compare the distribution of calorie intake in
Sri Lanka in 1980/81 with those from Sri Lanka a decade previously, as
well as other countries. Table 22 depicts the cumulative percentage
of the population falling below different levels of calorie intake.
One can see that in 1980/81, 37 percent of the population consumed
less than 1800 calories per capita. None of the population fell in
this category ten years earlier. Furthermore, the data suggests that
the distribution of calorie intake parallels closely that found in
Indonesia and is in fact worse than Bangladesh.
Despite the measurement problems which make such comparisons
difficult, one must consider possible explanations for the increase in
food shares and the deterioration in calorie levels between 1969/70
and 1980/81 in Sri Lanka. Among them is a worsening distribution of
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Table 22 -- Distribution of Calorie Intake
Percentage of Population Consuming Below:
2,400 2,200 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400
Calories Calories Calories Calories Calories Calories
Sri Lanka (1980/81)
Sri Lanka (1969/70)a
Bangladesha
Indiaa
Indonesiaa ,b
Moroccoa
Pakistana
71 61 49 37 25 15
84 41 7 0 0
91 75 55 35 18
60 48 35 22 12
74 64 53 41
48 39 30 21
97 90 44 2
0
8
5
26 12
13 7
00
a Source of data for surveys
Scandizzo, "The Demand for
of Agricultural Economics,
other than Sri Lanka (1980/81): 0. Knudsen and P.
Calories in Developing Countries," American Journal
64 (1982) pp. 80-86.
b According to personal communication with C. Peter Timmer, the Indonesia figures
are biased downward due to definitional problems with food consumption sta-
tistics. Foods consumed away from home (e.g., at street stalls) and all fruits
and vegetables had zero calorie contribution.
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income, and a decrease in purchasing power across the board.
Concerning the distribution of income, Table 23 presents data on the
Gini Coefficients computed from five households surveys in Sri Lanka.
One can note the higher coefficient in 1980/81 than in 1969/70. This
suggests that the trend toward a more equitable distribution of income
reversed itself during the latter half of the 1970s.
In Tables 24 and 25, households are ranked according to their
monthly per capita income and expenditures, respectively. In the
former, the percent of the population in, and percent of total income
controlled by each decile of the income distribution is presented.
The same data, by expenditure deciles and expenditure levels, is
included in Table 25. Data from 1969/70 are also presented to serve
as a source of comparison.
As expected, the inequality in per capita income or expenditures
is greater when the percentage share of total income or expenditures
for deciles of the population, rather than the household, is employed.
This is because households at the lower end of the distribution have
more members. In general, given that the households are ranked on a
per capita basis, the use of percentage shares in terms of the popula-
tion is commended. The other is also presented to facilitate com-
parisons with the 1969/70 data and surveys in other countries.
It can be readily seen that, regardless of whether one ranks by per
capita incomes or expenditures, the bottom deciles of the population
control a smaller share of the resources in 1980 than they did a
decade previously. This supports the inferences drawn from the Gini
Coefficients, that the equality of the income distribution has
deteriorated. For example, in 1969/70, the bottom 20 percent of the
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Table 23 -- Gini Coefficient
(Based on Total Household Incomes)
1953a
All-Island 0.46
1963a
0.45 0.36
0.42
0.32
0.26
1 Figures include the imputed values of the rice ration.
Sources: a
b
c
Op. cit., Isenman, p.247.
Visaria, 1981, p.27.
Labour and SocioEconomic Survey 1980/81, Department of
Census and Statistics, (Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1983) p.11.
Urban
Rural
Estate
19 73a 1980/ 8 1C
0.35 0.43
0.44
0.38
0.27
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Table 24 -- Comparison Between 1969/70 and 1980/81 of Income Shares
for Deciles of Households Ranked According to Per Capita Income
(and the Income Shares for Corresponding Deciles of Population)
Percentage Share
For Decile o
Populationa
of Total Income
For Decile of
Householdb
1 1969/70c
1980/81
2 1969/70
1980/81
3 1969/70
1980/81
4 1969/70
1980/81
5 1969/70
1980/81
6 1969/70
1980/81
7 1969/70
1980/81
8 1969/70
1980/81
9 1969/70
1980/81
10 1969/70
1980/81
a Determined by
10
PCINCj/(r PCINCj)
j=1
10
b Determined by (PCINCj x HHSIZEj) / E (PCINCj x
j=1
C Source of data from 1969/70: Visaria, 1981, p.25.
Per Capita
Income
(Deciles)
Percent
of
Households
Percent
of
Population
12.17
12.23
11.72
11.72
10.97
11.62
10.43
10.28
9.95
10.29
9.81
9.77
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
3.61
2.72
4.89
4.05
5.73
4.89
6.56
5.80
7.47
6.80
8.52
7.94
9.83
9.37
11.59
11.51
14.40
15.17
27.40
31.75
4.59
3.67
6.03
5.23
6.68
6.27
7.37
6.58
7.98
7.73
8.92
8.57
9.87
9.52
10.92
10.90
13.63
14.26
24.00
27.28
9.43
9.21
8.78
8.58
8.68
8.51
8.07
7.78
HHSIZEj)
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Table 25 -- Comparison between 1969/70 and 1980/81 of Expenditure
Shares for Deciles of Households Ranked According to Per
Capita Expenditures (and the Expenditure Shares for Corresponding
Deciles of the Population)
Per Capita Percent Percent Percentage Share of Total Expenditures
Expenditure of of For Decile of For Deci le oT
(Deciles) Households Population Population Households
1 19 6 9/ 7 0a 10 12.45 4.18 5.94
1980/81 10 12.68 3.68 5.00
2 1969/70 10 11.67 5.52 6.78
1980/81 10 12.06 5.02 6.60
3 1969/70 10 11.01 6.35 7.43
1980/81 10 11.21 5.98 7.35
4 1969/70 10 10.75 7.17 8.27
1980/81 10 10.26 6.82 7.62
5 1969/70 10 10.14 8.03 8.70
1980/81 10 10.10 8.00 8.55
6 1969/70 10 9.46 9.02 9.09
1980/81 10 9.72 8.66 9.17
7 1969/70 10 9.71 10.21 10.57
1980/81 10 9.21 9.96 9.99
8 1969/70 10 8.46 11.78 10.67
1980/81 10 8.86 11.65 11.24
9 1969/70 10 8.53 14.20 13.26
1980/81 10 8.12 14.34 12.69
10 1969/70 10 7.78 23.54 19.80
1980/81 10 7.61 26.17 21.70
from 1969/70: Visaria, 1981, p.24.a Source of data
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distribution controlled 8.5 percent of the total income; in 1980/81
this figure was 6.8 percent. Another interesting point is that the
overall inequitableness of the distribution is greater for income than
expenditures. This can be explained by the savings of the wealthier
households and the disavings of those at the bottom end of the
income distribution.
Further support to these findings on a reversal towards less
equitable income distribution can be seen from data in Table 26.
These are compiled from comparable surveys performed by the Central
Bank. 1  They corroborate the analysis earlier, using data from the
SocioEconomic Surveys, that the 1970s witnessed a deterioration in the
share of income controlled by the lowest quartiles of the population.
Other reasons for the declining level of calorie intake among the
poor and the overall higher food share revolve around the change in
nominal expenditures relative to nominal prices during the past
decade. First, in Table 27 the percent nominal change in per capita
expenditures is presented. Notice that on the average, nominal expen-
ditures increased 343 percent during the 1970s. Note, however, the
changes among the highest deciles is considerably greater (by 23
percent) than the change in the lowest expenditure decile. This is
just another manifestation of the increasing skewing of income. But
this does not answer fully why the apparent loss in welfare of all
groups.
In Table 28 one can see the change in open market prices between
1970 and 1981. A cursory glance at the nominal change in prices tells
1 Op. cit., Thorbecke and Svejran, p.26.
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Table 26 - Sri Lanka, Percent of Total Income Received by Two Poorest
Quintiles of Income Receivers, Rural and Estate Sectors,
1963, 1973, 1978/79 (percentages)
Ranked Income
Receivers
Lowest 20 %
Second 20 %
Bottom 40 %
Rural
1963 1973
3.60 5.35
8.75 11.60
1978/79
3.49
8.60
12.35 16.95 12.09
Estate
1963 1973
8.55 7.51
14.20 11.73
22.75 19.24
1978/79
7.73
13.21
20.94
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Table 27 - Nominal Changes in Per Capita Expenditures, By Deciles
Expenditure
Class
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
TOTAL
Nominal Monthly Per Capita
1969/70a 1980/81
24.21 97.11
32.20 132.21
37.39 157.64
42.62 179.49
47.58 202.59
53.28 228.01
60.32 262.10
69.89 306.61
86.17 377.60
140.58 688.90
59.42 263.21
Expenditures (Rs.)
% Change
301
311
322
321
380
328
335
339
338
390
343
a Source of the 1969/70 data: Visaria, 1981, p.191.
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Table 28 - Change in Open Market Retail Prices in Colombo City
FOOD
COMMODITIES
Cereal s
Rice (raw)
Flour
Bread
Pul ses
Mysore Dhal
19701
Rs.
1.21/measure
0.33/lb.
0.35/lb.
1.04/measure
19811
Rs.
6.18/measure
2.62/lb.
2.37/lb.
14.13/measure
Yams
Mani oc
Sweet potatoes
Potatoes
Beef (without bones)
Fish
(fish)a
(dried)b
Milk
(fresh)
(condensed)
Coconuts
Sugar
0.85/26 oz.
1.25/lb.
0.25/each
0.72/lb.
3.26/26 oz.
9.87/lb.
1.77 each
7.31/lb.
NON-FOOD ITEMS
Kerosene Oil
(bottle)
Bus
Train/mile
1 Prices are taken from: Bulletin of Selected Retail
1979-81. Department of Census and Statistics, Mini
Implementation, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1982, pp. 1-20.
Prices,
stry of Plan
a Average of seer, paraw and galmaru.
b Average of six types of dried fish.
% change
410
694
577
1,259
1.13/lb.
1.71/lb.
4.35/lb.
8.01/1b.
0.18/lb.
0.28/lb.
0.83/lb.
1.67/1b.
3.10/lb.
3.27/lb.
528
411
424
444
11.8/1 b.
16.71/lb.
282
411
284
689
608
915
0.15
0.05
0.03
2.97
0.28
0.16
1880
460
433
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the story of their increasing across the board at a pace much more
rapid than expenditures. A major loss in welfare is inevitable given
that the rise in expenditures are not even close to keeping pace with
commodity prices. For example, given that the food commodities in
Table 28 make up over 70 percent of the food basket and account for
well over 80 percent of the calories for rural households in the
lowest expenditure decile, it is noteworthy that their cost, weighted
by the percent contribution to total expenditures (as found in Table
7) rose 527 percent in nominal terms. This does not compare favorably
with a 300 percent rise in nominal expenditures. It is no wonder,
given that these poor households were already spending nearly 80 per-
cent of their income on food in 1969/70, that their calorie and pro-
tein intake levels have declined precipitously. Even the expenditures
of the rich have been far outpaced by the rise in prices during the
same period. This, coupled with the data in Table 29 which shows that
food prices rose more quickly than other goods, and the data presented
earlier on an increased skewing of the income distribution, explains
why food is an increasingly large component of their total outlays and
why food consumption levels among the poor have declined so drasti-
cally.
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Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Table 29 - Cost of
(Base
Food Index
1.00
1.06
1.09
1.16
1.29
1.48
1.60
1.58
1.59
1.86
2.06
2.66
3.13
3.52
Living Indexes for
year 1969 = 100)a
Non-Food Index
1.00
1.05
1.09
1.16
1.24
1.33
1.40
1.47
1.51
1.57
1.74
2.10
2.50
2.68
a Data adopted from Central Bank of
Statistical Appendix.
Sri Lanka, 1982 Annual Report,
Colombo Town
Food and
Non-Food Index
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.04
1.11
1.14
1.07
1.05
1.18
1.18
1.27
1.25
1.31
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IV. OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, INCOME SOURCES, AND LAND HOLDERS
In this chapter, the analysis of food consumption and expenditure
patterns is continued. Attention is focused, however, on exploring
the occupational and income characteristics of households, and exa-
mining which groups are at greatest nutritional risk. In addition,
the dual role of land holders as producers and consumers in the food
sector is the subject of an analysis which examines the short-term
welfare implications of paddy and coconut price shifts. This infor-
mation is considered vital to both targeting intervention programs to
those in greatest need and understanding the implications of policies
which effect specific occupations and labor force participation.
OCCUPATION GROUPS
An important way to disaggregate households is according to
occupation. For a given household, there may be one or more income
earner. Each income earner may in turn have one or more occupations.
In order to facilitate the analysis, the individual within the house-
hold who earns the largest share of household income was identified as
the major income earner. This individual is not necessarily the head
of the household, nor always male. The primary occupation of the
major income earner will be most often referred to in the text which
follows. However, it is important to note that there are, on the
average, 1.63 income earners per household. This figure is 1.65,
1.54, and 2.17, in the urban, rural, and estate sectors, respectively.
Of equal interest is that there is no trend in the number of
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income earners with rising per capita expenditures. However, there is
a marked reduction in household size with rising per capita expen-
diture levels. This decline is much more rapid in the estate sector
than in the rural sector, which in turn shows a faster rate of decline
than the urban sector. These factors combine to point out some
interesting figures on the ratio of household members to income ear-
ners (see Table 30). Most important is that this dependency ratio
declines markedly with higher income. It is also more than one-third
lower for the estate sector than the urban and rural sectors.
In order to examine the specific occupational characteristics of
the income earners, the households were divided into fourteen cate-
gories. The basis for doing so was the primary occupation of the
major income earner. These categories are identified in Figure 5.
Some, such as cultivators and farmers (#5) and agricultural and animal
husbandry workers (#6), include relatively more households. However,
they represent the highest degree of disaggregation permissable given
the raw data. Other groups, such as sales workers (#3), were the
result of aggregating a number of occupational categories with too
small of a sample to have any meaning.
In Table 31, it can be seen that occupational groups composed of
agricultural and animal husbandry workers, non-specific laborers, and
the group comprised of unemployed, 1 missing, and others appear
1 The small percentage of unemployed major income earners is not to
be confused with the unemployment rate. The national unemployment
rate is figured as follows: Unemployment Rate = Unemployed
Population/Economically Active Population X 100. This figure was
computed to be 14.3 percent nationally for men and 31.1 percent
nationally for women (Department of Census and Statistics, 1982).
If the head of household, for example, is unemployed, another
continued on page 88.
Table 30 -- Household Size, No. of Income Earners, and Ratio of Household Size to
Income Earners by Sector and Expenditure Class
Per Capita
Expenditure
Group
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total
Household Size
Urban
6.4
6.6
6.1
5.9
6.0
5.5
5.2
5.4
5.1
4.5
5.5
Rural Estate
7.3
5.6
5.7
4.6
4.2
4.7
4.9
3.6
2.6
2.2
4.6
6.5
6.2
5.8
5.3
5.3
4.9
4.6
4.4
4.0
3.7
5.1
No. of Income Earners
Urban Rural Estate
1.5
1.4
1.7
1.6.
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.5
2.6
2.1
2.6
2.1
2.1
2.4
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.2
2.2
Ratio of Household
Size to No. of
Income Earners
Urban Rural Estate
4.3
4.7
3.6
3.7
4.0
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.0
2.5
3.2
4.1
4.1
3.6
3.4
3.3
3.1
3.1
3.1
2.9
2.3
3.4
2.8
2.7
2.2
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.8
1.7
1.8
2.1
U,
Urban
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Figure 5 -- Categories of Occupational Groups
1. Professional, Technical and Related Workers. Administrative and
Managerial Workers.
2. Clerical and Related Workers.
3. Sales Workers.
4. Service Workers.
5. Cultivators and Farmers.
6. Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Workers.
7. Farm Managers, Estate Superintendants, and Supervisors. Livestock
Farmers, Fishermen and Related Workers, Hunters and Related
Workers, Forestry Workers.
8. Production Supervisors and General Foremen. Miners, Quarrymen,
Well-Drillers, and Related Workers. Metal Processors. Wood
Preparation Workers and Paper Malters. Chemical Processors and
Related Workers. Blacksmiths, Toolmakers, and Machine-Tool
Operators. Machine Fitters, Machine Assemblers, and Precision
Instrument Workers. Electrical Fitters and Related Electrical and
Electronic Workers.
9. Spinners, Weavers, Knitters, Dyers, and Related Workers. Tanners,
Fillmongers, and Pelt Dressers. Food and Beverage Processors.
Tobacco Preparers and Tobacco Product Makers. Tailors,
Dressmakers, Sewers, Upholsterers, and Related Workers.
Shoemakers and Leather Goods Makers. Cabinet Makers, Furniture
Makers, and Related Woodmakers. Stone Cutters and Cavers.
Broadcasting Station and Sound Equipment Operators and Cinema.
Plumbers, Welders, Sheet Metal, and Structural Metal Preparers.
Jewelry and Precious Metal Workers. Glass-formers, Brick and Tile
Makers. Potters and Related Workers. Rubber and Plastic Products
Makers. Printers and Related Workers. Painters. Production and
Related Workers.
10. Military Personnel. Bricklayers, Carpenters and Construction
Workers. Stationary Engine and Related Equipment Operators.
Material - Handling and Related Equipment Operators, Dockers,
Freight Handlers.
11. Non-Classified Laborers.
12. Missing, Unemployed, or Other.
13. Housework.
14. Retired.
Table 31 -- Per Capita Expenditures, Per Capita Calories, and Extent of Poverty, by Primary Occupation of Major Income Earner
Households
No. of
Households
294
282
393
193
947
844
113
218
196
397
601
89
140
256
Mean in Lowest
Per Capita Quartile of
Expenditure Expenditure
(Rs/Year) Dist. (%)
5456
4265
3988
3342
2838
2459
3537
3043
2976
2934
2387
2761
3583
3361
3.7
8.1
13.0
14.0
19.12
28.4
24.5
19.3
16.32
21.2
30.1
28.6
15.72
17.0
Mean
Calories
per AEU
3181
2961
2835
2699
2917
2763
2878
2688
2757
2586
2472
2541
2973
2905
Households
With Severe
Poverty (%)
1.4
2.5
6.1
6.7
6.8
10.2
8.8
5.5
5.1
8.8
16.5
11.2
5.0
9.0
% Residing
in Rural
Sector
61
60
60
55
96
56
34
74
74
74
71
64
64
73
% Residing
in Urban
Sector
38
36
38
25
2
3
41
24
26
24
26
29
35
23
% Residing
in Estate
Sector
1
4
2
20
2
41
25
2
2
3
7
1
4
Occupa-
tional
Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
00
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economically worse off based on per capita expenditure levels. The
figures for non-classified laborers with a mean per capita expenditure
level of Rs. 2387, with 30 percent of the households falling in the
bottom 20 percent of the income distribution, are of special concern
given their numbers in the total labor force. The other highest risk
group, agricultural and animal husbandry workers, are approximately
half rural farm workers, with the other half being estate workers on
plantations.
The high percent of low-income households in certain occupational
groups has the expected implication for calorie intake. Based on
calories per AEU and the percent of households falling in the cate-
gory of the ultra-poor, non-classified laborers once again distinguish
themselves. However, the range and variation of calorie intake among
occupation groups is considerably less than expenditure levels.
Engel's and Bennet's Laws once more are operable.
Another interesting approach to exploring the occupational charac-
teristics of different types of households is found in Table 32. In
the first column, there is the distribution of households in the
entire sample across occupation groups. For example, 19.1 percent of
the primary occupations of the major income earners are farmers and
cultivators. This serves as a benchmark. In columns two and three,
respectively, are the percent of major income earners with various
occupations in the lower and upper quartile of the per capita
1 continued from page 84:
family member is regarded as the major income earner if she is
earning the largest share of the household income. Thus, only if
the major income earner is also unemployed, an unlikely scenario,
will they be included in Group 12 in Figure 5.
Table 32 -- Percent of Households in Which the Major Income Earner Falls in Different Occupation Groups
Distribution
by Occupations
Occupation in Total
Group Population (%)
1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Total
5.9
5.7
7.9
3.9
19.1
17.0
2.3
4.4
3.9
8.0
12.1
1.8
2.8
5.2
100.0
Distribution
by Occupations
Among House-
holds in Lower
Exp. Quartile
1.1
1.9
5.5
2.9
18.8
23.8
2.5
4.2
3.1
8.3
17.9
2.6
2.4
4.8
100.0
Distribution
by Occupations
Among House-
Holds in Upper
Exp. Quartile
14.6
10.8
11.7
4.9
15.3
9.3
0.3
4.7
2.8
7.8
11.0
1.2
3.7
6.0
100.0
Distribution
by Occupation
Among the
Ultra-Poora
0.8
1.6
6.0
2.9
15.5
20.5
2.6
3.1
2.4
9.2
24.2
2.1
1.8
5.8
100.0
Distribution
s Occupations Among
Households Nutri-
tionally At-Riskb_
3.1
4.6
10.1
3.6
15.7
14.8
2.4
5.7
5.2
10.1
13.5
2.3
2.8
5.7
100.0
a Defined as calorie intake < 0.8 of requirement and food share
b Defined as calorie intake < 0.8 of requirement and food share <
0
0.8.
0.8.
>
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expenditures. The contrast is often sharp. For example, 15 percent
of the major income earners in the upper expenditure quartile fall in
the category of professional, technical, and related workers, and
administrative and managerial workers. The comparable figure for the
lowest expenditure quartile is one percent. Similarly, more than
twice the percentage of primary income earners in the lower end of the
income distribution are agricultural and animal husbandry workers, and
50 percent more fall in the category of non-classified laborers than
are found in the quartile represented by the wealthiest households.
The households in column four are defined as the ultra-poor. The
only difference of significance concerning the occupational charac-
teristics of these households, as opposed to the poorest quartile of
the population (column 2) and other nutritionally at-risk households
(last column), is that nearly one-quarter of the major income earners
among the ultra-poor are non-classified laborers.
The data in the previous tables do not account for the fact that
there is often more than one income earner per household, and that
the major income earner may be employed in a secondary occupation.
Nearly half of the households report an occupation for a second income
earner. Only a third of the major income earners report being
involved in a secondary occupation. In households where the primary
income earner falls in one of the three major occupations, (i.e., far-
mers and cultivators, agricultural and animal husbandry workers, and
laborers) the highest percentage of secondary income earners con-
veniently falls in either the same occupation as the primary income
earner or in one of the other two major occupations found in Table 33.
With the exception of the few households where the major and
Table 33 -- Occupation of Second Income Earners, by the Occupation of the Major Income Earner
Occupation of
Major Income
Earner
Cultivators
and Farmers
Agriculture
and Animal
Husbandry
Workers
Laborers
Cultivators
and Farmers
Percent
Cal/AEU
PCEXP
Percent
Cal/AEU
PCEXP
Percent
Cal/AEU
PCEXP
8.8
2681
N=83
2.4
2567
N=20
3.0
2875
N= 18
Occupation of Second Income Earner
Agriculture and
Animal Husbandry
4.5
2765
N=43
44.7
2794
N=377
5.7
2597
N= 34
Laborers Other None
2.5
2595
N=24
2.5
2437
N=21
16.5
2319
N=99
12.5
10.3
15.8
71.7
2982
N=689
40.1
2821
N=341
59.0
2528
N=356
"6
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secondary income earner is a non-classified laborer, the expenditure
levels of households with the second income earner engaged as a culti-
vator, agricultural and animal husbandry worker, or laborer, is lower
than households where there is only one person engaged in the labor
force. In combination, these data strongly suggest that a second
household member in the labor market is not a windfall which raises
the standard of living to heights greater than experienced by house-
holds with single workers. Rather, it is a necessary adaptive mecha-
nism for economic survival.
In reference to households where the major income earner is
engaged in a secondary occupation, the only finding of significance is
that non-classified laborers who are engaged as farmers and cultiva-
tors as a secondary occupation have markedly higher calorie intakes
than the population of laborers as a whole, despite their expenditure
levels not being significantly different. This further supports the
data presented earlier that households which grow their own food may
be better off nutritionally. This will be tested econometrically in
the next section of this chapter.
The discussion above concerning households with second income
earners and secondary occupations has one other implication which is
noteworthy. Specifically, this relates to the fact that most house-
holds earn income from a number of sources, despite one usually being
predominant. In Table 34, the percent of income from a variety of
sources, and the percent of households earning income from that source
are provided. This is stratified by the occupation of the major
income earner. Of particular interest are the occupation groups in
which most of the population, especially those at greatest risk, are
Table 34 -- Source of Household Income by Primary Occupation of Major Income Earner
holds
Share Earning
of from
Incomea Sourceb
70 (95)
76 (100)
27 (44)
70 (94)
16 136)
74 (97)
51 (64)
65 (88)
51 (71)
70 (91)
72 (98)
34 (53)
14 (29)
12 (28)
Pensions,
Remittances,
and Food Stamps
% House-
holds
Share
of
Income
4
14
7
5
10
8
7
6
10
7
11
26
31
34
Earning
from
Source
(20)
(18)
(46)
(30)
(55)
(48)
(42)
(42)
(57)
(44)
(62)
(71)
(70)
(83)
Profit from
Business
% Fouse-
holds
Share
of
Income
8
3
7
8
12
3
30
13
21
10
3
7
6
7
Earning
from
Source
(17)
(13)
(70)
(19)
(28)
(9)
(40)
(28)
(40)
(22)
(11)
(17)
(17)
(20)
Net Sale of
Agricultural
Commodities
% House-
holds
Share
of
Income
2
2
3
2
33
2
2
1
2
4
8
7
Earning
from
Source
(20)
(21)
(19)
(15)
(80)
(18)
(10)
(14)
(15)
(15)
(13)
(21)
(28)
(32)
Net Home Con-
sumption of
Agricultural
Commodities
i House-
holds
Share Earning
of from
Income Source
Other Periodic
Cash Receipts
I House-
holds
Share Earning
of from
Income Source
(53) 2 (9)
4 (56)
5 (55)
5 (64)
20 (97)
5 (80)
5 (69)
4 (54)
5 (57)
4 (58)
5 (60)
4 (57)
7 (61)
9 (63)
2 (9)
1 (7)
1 (8)
2 (10)
2 (9)
1 (6)
4 (12)
2 (11)
1 (8)
1 (8)
14 (35)
15 (38)
13 (32)
a These figures represent the
b
mean percent of total income that a given income source comprises.
These figures represent the percent of households which earn a portion of their income from that
the average, 70 percent of the income is from wages for households where the major income earner
households do not earn any income from that source).
given source (i.e., so although, on
is in Group 1, 5 percent of those
Occupation
Groups
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
IA
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incl uded.
The situation for agricultural and animal husbandry workers, and
non-classified laborers is relatively more straightforward. Three-
quarters of total income is from wages among households falling in
these two occupational groups. In the estate sector these figures are
above 80 percent, while in the rural sector they are slightly below 70
percent. Increasing wages or hours employed will clearly enhance the
incomes of these households, and therefore must be the focus of
policy makers. In addition, employing a means test for participation
in welfare programs such as food stamps will clearly work to the
disadvantage of salaried workers, such as those in the estate sector,
who have less opportunity to disguise or under-report income.
Among households where the primary income earner is a farmer or
cultivator, only 33 percent of their income is from the sale of home
produced products. Combined with the additional 20 percent of their
income represented by home consumption, slightly over half of their
household income is from directly productive agricultural activities.
Earning from wages, businesses, and pensions, remittances, and food
stamps all make significant contributions to total earnings. These
data exemplify the complexity of understanding the impact of economic
policy on the well-being of farmers due to the diversity in their
sources of income. For example, raising farmgate prices will undoub-
tably transfer some income to producers, but as will be shown below,
this will mainly benefit the wealthier producers. However, the
indirect effect of higher prices increasing labor demand and creating
employment opportunities, both as farm workers and in business
enterprises, may prove a more fruitful and direct means of helping the
-95-
rural poor. This is supported by the data in Table 35, which
illustrates that the ultra-poor, like the entire population (of which
they comprise 8 percent) receive over half their incomes in the form
of wages and salaries, with business profits (i.e., small scale
enterprise) being the second most important source of earnings. It is
also noteworthy that pensions, food stamps, and remittances represent
a disproportionately large share of the ultra-poor's income. This
further supports the contention that their well-being and improvements
thereof are subject to external influences such as food stamp policy,
pensions from government, and remittances from abroad.
A final concern revolves around the issue of female participation
in the work force. This interest emanates from the potential nutri-
tional implications of women working outside of the home. This issue
will be explored in detail in Chapter VIII. However, it is worthwhile
noting that around 15 percent of the households in the sample are
headed by females. This figure is higher than the 12 percent reported
in the 1969/70 census. The discrepancy may be due to a sampling
error, a changing pattern of household structures, or differences in
reporting procedures. However, when one looks at the percentage of
households where the woman is the major income earner, that figure is
around 14 percent of households. Interestingly, of the households
where a woman is the largest income earner, only two-thirds report
that a woman is the head of the household. Conversely, of those
households where a woman is the head of household, only 60 percent
report the major income earner is a woman. These figures admonish the
researcher to distinguish carefully between the concept of households
where women are the major income earners and women are the head of
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Table 35 -- Sources of Income for Entire Population and for the Ultra-Poor
Wages and Salaries
Business Profits
Pensions, Remittances,
and Food Stamps
Net Sale of Home
Production (i.e.,
Agricultural Proaucts)
Other Periodic Cash
Rents, Dividends, and
Interest Payments
Home Consumption
Other Non-Money Sources
Entire
Share of
Total
Income
51.1
11.4
10.4
8.4
3.0
0.7
7.8
7.2
Population
% Households
Earning
from Source
(72)
(24)
(50)
(30)
(11)
(4)
(69)
Ultra-Poor
Share of % Households
Total Earning
Income from Source
52.8 (77)
9.8 (21)
18.3
4.5
2.7
0.1
6.2
5.6
(75)
(17)
(12)
(1)
(67)
(95)
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household.
Table 36 presents the calories per adult equivalency unit and the
per capita expenditures for households with male and female major
income earners and heads of households. Households where the woman is
the head have higher intakes and higher levels of expenditure than
male headed households; although, the difference is not significant
in either case. Households where a woman, rather than a man, is the
primary income earner have significantly higher calorie intake and
expenditure levels (see Table 36). Similarly, Table 37 shows that the
households in which women earn more than 62 percent of the income
have calorie intakes per AEU of 2930, as opposed to 2770 calories in
households where women earn between 24 and 39 percent of the income,
despite that the former group has lower mean expenditure levels.
Although these types of data are of interest, they are difficult
to draw any inferences from. The reason is that there are numerous
demographic and economic variables which vary considerably between
households where a different percent of income is controlled by fema-
les. These include important characteristics such as household size,
the number of income earners, the number of children below five years
of age, age of the head of household, level of education and so forth
(see Table 37). Therefore, one could expand at great length on the
relationship between female income earnings and calorie intakes and
expenditure levels in the form of tables and graphs. However, such
comparisons are of limited value given that a myriad of factors, such
as the number of income earners or levels of per capita expenditures,
confound these findings. There is a need to control for a number of
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Table 36 -- Difference of Means Tests Between Male and Female Headed
Households and Income Earners
Classification Variables
I. Head of Household
Cal ori es/AEU
N Mean SD
P.C. Expenditures
Mean SD
2770 966
2844 1121
t=1.68
p>0.05
II. Major Income Earner
2757
2938 1142
t=3.85
p<0.05
Male
Female
4012
741
264
261
205
204
Male
Female
t=O.26
p>0.05
4094
659
964 260
281
199
235
t=2.12
p<0.05
Table 37 -- Calorie Expenditure Levels Stratified by the Percent of
Total Income Earned by Females
Percent of Total
Income Earned by
Females
0
N Calories/AEU
3119
1-23
24-39
40-62
62-100
396
409
412
416
2774
2605
2770
2873
2930
P.C. Expenditures
260
259
283
264
271
Household
Size
5.2
5.9
5.7
5.0
4.0
No. of
Earners
1.3
2.6
2.5
2.3
1.5
No. of
Children
< 5 years
6.5
5.5
5.5
5.4
3.5
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factors concerning the structure of the household itself when
exploring the question of whether households in which income is
controlled by women are better off nutritionally. This avenue of pur-
suit is the subject of Chapter VIII.
LAND HOLDERS AND FARMING HOUSEHOLDS
In the previous sections of the report, the large number of impov-
erished and malnourished households were identified. The fact that
rice and coconuts represent the largest expenditure items in the food
budget, and as will be shown in the following chapters, that consumers
are extremely price responsive both in terms of commodity consumption
and nutrient intake, leads one inevitably to explore the dual role of
pricing policy in reducing hunger. What makes this such an
interesting question is two facts. First, rice is the staple food for
all households in Sri Lanka, with coconuts being the second most
important staple. Concurrently, according to survey data being ana-
lyzed, 27 percent of the total households in Sri Lanka produce paddy
and around 33 percent grow coconut. In the rural sector, those
figures are 35 and 41 percent, respectively. Therefore, a compelling
issue is that prices of the two most important staple foods are a
double-edged sword -- they affect consumers on the one hand as well as
producers on the other. The issue to be addressed in this section
revolves around linking consumption and production ends of the food
sector. The purpose is to begin to answer the question of how
changing paddy and coconut prices will prove helpful or harmful to the
vulnerable households.
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Before embarking on this effort, an important qualification is
necessary. The data on the production side from the SocioEconomic
Survey have serious limitations. The survey was not designed as a
complete agricultural census. Despite this, a fair amount of data on
agricultural production and land holding patterns provides an oppor-
tunity to observe the dual role of the household as producers and con-
sumers among population groups. However, it is not possible to
extrapolate supply figures to the national level, nor examine supply
response and farm behavior on the basis of the information in the sur-
vey.
General Land Holding Characteristics
According to the most recent agricultural census in Sri Lanka,
there are 1,807,697 operational holdings in the country, excluding
estates. 1  Given that there are 3,058,043 households in Sri Lanka,
this translates into approximately 60 percent of Sri Lankan households
being landholders. Of the nearly 5,000 households in the two rounds
of the 1980/81 SocioEconomic Survey being analyzed in this study,
almost 70 percent of the households reported owning land. This
discrepancy can be attributed to a number of factors. First is that
the Agricultural Census excludes holdings greater than 20 acres.
Second is that the Agricultural Census excludes the estate sector. A
third possible explanation revolves around the fact that in the survey
being analyzed herein, there are relatively more small land holdings
1 Census of Agriculture, 1982, Small Holding Sector, Department of
Census and Statistics, Ministry of Plan Implementation (Colombo, Sri
Lanka, 1983) p.9.
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than in the 1982 Agricultural Census: 54 percent of the holdings are
less than one acre in the former, as opposed to 42 percent in the
Agricultural Survey. Assuming that the Agricultural Census is truly
representative, it appears that the SocioEconomic Survey is biased
toward small operational holdings. Since these are often the poorer
households and the focus of interest of this report, this is not con-
sidered problematic. It does admonish, however, that caution be used
in extrapolating actual values to a national level, although charac-
teristics and behavior of households with different size holdings are
considered meaningful.
In the sample, around 70 percent of the households report owning
land. In the rural sector, this figure is 81.5 percent, while in the
urban and estate sectors, 26 percent and 13 percent of the households
have operational holdings. Two-thirds of these land holdings consist
of high land only; and one-third own high land and paddy land. Less
than 2 percent of the land holders have paddy land only. High land
includes land where crops other than paddy are planted (e.g., coco-
nuts, condiments, coarse grains, pulses, vegetables), as well as home
gardens. Before distinguishing among types of land holdings and
focusing on growers of paddy and coconuts, the two most important food
crops, some general findings concerning households which produce agri-
cultural commodities and own farm land are presented.
One can divide the population of land owners into four nearly
equal size groups, according to the acreage of their holdings. For
the smallest group of land owners, virtually all their holdings are in
the form of high land (see Table 38). This is in contrast to the
large landholders (greater than two acres) where on the average 40
Table 38 -- Value of Production and Share of Income by Land Holding Size
Share of Value of Share of income
Total Production (%) From Different Sources
Pensions,
No. of Average Average Agriculture Home Business Wages and Remittances
Households Paddy Land High Land Paddy Coconuts Sales Consumption Profits Salaries and Stamps Others
262 0.001
454
744
120
807
936
52
876
931
42
754
797
0.003
0.002
0.020
0.032
0.030
0.316
0.273
0.274
3.525
2.039
2.116
0.101 1.11 11.96
0.114 4.09
0.108 2.89
0.348 2.36
0.354 9.96
0.354 8.89
0.890 13.77
1.044 27.18
1.035 26.34
6.278 36.70
2.950 52.41
3.126 51.61
15.87
13.90
28.29
26.17
26.31
0.20 1.20 20.01 50.76 10.28
1.78
1.46
1.84
3.62
3.38
Size of Holding
(ACRES)
0 - 0.24
Urban
Rural
a/
All-Island
0.25 - 0.72
Urban
Rural
a/
All-Island
0.73 - 2.0
Urban
Rural
a/
All-Island
2.0 or more
Urban
Rural
a/
All1-island
3.69
2.81
11.06 54.49 15.63
13.82 54.18 13.16
2.10 18.25 44.92 13.16
7.09 10.75 55.76 12.68
6.43 11.67 54.55 12.68
5.69 11.03 50.80 9.31
13.41 11.64 41.18 11.53
12.95 11.59 41.70 11.37
7.64 16.91 31.17
18.24 13.16 21.44
17.66 13.36 21.99
5.87
7.14
7.06
a/ Includes 41 estate holdings
40.78 3.93
22.76 12.10
23.70 11.76
35.40 15.57
17.31 30.75
18.24 29.91
frj
0-.CDJ
17.55
13.35
14.57
19.73
10.10
11.29
19.26
10.14
10.63
22.86
9.27
10.02
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percent of their holdings are in the form of paddy land. This is
reflected in the value share of total home production of goods
(including firewood and other miscellaneous items) which comes from
paddy and coconut production. Among the smallest half of the
landholders, paddy represents less than 10 percent of the value of
home produced goods. Subsidiary food crops, such as condiments,
coarse grains, roots and tubers, and pulses are clearly of great
importance to small farmers. To the extent that research, extension
and price support for these commodities has been neglected (as inti-
mated in the previous chapter), the major loss is born by the small
and marginal farmer. For households with operational holdings greater
than two acres (see Table 38) over half their share of production is
from paddy. The share of the value of production from paddy and the
proportion of paddy land to total holdings is also consistantly higher
in the rural sector than in the urban sector, as expected.
The percent of income from goods produced at home also reveals
that agricultural sales and home production make up a relatively small
share of the total income of landholders. Among the small
landholders, less than five percent of their income is based on agri-
cultural production. This rises to close to 50 percent in the rural
areas, but is still only 23 percent in the urban sector. Wages and
salaries remain the major source of income among all but the land
holders with greater than two acres in the rural area. It is also
noteworthy that among small land holders, a larger share of income is
in the form of home consumption than agricultural sales. As the size
of holdings increase, this trend reverses itself.
These data on sources of income is also reflected in the
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occupational characteristics of households with different size land
holdings (see Table 39). Among the smallest landholders, only about
one-fifth report occupations directly related to agriculture as their
primary occupation. An additional 15 percent are engaged as non-
classified laborers, many of which may be finding a portion of their
work as seasonal or occasional agricultural laborers. As farm sizes
increase, there is a commensurate rise in the percent of households in
which farming is the primary occupation. These All-Island figures
reflect largely the influences of the characteristics of the rural
sector. The main inter-sectoral differences is that in the urban sec-
tor even fewer major income earners report directly productive agri-
cultural activities as their primary occupation; and in the estate
sector, there are so few land owners that is it impossible to draw any
inferences.
One further question is whether land holdings are a good predictor
of nutritional risk, especially in rural areas where only 15 percent
of the households are totally landless. This is of particular rele-
vance given that consideration is being given to employing land
holdings as a criteria for the receipt of food stamps or other
transfer payments. In Table 40 it can be seen that calorie intakes
rise with the size of land holdings. This mostly reflects higher
income levels among larger land holders. Interestingly, the calorie
intake of non-land holders in the rural areas is 2729 per adult equiva-
lency unit. This is attributable to the fact that there are relati-
vely fewer landless households in the lower end of the income
distribution than households with operational holdings less than one-
quarter of an acre; and there are a greater percent of households in
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Table 39 -- Primary Occupations of Major Income Earners by Farm Size
% Households Where the Primary Occupation of the Major Income
Earner Is:
Agricultural and
Animal Husbandry
Worker
14.7
14.6
14.2
Farm and Estate
Manager, Live-
stock, Fisherman,
Hunter and
Forestry Worker
3.5
2.2
1.0
0.9 2.0
Farm Size
0-0.24
0.25-0.72
0.73-2.0
Cultivator
and Farmer
3.8
10.0
28.5
Laborer
15.2
14.4
10.6
> 2 60.5 4.6
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Table 40 -- Average Calorie Intake per AEU and Per Capita Expenditures by
Size of Landholding
Calories Per Capita
/AEU Expenditures
% Households
in Bottom
Quartile
of Income
Distribution
% Households
in Upper
Quartile
of Income
Distribution
None
0 - 0.24
0.25 - 0.72
0.73 - 2.0
2729
2543
2691
2810
2690
2685
2686
2865
31
42
31
27
3646 17
Size of
Farm Land
Holdings
18
17
17
21
32> 2 3146
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the upper quartile of the income distribution among the rural landless
than those having holdings of less than one-quarter of an acre. It is
evident that landlessness alone is not an adequate predictor of
poverty and undernutrition, even in the rural sector. Access to only
small land holdings (i.e., one-half an acre) does not portend low
levels of food consumption since off-farm employment and earnings are
of equal if not greater importance to rural land holders and non-land
holders alike. The question arises, however, as to whether land
ownership does offer any hedge against hunger, given expenditure
levels and other economic and demographic characteristics.
To test this question, the following simple regression was run
where paddy and high land holdings were independent variables
controlling for other demographic and household characteristics:
LnCAL/AEU = -6.3 + 3.02LPCEXP - 0.16LPCEXP2 - 0.69LAEURAT
(26.9) (22.1) (22.1)
- 0.01HHSIZE + 0.63URB - 0.67EST - 0.10URBX
(5.7) (5.6) (2.8) (7.0)
+ 0.10ESTX - 0.01EARNERS + 0.005PADDYLAND
(3.1) (1.5) (1.96)
+ 0.005HIGHLAND
(2.94)
where:
LnCAL/AEU = log of calories per AEU
EARNERS = number of income earners per household
PADDYLAND = acres of paddy land holdings
HIGHLAND = acres of high land holdings
The positive and significant coefficients indicate that households
with land holdings do indeed consume more calories than a comparable
unit with the same overall level of expenditures. However, the magni-
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tude of the increased level of calorie consumption is indeed small.
Specifically, aLnCAL/aPADDYLAND = .0048. Through some arithmetic
manipulation, one gets: 3CAL/aPADDYLAND = 0.0048 * CAL. For the
average household consuming 2,583 calories/AEU, an increase of one acre
of land holding, keeping all else constant, will increase daily intake
by approximately 12.4 calories per AEU, or around one-half of one per-
cent of the average intake. Of course land ownership is in fact
highly correlated with income, and this is the factor through which
higher energy intake is mediated.
Paddy and Coconut Producers
In the short-term, the deleterious welfare effects of a price
change can be estimated easily for poor households which are non-
producers. But what of the producers? What is the tradeoff between
higher income as mediated through higher producer prices for paddy and
coconuts and the higher prices they would in turn face as consumers?
To begin, the households which produce paddy were identified.
They were stratified into quartiles, as a function of the value of
their production. In Table 41 one can observe that, as expected,
households which produce more paddy have higher calorie intake. This
is mostly explained by the fact that larger producers fall in higher
expenditure categories. However, energy intake generally rises the
higher the production within a given expenditure level.
Among the small paddy producers, it is initially instructive to
note that only around one quarter of the major income earners in these
households list farming and cultivating as their primary occupation.
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Table 41 -- Calories Per Adult Equivalency Unit by Value of Paddy
Production and Per Capita Expenditures
Value of
Paddy
Production
(Quartiles)
Per Capita Expenditures (Quartiles)
1 2 3 4
1 Cal/AEU 1903
n=94
2 Cal/AEU 1983
n=91
3 Cal/AEU 2008
n=60
4 Cal/AEU 1998
n=28
Total
2548
n=94
2483
n=91
2611
n=72
2569
n=57
3609
n=47
4005
n=64
4032
n=91
3140
n=84
3135
n=83
3211
n=87
3218
n=117
2670
n=319
2807
n=329
3080
n=310
3310
n=319
4073
n=117
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Fifteen percent of the households respond that they are agricultural
or animal husbandry workers. Around 10 percent of the major income
earners list farming and cultivating as their secondary occupation.
Twelve percent of the second income earners are also farmers and
cultivators. This reinforces the data presented above that small
paddy producers are engaged in other wage earning activities off the
farm. In contrast, farming is the primary occupation of either the
first or second income earner in 85 percent of the families which fall
in the highest quartile of the value of paddy output. For these
households with large land holdings, agriculture represents not only a
commercial enterprise, but a lucrative one as well.
Table 42 indicates that only 8.2 percent of households which are
small producers participate in the market as sellers of paddy. Fully
94 percent of the paddy they produce is consumed at home. As the
level of paddy output rises and the wealth of farmers increase, this
trend reverses. Among the upper quartile of producers, 95 percent
sell paddy in the market. Only 31 percent of the production is con-
sumed at home, and virtually all the households produce more than they
consume. The implication of these figures revolves around the
question of whether the household is a net producer or consumer, and
thus whether a price increase will positively or adversely affect
household income. It is noted that only three percent of the house-
holds produce more than they consume among the smallest producers,
i.e., less than one-half an acre of land. That figure rises steadily
to nearly 100 percent among larger holders with average paddy land
holdings of 3.3 acres. Thus, virtually all of the smallest producers
are net purchasers of paddy.
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Table 42 -- Percent of Households Selling Paddy, Sale Price, Ratio of Home Consumption
to Total Production, and Occupational Characteristics of Paddy Growers
Value of Paddy Production (Rs/Year)
<787 788-1900 1901-4760 >4760
n=319 n=329 n=310 n=319
% Households where 26.6 48.6 58.4 74.9
occupation of
major income
earner is farmer
% Households where 12.2 10.3 9.7 11.2
occupation of
second income
earner is farmer
% Households where 10.0 8.2 14.8 7.8
secondary
occupation of
major income
earner is farmer
% Households 8.2 27.7 64.2 95.0
selling paddy
Mean ratio of home 0.94 0.83 0.60 0.31
consumption to
total production
% Households which 2.8 23.4 60.6 98.1
produce more
than consume
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A similar story can be told for coconut producers (see Table 43).
Less than one-third of all coconut producers sell coconuts, and of
those that do, most are the large producers. Among the smallest pro-
ducers, almost all of the coconut grown is consumed at home. The
ratio of home consumption to production remains above 0.85 for three
quarters of the households involved in coconut production. The per-
cent of households which produce more than they consume rises dramati-
cally from 3 to 90 percent from the quartile of smallest to largest
producers. As expected, there is also a precipitious decline in the
percent of households in the lowest quartile of the income distribu-
tion as the value of coconut production rises.
The data on agricultural production in general, and paddy and
coconuts in particular, reveal that most of the households growing
food do so for their own consumption. Sri Lanka's agriculture remains
mainly composed of enterprises producing for home consumption. A
large percent of the poor households are the small cultivators, which
also earn much of their income in the form of wages and salaries.
Therefore, it appears from the data presented above that the small
farm households will be hurt in the short term by the raising of pro-
ducer prices, assuming stable marketing margins.
To further illustrate this point, a simple simulation was deve-
loped to determine how incomes would be affected by exogenous changes
in the farmgate and market prices of rice and coconuts. New levels of
income were calculated as follows:
P C
YN = YI + [(PADDYS x APS) + (COCOS x APs)] - {[(RICEV - (0.66 x
P P C C
46.7 x PADDYHC x P )) x UaP ] + [(COCOVT - COCOQHC x P ) X %AP
M M M M
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Table 43 -- Percent of Households Selling Coconut, Sale Price, Ratio
of Home Consumption to Total Production, and Occupational
Characteristics of Coconut Growers
Value of Coconut Production (Rs/Year)
<432 432-1170 >1170
n=777 n=400 n=411
% Households where 22.10 27.30 36.00
occupation of
major income
earner is farmer
% Households where 5.65 9.50 6.60
occupation of
second income
earner is farmer
% Households where 5.00 8.00 5.80
secondary
occupation of
major income
earner is farmer
% Households 5.95 27.75 83.21
selling coconuts
Mean ratio of home 0.97 0.87 0.45
consumption to
total production
% Households which 94.94 55.00 7.30
produce more
than consume
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where:
YN = new level of income, after a change in paddy or coco-
nut farmgate prices
YI = initial level of income,
PADDYS = the quantity of paddy sold,
AP = the change in the sale (i.e., farmgate) price of paddy
S as the result of an exogeneous policy decision,
COCOS = the quantity of coconuts sold,
APC = the change in the sale price of coconut,
S
RICEV = the value of rice consumed (i.e, quantity x market
price),
PADDYHC = the quantity of rice grown and consumed at home,
PP = the market price of paddy,
M
P
%UP P= a non-dimensional number which is the percentage change
M in the market price of paddy as a result of an exogeneous
policy decision,
COCOVT = the value of coconuts consumed,
COCOQHC = the quantity of coconuts grown and consumed at home,
PC = the market price of coconuts,
M
%&PC = a non-dimensional number which is the percentage change
M in the market price of coconuts as the result of an
exogenous policy decision.
This formula allows for a static analysis of the effects of price
changes. Thus, it is appropriate for the short-term when one would
not observe a major supply or marketing response among producers, nor
marked changes in the demand for labor or rural wage rates.
A variety of scenarios regarding price changes were explored. For
each, the percent of households whose incomes would be enhanced is
presented in Table 44. In column 1, it is apparent that an equal
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Table 44 -- Effect of Changes in Producer and Consumer Rice and Coconut
Prices on Net Income
Percent of Households
Equal Percent
Increase in Con-
sumer and Prod-
ucer Rice Price
Whose Income Increases as a Result of:
Equal Percent
Equal Percent Increase in
Increase in Con- Consumer and
sumer and Producer Producer Coconut
Coconut Price and Rice Price
2.4
3.5
7.5
7.1
11.3
13.6
2.5
4.4
7.6
8.6 17.2
Per Capita
Expenditure
(Quartiles)
1
2
3
4 11.6
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percent increase in producer and consumer prices for rice will lower
the income of almost all households in the lower quartile, and for
almost 90 percent of the households in the highest expenditure group.
From column 2, one observes that raising coconut prices, under the
assumption of constant marketing margins, will improve the income
position of more than twice as many households, regardless of their
expenditure level, as when paddy prices are increased. However, more
than twice as many households in the upper expenditure group (17.2%)
benefit from a coconut price increase than in the lowest expenditure
groups. In column 3, the results of raising coconut and rice prices
an equal percent are reported. Once again, it adds support to the
contention that relatively few individuals, especially in the lower
end of the income distribution, are net sellers of rice or coconuts.
Thus, further price increases must be viewed as a short-term hazard.
The nutritionally vulnerable do not stand to benefit significantly
more in terms of income earned from agricultural sales; rather, their
real income will decline because they are facing higher consumer
prices.
There are obvious limitations in this short-term analysis. Most
severe is that the supply response to price changes in paddy produc-
tion is not accounted for, as well as the output elasticity of market-
ings. But even if there is a significant supply response, the impact
on rural wages will be mediated through the factor utilization pat-
terns (i.e., labor versus capital intensification) in the face of
increasing production, coupled with the supply elasticity of hired
labor. Estimating these parameters is a major research question in
its own right and beyond the scope of this analysis on consumer
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behavior. However, in analyzing the 1980/81 Survey it was possible to
determine that Sri Lanka has a rural unemployment rate of around 15
percent. In addition, nearly 60 percent of all rural major income
earners said that given the opportunity they would choose to work more
hours. This figure was 77 percent among rural laborers and 60 percent
among cultivators. These data suggest that the supply elasticity of
hired labor is high. This indicates that the supply price of labor
(i.e., wages) may remain relatively stable even in the face of a
robust supply response which translates into increased labor, rather
than capital, utilization.
A long-term analysis of the expected effect of further price
increases is an important subject for future research. There are,
however, great difficulties in such analyses. Nevertheless, the old
saying that "we are all dead in the long-run" emphasizes the impor-
tance of addressing short-term dislocations, which may result from
further rises in staple prices, which are likely not to be offset by
higher earnings among the poor.
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V. UTILITY THEORY AND CONSUMER DEMAND ANALYSIS
Modeling consumption behavior at the household level is paramount
in order to identify efficacious policies and interventions to improve
dietary intake and nutritional status. As suggested by the previous
chapter, the main nutritional concern revolves around assuring that a
household achieves calorie adequacy.
The theory behind estimating price and income (or expenditure)
elasticities of demand for specific commodities, as well as nutrients,
and estimating parameters for other socio-demographic factors which
determine food consumption behavior is thus the central theme of this
chapter. However, before embarking on estimating demand equations, a
brief review of the theoretical underpinnings for food demand analysis
is required.
The theoretical basis for consumption analysis is based on tradi-
tional demand theory. The consumer is assumed to maximize his utility
function
(3) u = u(ql, q2, q3, ... qn
by purchasing some or all of n commodities subject to the exogeneous
budget constraint governing a period of time.
(4) JPiq i < Y
i
where Pi = (P1, P2, P3, ... Pn) and represents the vector of prices
corresponding to the set of commodities qi. Y is the consumer's real
income.
By assuming that the consumer is facing a linear budget constraint
tangent to a convex indifference curve, represented by a repeatedly
differentiable utility function, and that the upper boundary of the
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opportunity set will always be attained, thus making (4) an equality,
one can solve the maximization problem by the Lagrangean function:
(5) L = u(x) + X(Y - jPiq i )
By differentiating the Lagrangean function, the first order con-
ditions where the function is set equal to zero yields a system of
Marshallian demand equations which assume the form:
(6) qi = qi(Y, P1, P2, P3 ... Pn)
The Lagrangean multiplier, x, is a scalar which is difficult to
interpret since it describes the extent to which utility which is not
measurable except in ordinal terms would increase as a result of the
relaxation of the budget constraint.
The system of demand equations from (6), derived from the
constrained maximization problem, can be used to generate income, own-
price, and cross-price elasticities. These are given respectively by:
(7) Ei = alogqi/alogY
(8) ei = alogqi/alogPi
(9) eij = alogqi/alogPj
These elasticities, which describe the relationship between quan-
tities and prices and income, are limited by the restrictions on the
demand functions from which they are derived. 1 There are three
restrictions which are outlined below because they will be useful in
testing the plausibility of the results reported at the end of this
chapter. The first, referred to as homogeneity to the degree zero, or
the absence of money illusion, implies that increasing the prices and
quantities by the same factor will leave demand unchanged:
1 A. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior,
(Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp. 15-16.
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(10) qi (cY, CPk) = qi (Y, Pk)
This implies that
(11) 1 Pk(aqi/aPk) + Y(aqi/DY) = 0
k
or that consumption of qi does not change as a result of a propor-
tionate change in prices and income. After dividing (11) by qi, one
arrives at:
(12) jeik + Ei = 0
k
That is, the sum of all own-price and cross-price elasticities plus
the income elasticity equals zero.
A second restriction, known as the adding-up restriction, simply
states that the entire budget is exhausted with expenditures on
commodities qk. That is given the property that Y(Pk * qk) = Y, one
k
may differentiate this budget constraint with respect to q to get:
(13) XPk aqk/Y = 1
k
This is known as the Engel aggregation. When multiplied through by
the identities qk/qk and Y/Y, it yields that:
(14) Yak * Ek = 1
k
where ak is the budget share, (Pkqk/Y), to commodity k. This indicates
that the summation of the products of the budget share and income
elasticities is equal to 1. In addition, one may differentiate the
budget constraint totally to get:
(15) dY = I Pkdqk + qkdPk
k
When dY = 0 and dPk = 0, K/j, then
(16) 0 = lPkaqk + qiaPi
k
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Rearranging the terms in (16) one gets the following:
(17) { Pk aqk = -qi
aPi
This is referred to as the Cournot aggregation. Thomsoni shows that
through some algebraic manipulation, one gets
(18) al e1i + azi + a3 e3i *- an eni = ai
This may be interpreted as saying the sum of all the own and cross-
price elasticities for commodity i, weighted by the budget share of
the kth commodity, will equal the budget share of the ith good.
A third property of demand theory is referred to as symmetry. It
can be derived from the Slutsky equation:
aqi aqi aqi
(19) = P u -p 0
where DXi
Pj Iu=uo is the compensated substitution effect. The Slutsky
equation can thereafter be multiplied through by Pi/Xi * Y/Y to yield
the same relationship in terms of elasticities:
(20) eij = cij - aiEi
where cij are the cross-price (i.e., pure substitution) elasticities. 2
The discussion above lays the theoretical foundation for estima-
tion of demand equations which would yield n income and n own-price
elasticities and (n2 - n) cross-price elasticities. The actual number
of income and price parameters to be estimated can be reduced from
1 Anne M. Thomson, "Nutrition, Food Demand and Policy," Ph.D.
Dissertation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1979).
2 C. Peter Timmer and H. Alderman, "Estimating Consumption Parameters
for Food Policy Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 61 No. 5 (1979) pp. 982-987.
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n(n+1) by imposing the restrictions of demand theory. That is, the n
restrictions of the homogeneity restriction, the one restriction from
the Engel aggregation and the 1/2(n 2 - n) restrictions by removing the
income effect from the cross-price terms in order to derive the pure
substitution effect, and thereafter applying the symmetric properties
of those parameters result in only 1/2(n 2 + n-2) parameters which need
to be estimated.
The data being analyzed from Sri Lanka contains over 200 food
items and non-food items. Thus, even if the restrictions discussed
above were employed, thousands of parameters and an unwieldy number of
equations would have to be estimated in the system. It is clearly
necessary to aggregate the commodities into groups. Doing so and
using a system to estimate parameters for aggregated groups implies a
set of properties which have been experimented with by previous
researchers.1 ,2 However, recent tests of the systems approach based
on aggregate commodity groups have rejected its usefulness for
1 See R. Frisch, "A Complete Scheme for Computing All Direct and
Cross Demand Elasticities in a Model with Many Sectors,"
Econometrica 27 (1959) pp.177-196; and also Per Pinstrup-Andersen
and Elizabeth Caicedo, "The Potential Impact of Changes in Income
Distribution on Food Demand and Human Nutrition," American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 60 No. 3 (1978) pp. 402-415.
2 The restrictions summarized by Deaton and Muellbauer (op. cit.,
p.6) are: (1) weak separability -- which implies that the marginal
rate of substitution between any two goods within one group is inde-
pendent of any good which is in any other group; (2) strong or addi-
tive separability -- which implies that the marginal utility derived
from goods i in one group is independent of the consumption level of
good j in another group, and that the overall utility function is
derived from adding together the sub-utility function functions of
individual groups; and (3) additivity or want independence -- which
is the case when only one good is in each group and implies that
all goods are normal and that the cross-price derivatives are pro-
portional to the income derivatives.
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accurate parameter estimation. 1
As an alternative, the method used herein will involve direct
estimation, based on a commodity-by-commodity specification of the
demand function. This unconstrained approach is less restrictive. It
is an approach in good currency and has been strongly advocated by
Timmer and Alderman, 2 despite its major drawback: the difficulty of
estimating a complete matrix of price elasticities. The effects of
this shortcoming can be mitigated in the context of Sri Lanka or other
food economies with a single staple food. As shown in the previous
chapter, five commodities comprise 80 percent of the average calorie
intake. Therefore, a reasonable objective is to estimate robust
income and price coefficients for most of these commodities. Doing so
will tell nearly the complete story of expected adjustments at the
household level to exogenous changes in the macro food economy. The
fact that it will not be possible to determine directly some cross-
price elasticities is considered of minor consequence since their
importance is proportional to (a) the absolute value of the coef-
ficient, and (b) the proportion of total expenditures represented by
that commodity.
1 Op. cit., Thomson, pp. 131-42; and also op. cit., Deaton and
Muellbauer, pp. 60-81.
2 C. Peter Timmer, "Is There "Curvature" in the Slutsky Matrix?"
Review of Economics and Statistics, LXIII, No. 3 (1981) pp. 395-402.
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VI. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND TECHNIQUE OF ESTIMATION: ECONOMETRIC
CONSIDERATIONS
Modeling household food consumption behavior requires that the
analyst specify the functional forms and estimation techniques to be
used. In the commodity-by-commodity analysis which follows, the point
of departure for Engel curve estimation is to find a functional form
with the best goodness-of-fit based on the observed data using an esti-
mation technique that is theoretically sound.
The basic Engel function takes the form:
(1) Qij = Yjali + Zkjaki + Uij and E(ui) = 0; j=1,2,...N
where:
Qij = quantity consumed of commodity i by household j
Yj = income of household j
a1 = coefficient of income to be estimated
Zk = vector of other independent variables
Sk = vector of coefficients to be estimated
Uj = independently distributed error term
N = number of households observed
Before being more explicit as to the actual form the commodity-
specific estimated models assume, a few general points concerning (1)
are noteworthy. First, the dependent variable is expressed in terms
of quantity. This is juxtaposed with some similar efforts which
either use expenditures or nutrients (i.e., calories, proteins) from
commodity i as the dependent variable. In the former case, there is a
marked disadvantage in that expenditures capture both qualitative and
quantitative choices of the consumer. In theory, one could increase
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markedly expenditures on a given good, without increasing the quantity
purchased. It is impossible to distinguish between the two without
estimating quantity functions. Therefore, given that food policy ana-
lysis is concerned primarily with how quantities of goods in the con-
sumption bundle will change in the face of exogenous factors,
quantity rather than expenditure functions are estimated.
In the latter case, although the concept of using nutrients as the
dependent variable is appealing since it will more directly elucidate
the nutritional implications of shifts in exogenous variables, there
remains an underlying weakness to this approach. Specifically, the
purpose of estimating consumption functions is to model rational con-
sumer behavior. The consumer utility function, however, does not
include calories as an argument. Thus, there is not an explicit
attempt to maximize calorie consumption. Consumers do not look at a
pound of rice or an ounce of beef and mentally calculate nutrient
values at the market. If they did, it would be quite remarkable. Of
course, consumer preferences account implicitly for the nutrient value
of foods when selecting their consumption bundle. Nonetheless, quan-
tity units remain the preferable dependent variable in food policy
analysis. Thereafter, these models with quantities can be aggregated
into nutrient values to explore more fully the nutritional implica-
tions of policies and behavioral response.
The second issue regarding (1) revolves around the income variable
Yj. In theory, income is given exogenously to the model. In prac-
tice, as discussed in Chapter III, there remains considerable question
as to whether income is reported with sufficient accuracy to warrant
its use in estimating Engel functions. Similarly, even if reporting
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is perfectly accurate, the time horizon over which it is collected may
not be long enough to account for the factors which condition a
household's perception of permanent income. Thus, the use of current
income reported in household studies will provide biased parameter
estimates. The extent of the bias will be a function of the dif-
ference between current income and permanent income, the latter of
which is a major determinant of consumer behavior. 1
In the Sri Lanka context, both reporting problems and problems
inherent in using current income are extant. The former was discussed
in Chapter III; the latter was shown by Visaria's work on life cycle
variations in expenditures for given income levels in Sri Lanka. 2
Despite the availability of rather detailed data on current income,
expenditures are therefore a preferred proxy for permanent income.
Engel estimates will follow the currently accepted practice of using
total expenditures as the regressor, represented by Xj.
As with many other facets of life, reaching a logical decision on
one problem leads to an entirely new dilemma. Indeed, there have been
objections voiced regarding the use of total expenditures as an inde-
pendent variable in Engel curve estimations. A classic case of errors
in variables may result in biased parameter estimates when ordinary
least squares estimates are used to regress quantities consumed on
total expenditures, and the vector of other independent variables.
1 Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function, (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).
2 Pravin Visaria, "Some Aspects of Relative Poverty in Sri Lanka,
1969-70," World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 461 (Washington, D.C.,
1981).
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To amplify, Summers1 pointed out that using single equation
least squares to estimate an Engel function, where the total expen-
ditures is used as a proxy for income, would result in biased estima-
tes. He reminds us that a basic theorem of single equation least
squares is that there is no feedback between the quantities consumed
(i.e., dependent variable) and total expenditures (i.e., independent
variable). In other words, ordinary least squares (OLS) is only an
appropriate estimation technique if the independent variables are
truly exogenous to the model. To the extent that
n
(2) Xj = IXij = X1j + X2j + X3j ... ekj i = 1,2,...N
and the dependent variable of (1)
(3) Qij = Xij/Pij
where Pij = price of commodity i, the use of Xj as an exogenous
variable and Qij as the dependent in a consumption function may result
in biased estimates. Although the problem of the stochastic term in
the regression not being independent of one of the right hand side
variables was recognized by Prais and Houthakker, 2 they argued that it
will result in insignificant biases if the item of expenditure (Qi)
represents only a small share of the entire budget (X). This is the
case for almost all goods in developed country economies. The case of
single staple, agrarian economies such as Sri Lanka may be different.
The fact is, for example, that upwards of 75 percent of total expen-
1 Robert Summers, "A Note on Least Squares Bias in Household
Expenditure Analysis," Econometrica, 27 (1959) pp. 121-126.
2 S. Prais and H. Houthakker, The Analysis of Family Budgets
(England: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
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ditures are on food; and often greater than 50 percent of food expen-
ditures are on rice. Clearly, there is a higher risk of total
expenditures being determined simultaneously with rice quantity and
thus not truly being endogenous to the model.
The size of the bias from this problem of errors in variables
was explored by Liviatan.1 He proposed the use of instrumental
variables to overcome this problem. This procedure involves iden-
tifying a variable correlated with the systematic part of X but not
correlated with the error terms. The correlation between the instru-
ment, which we label Z, and X only effects the statistical efficiency,
not the consistency of the estimate.
Another way of thinking about this problem is as a system of
simultaneous equations which can be solved using a two-stage least
squares method. This was the method used by Massell. 2  According to
Maddala, 3 "the 2SLS method is also an instrumental variable method."
The method involves determining a fitted value for the endogenous
variable (in this case Xj) by regressing that variable on all the exo-
genous variables in the system.
Given the previous discussion, the salient question is whether it
is worth the loss in computational efficiency to use a fitted value
for per capita expenditures Xj. In order to answer this question, an
1 Nissan Liviatan, "Errors in Variables and Engel Curve Analysis,"
Econometrica 29 (1961) p.3.
2 B. Massell, "Consistent Estimation of Expenditure Elasticities
from Cross-Section Data on Households Producing Partly for
Subsistence," Review of Economics and Statistics 51 (1969)
pp. 136-42.
3 G. Maddala, Econometrics (McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1977) pp. 220-50.
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experiment was devised which consists of estimating Engel functions
using single equation least squares, as is normally practiced, and
comparing those results with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates
which remove the simultaneity in the system. This would allow testing
the effects of the stochastic term not being independent of a right
hand side variable. Some results of experimenting with the use of
instrumental variables using 2SLS are thus reported in Chapter VII.
NON-CONSUMING HOUSEHOLDS
A further theoretical problem in estimating consumption functions
is that not all households consume all food commodities. This was
illustrated in Tables 4 through 6. For some food groups, e.g., rice,
coconut, fish, virtually all households are consumers. For others,
e.g., meat, wheat, and milk, around half to two-thirds of the house-
holds are consumers.
This problem of non-consuming households arises due to a number of
reasons. First, it may be that the period covered by the survey
(i.e., one week) was too short. If a longer time horizon was used,
non-consumers might have been reduced. Seasonal factors not captured
by a cross-sectional survey could also have influenced the consume/not
consume decision. Alternatively, households may choose not to consume
a commodity because of its price or their limited income. There may
also be a variety of social or cultural reasons that households do not
consume certain products, regardless of economic consideration, e.g.,
Muslims do not eat pork. Regardless of the reason, non-consuming
households present some interesting estimation problems.
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The simpler problem is when, due to non-consumption, one cannot
impute a price for a commodity to be used as an independent variable
in a regression analysis. Most statistical packages will normally
eliminate observations with missing independent variables. Assigning
those households a zero price is likewise not acceptable since even
non-consumers are facing a price in the market place. Therefore, it
was decided to assign a price to all non-consuming households. First,
mean market prices were determined by region. Non-consuming house-
holds were then assigned the mean price of the district in which the
household resided.
A less tractable problem is where the dependent variable in the
function has a zero value, i.e., when the quantity consumed is nil.
There are two reasons this is problematic. The first is that a large
number of zero values will result in biased estimates of the coef-
ficients using OLS. The second is that one will lose a considerable
amount of information on consumer behavior, in terms of understanding
whether a change in one of the parameters will bring about entry into
the market. This information on market entry is vital to assess
aggregate commodity demand in a changing micro food economy, as well
as to determine how a change in income or prices will effect the
overall calories consumed by households which may not enter the market
as a result of such shifts.
To amplify this problem, assume that the underlying model to be
estimated is of the form
(4) Qi=X + ui and E(u) = 0
where:
Qi = quantity of commodity i,
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X = vector of independent variables,
a = vector of coefficients to be estimated,
ui = independently distributed error term.
Tobini points out that if it includes both consumers and non-
consumers (in the latter case Q=0) the error term ui will not be
normally distributed. This violates the central assumption of ordi-
nary least squares. As an alternative, one could eliminate all zero
observation, i.e., non-consumers. If the sample is truncated to
include only consumers, then through some simple algebra one can see
that ui > xa. Tobin once again points out that this does not conform
to a second assumption of classical least squares that E(u) = 0.
The potential bias introduced when a large percent of households
are non-consumers therefore requires further consideration. There are
a few options worth pondering. The first concerns the process of
aggregating commodities into broader community groups. Take wheat and
bread, for example. In a previous attempt to estimate parameters in
Sri Lanka, the researchers aggregated these two foods into a single
group.2  If this was done herein, the problem of non-consuming house-
holds would be resolved. But at what cost? The fact is that, as shown
in Chapter III, household consumption patterns are extremely different
with regard to wheat and bread. As a result, aggregating market goods
into broad groups may in fact lead to spurious conclusions.
Similarly, if commodities like wheat and bread or milk and meat are
1 J. Tobin, "Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent
Variables," Econometrica 26 (1958) pp. 24-36.
2 M. Yetley and S. Tun, "Household Demand Analysis for Assessing
Nutritional Impact of Development Programs," IED Staff Report
(Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1981) Appendix.
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aggregated, one also reduces the potential degrees of freedom for
developing sound food policy.
The second possible solution involves the use of cell mean data.
Specifically, one can adopt the approach used by Timmer and Alderman1
to estimate functions, arguing that it smooths out taste variability,
and thereby eliminates the problem of non-consuming households. The
obvious problem with such a procedure is that variation is lost in the
process of aggregation. Inclusion of variables on occupation and
household structure will not be possible with aggregate functions. A
considerable amount of price variation will also be lost. This is a
big problem in cross-sectional data where price variation is often
limited. However, given that it is usually possible to construct cell
means on the basis of income or region where there are at least some
consumers, if a sufficient amount of variation can be maintained, the
procedure of aggregation will effectively provide information on the
average response of the group of consumers.
A third option revolves around employing estimation methods other
than ordinary least squares. Techniques such as Tobit and Probit are
considered in this regard. Concerning the former, Tobin 2 devised a
maximum likelihood technique which has been used in consumption analy-
sis by Pitt3 to estimate elasticities in Bangladesh and by
1 C. Peter Timmer and Harold Alderman, "Estimating Consumption
Parameters for Food Policy Analysis," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 61, No. 5 (1979) pp. 982-987.
2 Op. cit., Tobin, p.7.
3 M. Pitt, "Food Preferences and Nutrition in a Poor Developing
Country," Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV (1983)
pp. 105-114.
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Kinseyl to estimate marginal propensities to consume food away from
home in low-income U.S. households. The estimates presented by Pitt
do not distinguish between the effects of how changes in the parame-
ters effect those who are already in the market, (i.e., elasticity of
demand of consumers), versus the effect of changes in parameters on
participation in the market (i.e., elasticity of entry into or exit
from the market). Therefore, the overall elasticities do not indicate
to what extent consumer response is due to shifts in consumption among
consumers or a shift from non-consumption to consumption among non-
participants. A method for doing so is discussed by McDonald and
Moffit.2  They show how the Tobit estimation can be divided into com-
ponent parts. The problem is that the parameters which explain entry
response and quantity response of consumers must be the same. Thus,
the benefit of decomposing the equation into components is limited to
the extent that the determinants of market entry and changes in con-
sumption once in the market are not identical.
As an alternative to Tobit, Alderman 3 uses a two stage approach to
estimate demand parameters which is commended because it does not
constrain the parameters for entry and quantity response to be the
1 J. Kinsey, "Working Wives and the Marginal Propensity to Consume
Food Away from Home," American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
65 (1983) pp. 10-19.
2 McDonald and Moffit, "The Uses of Tobit Analysis," The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 62 (1980) pp. 318-21.
3 Harold Alderman, "Allocation of Goods Through Non-Price Mechanisms:
Implications of Rationing and Waiting Times in Egypt," (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1984), pp. 51-62.
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same. The method, based on Heckman'sl labor participation work and a
paper by Griliches, Hall, and Hausman 2 basically involves combining
two separately specified functions. The first involves the use of a
binary choice model , such as a probit, which represents a switching
function. In this case, one estimates the standardized cumulative
normal function F(z) to determine the probability, Pi, of being in the
market as a function of a variety of random variables, X. One can
differentiate the function aF(z)/aX. To the extent that aF(z)/aX is
not zero, the probability of consuming commodity Qi is not equal to
zero.
The second function to be estimated involves performing an ordi-
nary least squares estimate on the truncated sample of households
above the limit (i.e., consuming households). However, once again the
problem remains that E(u) / 0 if the subsample of participating house-
holds is not random. This problem of biased estimators can be
addressed by including the inverse of the Mills Ratio, which is the
ratio of the unit normal density to the cumulative normal density, as
a regressor in the OLS equation. The Mills Ratio, according to
Heckman, can be determined from the probit equation discussed above,
which provides data on the probability that a household has a positive
value, Qi. Thereafter, the Probit estimates and the truncated OLS,
with the inverse of the Mills Ratio as a regressor, can be combined
1 J. Heckman, "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of
Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a
Simple Estimation for Such Models," Annals of Economics and Social
Movement 5 (1976) pp. 475-93.
2 Z. Griliches, B. Hall, and J. Hausman, "Missing Data and
Self-Selection in Large Panels," Annales de L'INSEE 30-31 (1978)
pp. 137-76.
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as follows to estimate the population parameter:
(5) aQi/axi = F(z) (aQ*/ax) + E(Q*) (aF(z)/ax)
where Q* is the truncated sample of consumers only. In other words,
the expected change in commodity Qi for a change in xi (e.g., the
marginal propensity to consume Qi) is determined by: (1) summing the
expected change in Qi for a change in xi given the probability that
someone is a consumer, and (2) the expected change in the probability
of consuming Q, weighted by the expected value of Qi, if a household
is already in the market.
The major drawback of both the Tobit and two stage Probit/OLS
estimation procedures is their cost. The non-linear estimation tech-
niques are not only expensive but the software packages are often
limited in terms of the size sample they can handle.
In the demand function which follows, ordinary least squares will
be employed for commodities where more than 90 percent of the house-
holds are consumers. This includes rice, coconuts, sugar, fish, con-
diments, and vegetables. For the other commodities, the two-step
approach will be used in order to ensure the accuracy of the parameter
estimates.
CHOICE OF FUNCTIONAL FORM
A final major consideration in estimating income and price parame-
ters revolves around the choice of functional form. The quest is to
find a formulation on the basis of a good fit for the observed data.
A variety of functional forms were therefore tested in the effort to
estimate meaningful income and price parameters. First, the linear
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model was rejected, as it implies that the expenditure elasticity of
demand for food commodities tends to unity with increasing income, an
unlikely scenario. The log-linear form was thus used as the point of
departure in specifying equations. While this form provides the ana-
lyst with a first approximation, it is limited because elasticities
are constrained to be constant across the entire range of consumption
and expenditures. The next step was to experiment with a variety of
forms which comply with an important observation in the food consump-
tion patterns presented in the previous section: that there is a
level of satiety above which more income will not compel the consumer
to purchase more of a given commodity. The conditions imply the use
of functional forms such as the log inverse where:
(6) LnQi = ai - a/PCEXP + yiiLnPi + EyijLnPj + SikZk
or the semilog where:
(7) Qi = a + OiLnPCEXP + yiiLnPi + EyijLnPj + 6ikZk
In the former, the expenditure elasticity is inversely proportional to
the level of per capita expenditures (PCEXP). In the latter, the
income elasticity is proportional to the level of consumption, and the
marginal propensity to consume varies inversely with income.
The log inverse and semilog both proved to fit the data con-
siderably better than the log-linear form. Nevertheless, in an
attempt to improve the goodness of local fits additional forms were
experimented with. These include the log-log inverse where:
(8) LnQi = a + ali/PCEXP - 62iLnPCEXP + yiiLnPi + yijLnPj +
6ikZk
the semilog quadratic where:
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(9) Qi = a + SliLnPCEXP + $2i(LnPCEXP) 2 + yiiLnPi + yijLnPj +
6ikZk
and the log-log quadratic where:
(10) LnQi = a + SliLnPCEXP + 02i(LnPCEXP) 2 + yiiLnPi + yijLnPj +
aikZk
These forms have a number of advantages over the ones above. First,
the expenditure elasticities can vary over a wide range. A commodity
may have an elasticity above unity for one expenditure group, while
being a necessity (O<ni<1) or an inferior good (ni>O) for other expen-
diture groups.
In searching for the best fits for observed data, the log-log
quadratic form proved equal to or better than the alternatives for the
commodities tested. In addition, upon taking the partial differential
of Qi with respect to Pi, and thereafter computing the elasticity, one
can see that the price response in the semilog form rises with levels
of consumption. This means that at equal expenditure levels, the con-
sumers purchasing more of Qi would be less price responsive. This is
not intuitively appealing.
A number of further refinements were attempted to improve the fit
of the log-log quadratic functions. The first concerns Zk, the vector
of other independent variables. Information on numerous household
characteristics were experimented with in an attempt to avoid the
income and price parameters picking up effects which are in reality
attributable to household structure and other demographic charac-
teristics. In this regard, a few variables were selected for inclu-
sion in the Engel function. First is the ratio of adult equivalency
units to household size, AEURAT. This variable is included to compen-
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sate for the fact that the age and sex composition of a household of a
given size affects directly the level of average per capita require-
ments for the household, and thus the demand for individual com-
modities. This ratio was found to explain more of the variances in
the equation than adding one or two variables such as number of
children below five, and the number of children of school age.
Just as the adult equivalency index was a vital demographic
variable, so is the need to include information on household size,
HHSIZE, and an interaction term between households and per capita
expenditure, HHSX. The former is included because adding another
household member will effect expenditures. For example, another per-
son may not add to the costs of shelter but may significantly increase
the household demand for food or health care. A further dimension of
the effect of household size is captured by HHSX. It could alter-
natively be considered a way of reflecting economies of scale in com-
modity purchases at the margin. If it has a negative coefficient, as
expected for food commodities, it signifies that as more members are
added to the household, a smaller amount of any marginal increase in
intake will be spent on a given good. Another way of interpreting the
negative and significant coefficient over the entire income range is
given by Deaton. 1  As per capita expenditures rise, there would be an
increasing understatement of welfare of the family if one only
deflated total household expenditures by household size. Simply, per
capita values fail to capture the effects of economies of scale that
are found in larger households.
1 Op. cit., Deaton, pp. 10-20.
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The other demographic variable experimented with in all the models
was a dummy variable which takes the value one when a household member
is a farmer or cultivator, and zero otherwise. This variable picks up
demographic and cultural differences in the population of farmers
which stem from a variety of factors. Most important in this regard
is locational factors and any difference in preference ordering. In
addition, this variable will account for any difference in prices
which they actually pay which might result from their status as produ-
cers (i.e., the difference between farm and retail prices due to
marketing cost).
A final variable, on the number of income earners, was included
for a variety of reasons. First, as shown in the previous discussion
of occupational characteristics, major income earners in certain occu-
pations are more likely to be complemented by a second worker in the
household. Likewise, it was shown that households where there is a
second income earner are more likely to be struggling for dietary ade-
quacy. Furthermore, EARNERS may pick up differences in food preferen-
ces which may result from more than one household member working to
earn money or in-kind resources than being engaged in household acti-
vities.
Two other dummy variables were also included in the models. These
were to pick up how consumption patterns differ in the urban (URB) and
estate (EST) sectors from the rural sector. While these dummy
variables when included alone in the equation will pick up most of the
variance explained by consumers being in the urban or estate sectors,
there is also a compelling policy question that they do not answer:
do urban and/or estate households react differently to changes in
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prices or incomes than those in the rural sector? In order to answer
this question, two further dummies were defined as interaction terms
formed by multiplying the log of per capita expenditures by URB and
EST. The result is the URBX and ESTX dummies, respectively, which are
slope shifters. They predict whether the expenditure elasticities for
the urban and estate sectors differ significantly from the rural sec-
tor. It is noteworthy that in addition to including the slope shifter
dummy variable in the equation, there are also dummies that represent
distinct intercept terms. The importance of doing so stems from the
fact that if only the slope shifter is included, the intercept for the
urban and estate sector is constrained to be the same as in the rural
sector. Given that the average consumption at different levels of
income is not the same in all the sectors, including only the slope
shifter while constraining the intercept to be the same will result in
incorrect econometric predictions for income elasticities.
Conversely, if one adds the dummy variable URB or EST alone, thus
allowing the intercept to vary while at the same time constraining the
slope to be the same, one may incorrectly infer that the elasticities
for the population groups are the same. In addition, constraining the
slope while allowing the intercept to vary will result in a value for
the URB or EST variable (i.e., intercept shifter) which will be biased
upward if the true elasticity of that specific population group is
higher than the general (i.e., rural) population, and biased downward
if the true elasticity of that specific population group is in fact
lower than the general population.
A series of other interaction terms were also experimented with in
each of the models which follows, although only a few are included due
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to problems of multi-collinearity with other variables. Specifically,
in addition to including own-price parameters, Pii, and cross-price
parameters, Pij, a series of interaction terms were formed by
multiplying the log of prices by the log of per capita expenditures
LnPk * LnPCEXP where Pk is the vector of prices for all commodities.
This was experimented with to determine if it was possible to pick up
any curvature in the price function which would not be captured by the
log-linear relationship between prices and quantities. In those cases
where LnPk * LnPCEXP proved insignificant, an interaction term between
the price and a dummy variable for low-income households was experi-
mented with. If significant, this would be an indication that poor
households are more price responsive than the remainder of the popula-
tion. Thus, either these interaction terms will allow price elastici-
ties to vary with expenditure level.
While there is considerable empirical evidence that expenditure
elasticities vary by expenditure levels, that is not so for price
elasticities. There remains a paucity of empirical data which relates
changes in price elasticities to income-class changes. Nevertheless,
the reasoning behind expecting price elasticities to vary with incomes
is embodied in the Slutsky equation:
(11) eij = Eij - Eiaj
where:
eij = overall demand for commodity i when the price of com-
modity j changes,
Eij = the pure substitution elasticity for commodity i when
the price of commodity j changes,
Ei = the income elasticity for commodity i,
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aj= the budget share of commodity j in the consumer's total
expenditures on all goods.
Past empirical work indicates that the income elasticity Ei is
higher among low-income households. In addition, in the previous
chapter it was shown that the budget share for food commodities, aj, is
also higher among low-income consumers. Exceptions where the budget
share actually increases with higher incomes are milk, fruits, fish,
and meat, all luxury food items. Therefore, with the exception of
these luxury commodities, if one assumes that the compensated price
term, Eij, remains the same, it is relatively straightforward to
conclude that the uncompensated price elasticity will have a higher
absolute value for low-income consumers and the rate of change in eij
would be directly proportional to Eiaj, regardless of the commodity.
Timmeri posits, however, that the pure substitution effects does
depend on income, and presents preliminary evidence that the absolute
size of the compensated price term Eij declines as per capita expen-
ditures rise. The hypothesized curvature to the pure substitution
effect (i.e., "Timmer's Curvature") implies that the rate of the
decline in the observed substitution or Cournot elasticities, eij, with
rising expenditures is less than the proportional changes in the pro-
duct of Eiaj. This is because Eij (which has the opposite sign of
(-Eiaj) would be smaller at higher expenditure levels if the Timmer
curvature holds.
Thus, estimating income specific own-price and cross-price coef-
ficients in the models which follow will enable one to not only pre-
1 C. Peter Timmer, "Is There 'Curvature' in the Slutsky Matrix?" The
Review of Economics and Statistics, LXIII, No. 3 (1981) pp. 395~~02.
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dict more precisely how consumers in Sri Lanka will respond to changes
in their micro food economy, but it will facilitate the accurate
testing of Timmer's hypothesized relationship that:
(12) a3ij/af(PCEXP) = 1/2 aEi/af(PCEXP)
To the extent that holds true, that knowledge can be applied to other
countries to indirectly predict price parameters without resorting to
the stringent restrictions of other indirect approaches discussed pre-
viously.
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VII. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF INCOME AND PRICE PARAMETERS
ESTIMATES
In the first section of this chapter, the results of the commodity
specific consumption functions are presented. They are discussed in
two groups. The first are those where ordinary least squares was
employed initially due to a negligable number of non-consuming house-
holds. Two of these demand functions were then re-estimated using a
two-stage least squares procedure to test for any biases which may
have resulted from the per capita expenditure terms not being truly
exogenous.
The second group of demand functions are those derived from the
two-step probit/OLS procedure discussed in Chapter V. For each of
these groups, the specific models are presented and discussed below.
(Variable definitions are found in Appendix B.)
In the second section of this chapter, income, own price, cross-
price, and Slutsky elasticities are estimated and examined. This is
followed in the third section with a discussion of how the parameters
can be used in formulating policy.
CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS
Ordinary Least Squares
Rice. In the basic rice demand equation, ordinary least squares was
used to estimate the log-log quadratic function (see Table 45). The
significance of the quadratic term reflects the curvature in the
Engel's function. The expenditure elasticity declines as income
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Table 45 -- Consumption Functions Estimated Using Ordinary Least Squares
Dendent Variables
LCId0U
(15.2)
(11.5)
(23.3)
(3.6)
(1.9)
(1 .4.1(11.21
2.92
-. 12
-. 05
-1.94
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.08
-. 05
1.13
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-. 05
.01
-.08
.04
.01
-. 09
.24
-. 52
-. 06
.05
.42
.10
-. 02
.05 (4.5) -. 14
-.03 (1.6) .05
.09 (1.4)
.11
(9.1)
(12.1)
(1.7)
(6.3)
2.0
1.0
5.0
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(7.0)
(1.7)
(2.0)
5.09
-. 21
-. 11
.04
2.77
.06
1.00
.11
.046
.061
-2.01
.04
-. 59
-. 02
-. 05
.55
-1.22
-. 06
.17
-. 48
.09
-. 01
(13.5)
31.8)
2.9
1.5)
(0.7)
2.0
1 9
2.2
(.7
3.0
1.71
0.7,
2.6
1.9
1.2
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URBX
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-147-
ri ses.
The third parameter in the model is the logarithm of rice price.
The robust coefficient indicates a significant own-price effect of
rice price on rice consumption. As with expenditures, one would
expect the own-price elasticity of demand for rice to vary inversely
with income. Including an interaction term between the price of rice
and per capita expenditures proved insignificant. Therefore, in an
attempt to determine if there is some difference in the price respon-
siveness of low-income consumers, a dummy variable for poor households
was multiplied by the price term. This variable, RICEDUM, proves
marginally significant with a t-ratio of -1.70, with p<0.10. Given
that this is an exercise in predicting consumer behavior, not a formal
attempt at hypothesis testing, parameters with an absolute value for
the t-ratios greater than 1.7 will be considered significant in the
quest to estimate a set of elasticities. As expected, the sign of the
RICEDUM coefficient is negative. This suggests that low-income con-
sumers are indeed more price responsive than the rest of the popula-
tion.
A number of cross-price terms are also included in the rice
equation, most of which prove significant. To a large extent, the
cross-price terms are included to reduce potential biases in income
and own-price parameters. Commodities hypothesized to have an impor-
tant relation with the dependent variable were included in the origi-
nal equations. Subsequently, many which proved insignificant were
removed to reduce multicollinearity in the equations. This approach
will result in estimating a matrix of elasticities which indicates the
major tradeoffs between prices of one commodity and the consumption
-148-
of the others. As mentioned previously, the alternative of
constraining the functions using a system is felt to be less worthy.
The fact is that in many instances empty or insignificant cells in the
matrix will truly reflect the fact that there are minimal tradeoffs
between one commodity and another. Imposing restrictions which will
generate values for these cells is not considered a good solution; it
will only obscure the accurate cross-price coefficients which are
estimable using a commodity-specific approach.
In the rice equation in Table 45, the coefficients for fish, coco-
nut, and oil are negative, indicating that as their prices rise, less
rice is consumed. This is not contrary to what is expected since they
are all complements in preparing curries. The sign of the cross-price
elasticity for other grains, which includes sorghum, millets, maize,
and a variety of cereal preparations, is somewhat surprising. It may
be explained by the predominance of the income effect over the compen-
sated price effect in the Slutsky equation. Among the positive para-
meter estimates is that for bread. As expected, it is a substitute
for rice in the diet. Interestingly, milk and meat also appear to be
substitutes. This may be partially due to the fact that whenever the
price of a luxury food increases, the household reverts to using their
limited resources for favored staple foods. The significant interac-
tion term between meat price and per capita expenditures indicates
that as incomes increase, the tradeoffs between commodities decrease.
This can be attributed to a combination of the decline in the pure
substitution effect, and the expected lower income elasticities and
budget shares as expenditure levels increase.
Wheat was the only commodity where a priori important tradeoffs
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were expected with rice (for the estate sector only) and a robust
coefficient could not be estimated. Various specifications were
attempted, including adding a dummy variable constructed by
multiplying wheat price by a dummy variable for those in the estate
sector. The results were all insignificant. The problem eminated
from the fact that all wheat flour is imported and milled by the
government. There is virtually no price variation, which all but
precludes estimating cross-price elasticities with cross-sectional
data.
Yams, tubers, and root crops, as a group, are also gross substitu-
tes for rice, but only for low-income households. This is determined
by not only including the log of the price (LYAMP) in the equation but
also an interaction term between the price term and per capita expen-
ditures (LYAMPX). The inflection point at which the sign of the
cross-price elasticity changes from being a substitute to a complement
commodity is Rs. 1877. This is approximately the mean expenditure
level of the third decile of the population. There are two interpre-
tations for this finding. First is that at low income levels, yams,
especially in the form of manioc, cassava, and sweet potato, are
indeed alternatives to rice. As incomes rise, not only do the trade-
offs between them and rice diminish but there is a shift toward
higher-priced root crops like white potatoes. As such, the second
interpretation of the curvature in the function is that it may reflect
partially an endogenously-determined shift in the quality of the com-
modity, which is captured in the price.
Similar significant cross-price interaction terms were estimated
for vegetables and meat. Unlike yams and vegetables, the turnaround
if
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point at which meat becomes a gross complement is at an expenditure
level achieved by less than 15 percent of the population. This is to
be expected given that meat is a luxury commodity with which the trade-
off between it and rice are considerably greater.
Most of the demographic variables were significant in the basic
rice model. The dummy variable for farmers and cultivators has its
predictable positive sign. AEURAT, or the ratio of adult equivalency
unit to household size, also had a positive parameter estimate as
expected. This reflects the fact that children have lower require-
ments for and thus consume relatively less rice than adults. The size
of the household, HHSIZE, has a positive coefficient, reflecting that
larger households with the same income purchase more rice. The third
hobsehold structure variable is the interaction terms between house-
hold size and per capita expenditures, HHSX. Its negative sign
reflects economies of scale in rice purchases.
The urban intercept and slope shifters (URB and URBX) are signifi-
cant. The coefficient of the former is positive, indicating that at
0
low levels of income the city dweller consumes more rice. In
contrast, the URBX term is significantly negative; the income elasti-
city of the urban consumer is thereby lower than rural households with
comparable expenditures. Where both the estate sector intercept and
slope shifters are included in the model, the sign of the former is
positive and the sign of the latter is negative, although neither are
significant. When one or the other is removed from the equation, the
one which remains becomes significant as the standard errors fall dra-
matically. Clearly there is a prqblem of multicollinearity between
the two variables. It was decided to leave both variables in the
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equation, despite neither being significant. The justification for
doing so was two-fold. First is that inclusion of such dummies picks
up variance and reduces the bias in the other price and income parame-
ters. Second is that, as mentioned earlier, constraining the inter-
cept while allowing the slope to vary may result in biased and
contrary econometric results.
Finally, interaction terms between rice price and the urban and
estate dummy variables were experimented with. In neither case were
they significant; although, the rice price times the urban dummy was
left in the model due to its F value and a desire to avoid biasing
other coefficients.
Coconuts. The demand function for coconuts, like rice, has a negative
and significant quadratic expenditure term. This once again rein-
forces the curvature in the Engel's function, and the importance of
employing a functional form sufficiently flexible to pick this up.
Another dimension of the coconut equation, not found for rice, is that
in addition to a highly significant own-price coefficient, it was
possible to estimate two other robust interaction terms for coconut
prices. The first is coconut price times per capita expenditures,
LCOCOPX. This significant and positive coefficient exemplifies that
as incomes increase, households become less price responsive. This is
attributed to a combination of decreasing budget share and income
elasticity of demand, and that the value of the compensated cross-
price term also varies with income. This will be explored further in
the next section.
The second feature of this demand function which was not observed
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with rice is the significant interaction term between coconut price
and the urban dummy variable, COCOURB. This positive coefficient
indicates that those residing in the urban sector have a lower own-
price elasticity than those in the rural and estate sectors. This
finding parallels the significant and positive URBX variable which
shows city dwellers to have a lower expenditure elasticity for com-
parable expenditure levels. It is also noteworthy that in this model
both the estate intercept and slope shifters, EST and ESTX, are in the
equation, although insignificant. If EST was removed from the
equation, like for rice, ESTX would be significant. However, since
EST and ESTX have different signs, removing the intercept shifter
would constrain the intercept to be the same for all sectors. The
result of doing so would be that the ESTX coefficient would switch
signs, and in fact be negative. The econometric results would be
incorrect.
Through iterative experimentation it was possible to find a func-
tional form which included robust cross-price coefficients for nine
commodities. That for rice was negative, and marginally significant.
Other functional forms (e.g., semilog quadratic, log-log inverse) were
experimented with in a quest to see if in fact the income effect of a
change in rice prices dominated the substitution effect, as was
observed with the log-log quadratic model. The results were all con-
sistent and negative. In addition, an interaction term between rice
price and a dummy for low-income consumers (RICEDUM) was added to the
basic model in hopes of finding a difference in the responsiveness
among this group. Once again, this coefficient proved marginally
significant. Its positive sign, however, conform to expectations
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that the poor are more price responsive than upper income households.
Interestingly, for this low income group of consumers, the cross-price
elasticity is actually zero. The income and substitution effects
cancel out one and the other. This can be attributed to the fact that
for low income households, the Slutsky cross-price elasticities are
higher (0.201) as compared to, for example, a value of .004 for house-
holds in the upper decile of the expenditure distribution.
Milk, meat, and yams are all gross substitutes for coconut. The
robust interaction terms between meat and milk prices and per capita
expenditures indicate considerable curvature in the cross-price effect
of these commodities on coconut consumption. However, they remain
gross substitutes well into the 90th percentile of the income distri-
bution. The only other commodity for which it was possible to esti-
mate a robust interaction term was bread. The fact that bread is a
complement to coconuts probably once again reflects the dominance of
the income effect over the substitution effect. The rate of decrease
in the income effect (largely mediated through a declining income
elasticity) being more rapid than the decrease in the compensated
price effect as expenditure levels increase, explains the reason that
the cross-price effect of bread on the quantity of coconuts consumed
eventually becomes positive among the upper expenditure deciles.
Sugar. The demand function for sugar once again has a significant
quadratic expenditure term. The interaction term between the log of
sugar price and log of per capita expenditures, which indicates a
decreasing absolute value of the own-price elasticity with rising
income, was also robust. In keeping with previous models, the
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elasticity of sugar consumption with respect to rice price is negative
due to the large budget share that rice represents. All other com-
modities, with the exception of condiments and vegetables, are gross
substitutes for sugar. Interestingly, it was possible to not only
estimate a robust cross-price effect with wheat flour, but to include
an interaction term between wheat price and per capita expenditures
without confronting problems of multicollinearity. One possible
explanation for this significant cross-price effect may be that out-
side the estate sector wheat flour is often used for preparing bakery
products and sweets which contain a high sugar content.
Another interesting feature of this equation is that all four
sector-specific dummy variables are significant. While functions for
other commodities included significant urban intercept and slope shif-
ters, the sugar equation is unique in that the variance in consumption
explained by living in the estate sector is large enough that both EST
and ESTX are significant. While the urban sector is less income
elastic than their rural counterparts, consumers in the estate sector
are more responsive to changes in incomes.
There is one final important finding from this equation. This
concerns the meat price and meat price times expenditures interaction
terms, LMEATP and LMEATPX. In most other cases, adding the interac-
tion terms results in multicollinearity; the standard error of the
original cross-price term rises, thereby making it insignificant. A
few exceptions, such as the case of wheat in this equation, are found
in most of the demand functions. In experimenting to find the best
fit for the observed data on sugar consumption, LMEATP only became
significant after LMEATPX was added into the equation. The non-linear
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relationship between the log of meat price and the log of sugar con-
sumption resulted originally in an insignificant coefficient. Only
when the interaction term LMEATPX was added, allowing for considerable
curvature in the relationship, did LMEATP become robust.
Fish. The demand function for fish, like rice and coconuts, also has
a significant quadratic expenditure term indicating a declining income
elasticity as incomes rise. The interaction between fish prices and
income is also significant. This once again indicates that the poor
are more price responsive. Included in the model is also an interac-
tion term between fish price and the urban dummy variable. Its posi-
tive and significant coefficient indicates that those in the urban
sector are less price responsive. A similar dummy variable for the
estate sector did not prove significant.
The model also provides many robust cross-price coefficients. The
expected animal food protein-rich substitutes, milk and meat, have
positive coefficients. The meat coefficient is larger as the trade-
offs between fish and meat are greater than between fish and milk. In
addition, an interaction term between meat price and expenditures is
significant, indicating that higher-income households are less likely
to substitute fish for meat as the price of the latter rises. A posi-
tive cross-price coefficient is also found for pulses. This is
encouraging from a food policy perspective. It shows that consumers
will substitute protein-rich pulses for fish. Vegetables, condiments,
and wheat also have positive coefficients. The fact that consumers
display a tradeoff between wheat and fish, but not between the other
starchy staples, rice and bread (both of which are gross complements)
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probably reflects the dominance of the income effect over the substi-
tution effect as rice and bread prices change. This dominance is
mainly a result of the large budget share of rice and bread.
Adding an interaction term between wheat price and the estate
sector (LWHTEST) where wheat is an important commodity with a large
budget share was designed to capture the same finding of the income
effect dominating over the substitution effect. As hypothesized, the
coefficient was indeed negative. However, the t-ratio was too low to
accept statistically that, in the estate sector, the income effect
dominates over the substitution effect to bring about a negative
cross-price elasticity between wheat and fish.
A final commodity with a positive cross-price term is sugar. This
is especially interesting since the interaction term between sugar
price and expenditures is also significant, pointing to considerable
curvature in the cross-price effects. At low levels of income, sugar
and fish are gross substitutes. As incomes increase this situation
changes and they become gross complements. This is suggestive, once
again, of the income effect predominating as incomes increase. In the
next section, which explores questions concerning the curvature of the
Slutsky matrix, the decreasing compensated price response with income
will be shown. It is also noteworthy that the inflection point at
which the cross-price parameter changes signs is at around the 10th
percentile of the income distribution. As a result, if the interac-
tion term was removed, LSUGARP would have a negative and significant
coefficient over the entire income range when in fact the commodities
are substitutes for the poor. This reinforces the importance of
searching for income class specific cross-price as well as expen-
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diture and own-price elasticities if one's concern is focused on the
poor.
Commodities with negative and significant coefficients include
roots and tubers and oils. Oil is a key ingredient in the preparation
of fish, which is often fried or consumed with curries. Roots and
tubers, also complementary commodities in the preparation of curries,
has a significant interaction term with expenditures, resulting in the
reduction in the absolute value of the cross-price effects.
The significant URB and URBX dummies show the same pattern found
for rice and coconut: a higher intercept and less curvature of the
regression line indicating a smaller increment in fish purchases which
would accompany marginal increases in income.
None of the dummy variables for the estate sector were significant
either. Nevertheless, they are left in the equation to avoid a bias
in the income and price parameters.
Once again the household structural variables are all significant.
The household size, adult equivalency ratio, and economies of scale
coefficients likewise were in keeping with the expected signs. An
additional dummy variable, D2, was included in this equation. It
takes on the value one if there is a fisherman in the household, and
zero otherwise. Like Di, it is designed specifically to pick up dif-
ferences in tastes and preferences of, as well as prices faced by,
families in which a member is involved in fishing.
Condiments. In Chapter III it was stressed that condiments are espe-
cially interesting because of their relatively large budget share and
small contribution to the diet in terms of calories. Perhaps the most
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interesting feature of the demand function is that with the exception
of the meat and bread price terms (the latter of which is not
significant), the cross-price coefficients of all other commodities
are negative. This is not surprising since condiments are not con-
sumed by themselves. To the extent that the prices of complementary
foods rise and their consumption declines, so will the use of con-
diments for food preparation.
As with the other Engel's functions for Sri Lanka, the urban sec-
tor has a lower income elasticity for condiments. The signs of all
the demographic variables are also in keeping with expectations and
the general patterns observed for other commodities.
Vegetables. Once again, the consumption function for vegetables be-
haves as expected. In addition to the significance of the quadratic
term indicating curvature in the expenditure elasticity, the ESTX
variable proved marginally significant and negative. Vegetables were
the only commodity for which the income elasticity of the estate sec-
tor was significantly lower than the urban and rural residents. It is
also noteworthy that the interaction term between the log of vegetable
price and EST, VEGEST, proved positive and significant, indicating
that estate residents are also less responsive to changes in vegetable
prices than other consumers. Bread, fish, milk, yams, and condiments
are all gross substitutes. Oil, in which most vegetables are pre-
pared, is a complement, although the significance of the coefficient
is marginal. The cross-price effects of rice and coconuts were not
significant. This may indicate that the small amount of micro-
nutrient rich vegetables consumed in the diet are somewhat immune to
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price changes of the two most important calorie sources.
There was an attempt to search for some cross-price response for
coconut price and rice price after LRICEP and LCOCOP proved insignifi-
cant in the basic model. A variety of combinations of interaction
terms between prices and sectoral dummies or prices and dummies for
low-income consumers were constructed in hopes of observing some
cross-price response among segments of the population. All efforts
proved insignificant, although inclusion of LRICEURB, LRICEDUM, and
LCOCODUM improved the robustness of other coefficients.
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
A final issue of concern before proceeding to the two-step
Probit/OLS estimates revolves around the discussion in Chapter V con-
cerning the possible feedback in the demand functions due to the fact
that the per capita expenditure was not completely exogenous. In
order to test the possible bias this would cause, a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) method was suggested. In essence, it employs a fitted
value for the LPCEXP and LPCEXP2 terms in the equation to assure that
they are not correlated with the error term in the model as discussed
earlier.
Models using the two-stage process were estimated for two of the
commodities, rice and fish, to determine whether the bias was worth
In the first stage of the procedure, the log of money income, land
holdings, and a wealth index as well as all the exogenous variables
in the rice model were included to estimate the reduced form coeffi-
cients. This procedure of including all the exogenous variables in
the system in the first stage, according to Madella (op. cit.,
p.221), will produce constant estimates.
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being concerned with. The results are found in Table 46. As one can
see, the parameter estimates for rice are nearly identical to those
found in Table 45 using single equation least squares. For example,
when calculating the expenditure elasticity for rice, one finds less
than a five percent difference between the single equation and two-
stage least squares estimates. The major difference is in the loss of
statistical significance in many of the parameter estimates. This is
to be expected, as there is a loss of efficiency in the estimation
procedure.1
The 2SLS method for fish, at first glance, does not lead to para-
meter estimates which are close to the fish equation found in the
single equation least squares estimation in Table 45. However, a more
careful examination once again shows the parameter estimated to be
extremely similar, Specifically, it is first necessary to disregard
the LPCEXPH coefficient and other parameters which are statistically
insignificant. It makes no sense to use a parameter estimate with a
t-ratio of less than 1.5 for the purpose of comparison. Second, when
comparing the 2SLS price coefficients (e.g., LFISHP or LYAMP) with the
OLS estimates, it is necessary to compare simultaneously their
interaction terms, LFISHPX and LYAMPX, from the two estimation tech-
niques. This can be done by either looking at the ratio of LnPi/LnPi
* LPCEXP or actually estimating an elasticity at a given expenditure
level. For example, calculating the own-price elasticity at the mean
expenditure level (Rs. = 2583) using the OLS and 2SLS equations,
respectively, yields:
1 R. Pindyck and D. Rubinfield, Econometric Models and Economic
Forecasts (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981) pp. 174-199.
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Table 46 -- Demand Functions Estimated Using Two-Stage Least Squares
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variables
LPCRICEQ LPCFISHQ
3.40
-0.13
-0.67
-0.06
0.22
-0.03
0.02
2.60
- 0.20
0.71
-0.03
-0.06
0.50
0.19
-0.15
0.06
0.03
0.73
0.24
-0.03
(1.4)
(1.2)
(19.1)
(3.47)
(1.9)
(2.36)
(1.54)
(0.72)
(10.9)
(2.4)
(0.88)
(2.54)
(0.93)
(0.36)
(0.4)
(0.97)
(0.59)
(8.7)
(1.43)
(1.4)
LPCEXPH
LPCEXP2H
LRICEP
LCOCOP
LBREADP
LWHEATP
LFISHP
LMILKP
LMEATP
LGRAINP
LPULSEP
LSUGARP
LYAMP
LCONDMTP
LOILP
LVEGP
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
AEURAT
HHSIZE
HHSX
D1
D2
RICEDUM
RICEPURB
FISHPURB
WHTEST
LFISHPX
LVEGPX
LMEATPX
LYAMPX
LSUGARPX
0.67
-0.32
-0.09
0.46
(1.0)
(0.7)
(2.5)
-0.04 (0.5)
0.10 (1.2)
0.39
-0.52
-0.30
-0.39
-1.33
0.68
-10.93
0.18
-16.8
0.25
18.2
-2.92
0.37
-0.24
0.35
5.83
-0.75
0.04
-0.24
-0.57
0.08
0.82
-0.09
0.02
-0.89
1.23
2.19
0.38
-2.37
(0.5)
(1.7)
(2.4)
(4.5)
(2.5)
(1.76)
(3.7)
(2.4)
(1.0)
(2.6)
(1.7)
(2.0)
(2.9)
(2.44)
(4.07)
(2.6)
(2.8)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.4)
(1.0)
(4.1)
(1.5)
(0.14)
(1.2)
(3.3)
(1.0)
(2.0)
(1.7)
0.28
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-7.6095 + 0.8045 * Ln(2583) = 1.2888
-10.9267 + 1.2299 * Ln(2583) = 1.2637
Indeed, the difference is extremely small, and much less than would be
expected comparing casually the parameter estimates.
Examining each of the significant parameters separately, the dif-
ferences between the 2SLS and OLS range up to 20 percent.
Nevertheless, it is concluded from this experiment that reducing the
biases in employing OLS estimates are not worth the loss of com-
putational efficiency in 2SLS which will often result in insignificant
and non-meaningful parameter estimates.
PROBIT/OLS
Before presenting the results of the two-step probit/OLS demand
functions, some background comments are necessary. First is that for
each commodity two equations are presented. The first is a market
entry equation; the second is a response equation conditional upon
already being a consumer of a given commodity. These will be used in
the next section to estimate the weighted entry, the weighted
response, and total elasticities.
The second matter concerns the approach used to arrive at these
equations, which stems from the extreme cost of a binary probit proce-
dure. 1 Specifically, all the models were developed using the ordinary
least squares, and thereafter the probits were only run on 60 percent
1 Due to the iterative nature of the probit procedure, the cost of
this method of estimating multivariate regressions when the depen-
dent variable is coded as a dummy variable taking only values of 0
or 1 was approximately 10 times higher than ordinary least squares.
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of the sample. This helped to contain the costs of the analysis.
Third is that none of the entry equations include a quadratic
expenditure term. For all the commodities tested, it proved insigni-
ficant and was subsequently removed to avoid multicollinearity with
LPCEXP. Finally, many of the variables which were formed by interac-
tion terms with per capita expenditures were excluded from the entry
models but not the response models because in the case of the former
they too proved insignificant due to a problem of multicollinearity.
Bread. Bread is the most important of the commodities which was esti-
mated employing a two-step technique. In Table 47 the market entry
and conditional response equations are found.
The sign of the coefficients estimated for the entry equations are
all reasonable. The positive and significant LPCEXP coefficient
indicates that a rise in income will increase the probability of con-
suming bread. The significant ESTX term shows that this is especially
the case for the estate sector, although at low levels of income those
in the estate sector are less likely to be consuming bread than the
rural sector, and those in the urban sector are more likely to be con-
suming bread than the rural sector. A rise in the prices of coconut,
fruit, pulses, and other cereals and grain will all raise the probabi-
lity of entering the market as consumers of bread. Equally plausible
is the finding that as meat and sugar prices rise, consumers are
likely to leave the bread market. This may be because a rise in
the price of meat will encourage bread-consuming households to
increase their rice consumption (as shown in the positive cross-price
coefficient in Table 48) and leave the market for bread. This is
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Table 47 - Mrket Entry and Conditional sponse dels
-- -. Dependent Variables h
DREAD -
-2.56
0.26
0.06
0.16
-0.53
0.35
-0.33
1.20
0.07
0.21
-0.23
0.13
0.17
2.46
-8.51
-0.25
0.99
-1.01
0.06
-0.001
0.03
0.007
(2.09)
0.62)
0.:94)
(-2.31)
(11.5)
(2.18
(-1.51
(1.49)
(1.76)
(2.29)
(4.25)
(-1.8)
(3.9)
(-3.16)
(0.37J
- M
(0.07)
UIL a LU&LT
12.3
3.36
-0.17
0.13
1.13
-1.26
0.46
-0.08
-0.25
0.52
0.08
0.18
0.14
0.13
0.07
0.12
0.27
0.82
-0.08
-0.09
0.81
0.07
-0.01
-0.04
0.74
-0.12
0.40
(6.1)
(5.7
(14.8
(.5)
(.8)
2.4
2.7)
(3.6)
0.4
1.6
1.6
0.6
5.
0.7
1.0
(.5
1.6
1.6
0.6
5.1
. 7
(2.5)
(1.6)
(2.0)
-1.69
0.52
0.20
0.37
0.63
-0.23
-0.09
-0.37
-0.23
0.20
-0.02
-0.10
-0.28
-0.60
2.40
1.99
-0.27
-0.20
-0.75
-0.53
0.06
0.8
0.11
-0.15
0.07
-0.13
(3.54)
1.31
2.91
0.95
-0.46l-1.23
-3.73
'-1.43(1.78
0
(0.85
-2.13
(-2.94
(-5.43
(2.20
(-0.7
(0.5)
-2.02)
-2.16
1- .55
(3.23
- 22
(1.09)
(-0.74)
(0.59)
(-0.42)
Independent
Variable
INTERCEPT
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
LRICEP
LCOCOP
LBREADP
LWHEATP
LFISHP
LMILKP
LMEATP
LGRAINP
LFRUITP
LPULSEP
LSUGARP
LYAMP
LCONDMTP
LOILP
LVEGP
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
AEURAT
HNSIZE
MHSX
LRICEPX
EARNERS
D1
RICEPURB
COCODUM
BREADURB
VEGEST
WHTEST
MEATPX
FISMDUM
SUGDUM
WHTDUM
0LOUNM
RICEEST
MILKDUM
MILLS
MEATDLM
MOCHILD
MILKURB
LPULSPX
.277
a Market Entry Equation
b Conditional Response Equation Using Truncated Sample
PULSE LPUL5E3
- - - - - - - - 0.56 (2.2)
1.3
1.6
3.6
1.9
1.7)
(5.1)
(3.0)
-2:
-I 0
(1.0)
(1.6)
.
23.0
0.1
. 4
(0.0)
(0.4)
-:
-12.4
3.16
-0.17
-1.99
0.30
1.11
-0.90
0.03
-0.11
0.15
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.03
-0.04
-0.31
-0.06
-2.36
0.01
0.00
0.33
-0.08
0.00
0.24
-0.03
-0.09
0.14
1.14
-0.14
0.12
0.28
0.15
-4.8
-2.19
-0.15
-0.75
0.21
-1.14
0.34
0.36
0.13
-5.2
0.11
-0.18
4.0
0.45
-0.59
-0.12
0.27
0.01
-0.34
0.69
0.70
-0.88
0.65
4.22)
4.1
1.7
4.2
3.6
3. 9
0.9
2 2
19
0.23)
1.7
0.8
0.6
1.3
0.6
(4.1)
0.1
2.2
0.2
0.2
1.7
0.8
0.2
1.7
1.5
1.5
(1.2)
(2.9)
0.5
.0 )
(1.80
(1.80
1.52
1.59
(3.46
(0.23)
(-2.06)
(-0.15)
(-19.2)
(2.75)
(1.92)
(0.99(1.65
(0.63
(-1. 14
1.93
0.40
1-9
-2.4)
-1.47)
-1.39)
(2.00)
(0.39)
(-1.39)
-2.80
1.38
-0.06
0.15
0.09
1.15
0.008
-2.1
-0.003
-1.00
0.158
0.10
0.59
1.80
-0.04
-0.15
0.37
0.04
-0.01
-0.04
-0.09
-0.27
0.25
-0.01
-0.46
-
.332 .358
LBREADT -
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Table 47
(continued)
Independent
Variable
INTERCEPT
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
LRICEP
LCOCOP
LBREADP
LWHEATP
LFISHP
LMILKP
LMEATP
LGRAINP
LFRUITP
LPULSEP
LSUGARP
LYAMP
LCONDMTP
LOILP
LVEGP
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
AEURAT
HHSIZE
HHSX
LRICEPX
EARNERS
D1
RICEPURB
COCODUM
SUGPES
WHTEST
MEATPX
FISHDUM
SUGoUM
WHTDUM
RICEEST
MILKDUM
MILLS
MEATDUM
NO CHILD
MILKURB
LPULSPX
Dependent Variables
WHEAT I
6.71 (1.79)
-0.62 (-1.34)
-0.09 (-0.63)
0.28 (2.83)
-0.12 (-0.21)
-0.73 (-2.09)
-0.59 (-7.45)
-2.41 (-1.38)
-0.41 (-3.94)
-0.18 (-3.97)
0.03 (0.387)
-0.30 (-4.36)
-0.91 (-0.127)
1.01 (9.48)
-1.19 (-3.59)
0.056 (4.07)
0.074 (2.18)
0.58 (0.54)
0.36 (1.68)
-0.15 (-1.66)
LWHEATQ* .
-35.3
7.42
-0.36
0.00
-0.40
1.77
-0.36
0.29
4.80
0.07
0.33
0.21
0.20
0.16
0.26
0.08
1.16
-0.01
-0.20
2.21
0.42
-0.06
-0.08
-0.14
0.63
0.42
(5.2)
(5.1)
(4.1)
(3.1)
(1.6)
(1.4)
(2.6)(0.7)
(1.9)
(2.7)
(2.2)(1.7)
(2.0)
(0.9)
(0.8)
(1.9)
(0.2)
(2.6)
(0.9)
MILK E
-7.41
1.23
0.04
0.17
-1.07
0.41
-0.89
0.18
0.65
0.18
0.06
0.17
0.08
0.30
0.09
-4.15
0.04
0.02
0.182
0.163
-0.91
0.82
0.33
0.269
(-5.74)
(8.27)
(027)
(1.63)
(-1.76)
(5.74)
(-9.29)
(1.907)
(1.60)
(1.33)
(1.65)
(-1.10)
(3.95)
(-0.756)
(-8.54)1
(0. 19)
(0.74)
(1.67)
(1.25)
(-4.5)
(3.71)
(6.34)
a Market Entry Equation
b Conditional Response Equation Using Truncated Sample
LMILKQ*
-11.09
3.12 (4.39)
-0.14 (-0.35)
-0.03 (-0.42)
-0.012 (-0.18)
0.322 (1.03)
0.08 (2.09)
-0.59 (-9.83)
0.00 5  (0.06)0.27 (4.32)
-0.05 (-0.83)
0.06 (2.06)
0.03 (0.61)
-0.100 (-2.5)
0.31 (0.61)
0.11 (0.116)
0.02 (0.317)
-0.008 (-0.06)
-1. 42 430
-0.03 (-0.27
-0.002 (0.14)
-0.07 (-1.06)
-0.29 -
- (-1.99)
0.153 (3.13)
0.138 (1.47)
0.02 (0.92)
-0.19 (-2.60)
.427
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Table 47
(continued)
MEAT . LMEA
Independent
Variable
INTERCEPT
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
LRICEP
LCOCOP
LBREADP
LWHEATP
LFISHP
LMILKP
LMEATP
LGRAINP
LFRUITP
LPULSEP
LSUGARP
LYAMP
LCONDMTP
LOILP
LVEGP
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
AEURAT
HHSIZE
HHSX
LRICEPX
EARNERS
D1
RICEPURB
COCODUM
SUGPES
WHTEST
MEATPX
FISHDUM
SUGDUM
WHTDUM
RICEEST
MILK0IN
MILLS
MEATDUM
NO CHILD
MILKURB
LPULSPX
YAMDUM
4.63
0.76
-0.11
-0.38
-0.13
-0.02
-1.28
-0.02
0.03
0.06
0.21
0.22
0.62
-3.5
0.03
0.5
-0.04
0.1
-0.04
0.004
-0.11
(7.8)
(0.7)
(3.8)
(1.9)
(0.3)
(9.6)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.3)
(3.5)
(2.2)
(0.7)
(6.3)
(1.1)
(0.0)
(2.0)
Dependent Variables
TQ* !. YAM
-16.3
4.0
-0.20
0.20
0.03
-0.0
0.04
-2.18
0.05
0.12
-0.09
0.06
0.03
0.04
2.8
0.01
-0.31
0.42
0.41
-0.05
-0.07
0.09
0.17
-0.27
0.21
0.24
(3.1)
(2.7)
(1.6)
(0.1)
(0.0)
(0.6)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.1)
(0.6)
(0.6)
(0.3)
(0.0)
(0.8)
(0.98)
(2.0)
(2.1)
(1.8)
(0.9)
(1.0)
(1.7)
(1.A)
(0.4)
-4.3
0.89
0.05
0.74
-1.4
-0.4
0.01
-0.12
-0.76
-0.45
0.54
-0.50
2.7
0.05
-0.36
0.08
0.04
0.357
(12.5)
0.3)
(0.8)
(2.6)
(1.1)
(0.1)
(1.1)
(14.7)
(1.13)
(1.6)
(5.8)
(0.1)
a Market Entry Equation
b Conditional Response Equation Using Truncated Sample
LTAMQW
9.3
1.60 (2.3)
0.10 (2.5)
-0.11 (1.2)
-0.11 (1.8)
1.5 (3.7)
0.14 (1.2)
-0.09 (1.8)
0.13 (2.2)
-0.43 (4.3)
0.20 (3.3)
-0.20 2.2)0.61 (11
2.2 7)
-0.09 1.3
0.28 (1.6)
-0.14 (1.2)
0.00 (0.4)
-0.04 (0.6)
1.13 (4.0)
0.14 (2.8)
0.510
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supported by the conditional response equation which also has a nega-
tive and significant coefficient for meat price.
Interestingly, with the exception of coconuts, all the cross-price
terms which were significant in the entry equation are also signifi-
cant and have the same sign as the response equation. The fact that
the household's decision whether to enter the market is positively
effected by a rise in coconut price, but the quantity consumed is not
affected in the truncated sample, is an interesting finding.
A number of variables have significant coefficients in the
response equations, but were either insignificant in the entry
equation or were left out of the entry equation because of their
insignificance in previous trials. These include a significant
quadratic expenditure term (indicating the expected curvature in the
demand function) as well as rice, wheat, roots and tubers, condiments,
and oils, which are all gross substitutes. In addition, the own-price
bread coefficient is robust and shows a high level of own-price
responsiveness. The marginally significant coefficient for BREADURB,
an interaction term between bread price and the urban sector dummy,
suggests that the bread purchases of urban residents are less effected
by its price. Also, just as those in the urban sector are more likely
to purchase bread, the significance of URBX indicates that they have a
lower expenditure elasticity than rural and estate households.
Vegetable Oil. As with bread, a number of significant coefficients
were estimated for both the entry and conditional response equations
for oil. A rise in expenditures increases the likelihood of entering
the market, as well as raising oil consumption if already consuming.
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Coconut prices and the price of other grains and cereals (i.e., not
rice, bread, and wheat) are the only other commodities which have
positive and significant coefficients in the entry equation. A rise
in the price of roots and tubers, milk, condiments, and fish will all
decrease the probability of entering the market to purchase oil. Once
again, this is plausible as the preparation of these commodities
involves the use of cooking oil.
Concerning the conditional response equation, with the exception
of the price of the commodity groups consisting of roots and tubers,
all the significant price terms in the entry equation are also signi-
ficant in the response equation. They are also of the same sign. A
number of other cross-price terms were also estimated. The cases of
rice and fish are especially interesting because a great deal of
variation in price responsiveness was found by expenditure group.
Specifically, across most of the range of expenditures, rice and oil
are gross complements. This is probably explained by a domination of
the income effect over the pure substitution effect. As incomes rise
above Rs. 3700, the commodites become gross substitutes. In a similar
fashion, for the upper 70 percent of the income distribution no cross-
price effect is observed between fish price and oil. However, for
low-income consumers there is a robust cross-price response which once
again is negative in direction.
A final consideration of interest is that while wheat and oil are
gross substitutes for the urban and rural sectors, just the opposite
is the case in the estate sector. As will be shown in the next sec-
tion, this is due to the greater value of the Slutsky cross-price
elasticity in the estate sector.
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Pulses. The expenditure coefficient and a quadratic term for the
entry elasticity for pulses were marginally significant, unlike that
for bread and oil, and will be used in the calculation of elastici-
ties. A robust cross-price term was significant, as was the own-price
interaction term LPULSEPX. There also were a number of significant
cross-price terms in the entry model, including a negative rice price
term and a positive interaction term between rice price and a dummy
variable for the urban sector.
Other marginally significant coefficients in the entry elasticity
which had negative values included those for oil price, fruit price,
and bread price. On the other hand, coconut, fish, and meat were all
positive in the entry equations. In addition, a significantly nega-
tive coefficient for URBX was found.
Concerning the conditional response coefficients, the model pre-
sented in Table 47 does not include the inverse of the Mills' ratio.
In examining the coefficients for the same model with the Mills'
ratio, they are virtually identical (all within 5 percent of one
another), as are the R2s. However, in the former with the Mill's
included, a problem with multicollinearity results in some of the
standard errors being higher, and thus low t-ratios. Therefore, the
second of the models, without the inverse of the Mills' ratio, is pre-
sented and used to calculate the elasticities.
One especially interesting point emerges from comparing coeffi-
cients in the entry and response equations. For certain commodi-
ties, the sign of the coefficient in the former is different from
those in the latter. For example, witness the case of rice price
(LRICEP) and oil price (LOILP). Both are negative in the entry
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equation while behaving as substitutes for those who stay in the
market. These are plausible and may be explained as follows. In the
face of lower rice prices, households which were not in the market may
have additional income with which to purchase other goods, and thereby
enter the market for pulses. Simultaneously, if a household is in the
market it may shift some of its consumption in favor of pulses if rice
prices rise dramatically. Essentially, in one case (for the entry
equation) the income effect dominates, while on the other (for the
response equation) the substitution effect is more important.
In the truncated least squares equation, other findings include
that coconut and bread are also substitute commodities. So is meat
for most of the relevant income range. Interestingly, the tradeoffs
between meat and pulses increase with rising expenditure levels. By
examining the Slutsky equation, this may be attributable to the poor's
higher income elasticity of demand for pulses more than compensating
for the rate of increase in the budget share to meat and the declining
value of the pure substitution effect.
Finally, there is a robust own-price coefficient for the price of
pulses. Efforts to include an interaction term between pulse price
and per capita expenditures (LPULSEPX) resulted in multicollinearity.
It was therefore removed from the equation, so that the own-price
elasticity is constrained to be constant over the range of incomes.
Wheat. The results of the wheat entry equations suggest that as the
price of wheat rises, the probability of entering the market
decreases. This is as expected. The marginally significant interac-
tion term between wheat price and low-income households (WHEATDUM)
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shows that the poor are even more sensitive to such changes, and are
more likely to enter or exit the market as a result of a price change.
The only cross-price terms in the entry equation which had a positive
coefficient is coconut, indicating that as coconut prices rise, house-
holds will be more likely to enter the market as wheat consumers. No
significant cross-price effect with bread was observed in the entry
equations. In addition, as expected, the significantly positive coef-
ficient for the estate dummy, EST, indicates the higher probability of
being a wheat consumer if living in the estate sector.
The conditional response elasticity for wheat had a significant
quadratic expenditure term. It was not possible to observe any cross-
price response between rice and wheat, although the tradeoffs between
bread and wheat were not only statistically robust but are indicative
of highly substitutable goods. Other gross substitute commodities
include meat, oil, vegetables, and pulses in those households already
consuming wheat.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment of the first wheat model was
the insignificance of the own-price term. The only way to overcome
this problem was to remove the Mills' ratio from the equation. There
is apparently a problem of multicollinearity between these two
variables. Therefore, in the model presented the Mills' ratio is
removed, and second, the truncated sample is taken from the entire
data set (as opposed to the 60 percent sample being used for the other
models), thereby increasing the degrees of freedom. By doing so, one
gets the expected negative own-price response. In addition, a dummy
variable for low-income consumers is also highly robust, indicating
that these consumers are more price responsive, in keeping
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with results found for other commodities.
In general, experimenting with the removal of the Mills' ratio
from the response equations presented in this chapter changed the
value of significant coefficients by only a few percent. It is felt
that given the option of showing no own-price response or one that may
be slightly biased, the choice should be to use the biased estimate in
computing elasticities.
Milk and Milk Products. The equations for milk differ from the others
presented above in that there are many variables which are significant
in the entry equation but not so in the conditional response model.
The expected high protein substitute commodities of fish, pulses, and
meat (for the poor only) all are significant in the entry equation.
However, pulses and meat prices are not significant in the conditional
response models. Similarly, the oil price coefficient is marginally
significant in the entry model, but not so in the response equation.
In both the entry and response equation, not only was the own-price
variable (LMILKP) highly robust, but so was an interaction term bet-
ween milk prices and a dummy for low-income households.
Interestingly, in the response equation MILKDUM was positive, indi-
cating that low-income consumers already in the market are less price
responsive to changes in milk prices. In the entry equation the
MILKDUM variable is negative and significant, suggesting that the
price of milk commodities has a greater effect on the decision as to
whether to enter the market for low-income households.
A final point about the milk equation concerns the variable
NOCHILD, or the number of children below five years of age in the
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household. Notice how that factor influences the decision as to
whether or not one should purchase milk products, but not the amount.
It appears that having young children will increase the probability of
purchasing milk; however, the addition of a second or third
preschool-aged child will not increase significantly the amount of
milk products consumed.
Meat. In addition to a robust expenditure term and the own-price term
in the entry equation, three cross-price coefficients were signifi-
cant. The only one which was a surprise was the negative sign for the
fish variable. There is little intuitive reason to expect more house-
holds to enter the market as meat consumers in the face of falling
fish prices. The only explanation for this finding could be that the
savings from a fall in fish prices will encourage households to
further improve the quality of their diet by purchasing meat products,
and that this is especially strong for low-income consumers as wit-
nessed by the significance of the FISHDUM variable.
Concerning the response equation, significant expenditure and
quadratic terms were estimated. However, the meat (LMEATP) and meat
times expenditure coefficient (LMEATPX) have low t-ratios. In order
to determine to what extent this was a problem of multicollinearity,
the same models were run again without the Mills' ratio. Practically
the identical coefficients were found but the standard errors were
much lower. It was therefore concluded that the insignificance of the
variable was due to multicollinearity and that they should be included
in estimating elasticities.
A number of cross-price terms were also found in the equation.
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These included a marginally significant rice price term and the
variables FISHDUM and MILKDUM, created by multiplying fish and milk
prices by a dummy variable for low-income households. The negative
sign of FISHDUM is hard to explain. It may indeed be attributable to
a structural problem with the data.
Roots and Tubers. In the entry equation, the expenditure and own-
price terms were both highly significant. Negative and significant
cross-price terms were also observed for bread and oil prices. The
only positive cross-price term in the entry equation was that for
vegetables (LVEGP). This indicates that a rise in vegetable prices
will result in households entering the market for roots and tubers.
This coefficient has a sign which is unlike the surprising negative
cross-price term in the conditional response equation. As was found
in previous commodity functions, some substitute commodities among the
truncated sample (i.e., bread and oil) had negative coefficients in
the entry equations. This finding once again indicates the distinc-
tion between the decision as to whether to enter the market from how
other households adjust the amount of a commodity being purchased in
the face of a given price change.
The most interesting elements of these models, however, is that
the expenditure term in the conditional response equation is negative.
This suggests that this group of commodities displays inferior quali-
ties. However, also notice the positive quadratic term which indi-
cates that this group of roots, tubers, and yams becomes less inferior
as incomes rise. At first glance this appears counter-intuitive. One
possible explanation for this finding is that for upper income
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households, higher quality roots and tubers, such as white potatoes,
make up a relatively larger share of this commodity group, and that
these commodities do not have the inferior qualities. Despite the
inferior properties displayed in the response equation, however, the
normal good properties in the entry equation will result in overall
positive income elasticities.
Final Considerations on the Two-Step Approach
Some concluding remarks concerning the probit/OLS estimation pro-
cedure are worthwhile. Those that consider employing such a technique
should consider the costs inherent in choosing the two-step technique.
These derive from both the costs of the binary probit computations,
due to its iterative algorithm, and the time involved in developing
entry and response models, and estimating separate elasticities which
can subsequently be combined.
On the positive side, the procedure of accounting for the deter-
minants of entry and its contribution to the overall income and price
elasticity is conceptually sound. It deserves further exploration.
The problems in estimating significant quadratic expenditure terms, as
well as income-specific price coefficients for the entry equations,
also merit further exploration.
Furthermore, in most cases including the inverse of the Mills'
ratio in the response equations had little effect on the coefficients.
There were instances, however, where parameter estimates with and
without the Mills' were rather divergent. It is therefore recommended
that future researchers estimate all response equations with and without
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the Mills' ratio. Thereafter, if the comparison of the coefficients of
the two equations (i.e., with and without the Mills') indicates that
there is no bias in the parameters caused by the absence of the Mills'
ratio, consideration should be given to leaving it out of the model if
it introduces multicollinearity, as was noted a number of times in the
previous demand functions.
Finally, future researchers are encouraged to place greater empha-
sis on distinguishing the difference in the determinants of market
entry and response. 1  Once again, this will involve a greater cost but
will add significantly to the knowledge of consumer behavior.
ELASTICITIES
The models presented above are used to compute expenditure, own-
price and cross-price elasticities. These can be disaggregated by
expenditure class to facilitate an understanding of how poor house-
holds respond to changes in incomes and prices, and how they differ
from the average and high-income households.
The elasticities can be computed by differentiating the OLS
Engel's functions. The formula for the income elasticities is:
n
(1) Ei = a1 + 2$2(LPCEXP) + l0ik(LnPk) + Xik(Zk)
k=1
and the formula for the own-price elasticity is:
(2) eii = yii + ii(LPCEXP) +-4ii(Zk)
and the formula for the cross-price elasticity is:
(3) eij = yij + 0ij(LPCEXP) + -Qij(Zk)
where:
1 Op. cit., Alderman, pp. 110-135.
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61 = the coefficient of the LPCEXP term
$2 = the coefficient of the quadratic term, LPCEXP2
y = the coefficient of own- and cross-price terms
Oik = the vector of coefficients of interaction terms between the
log of prices and the log of per capita expenditures.
Xik = the vector of coefficients of interaction terms between
demographic variables and the log of per capita expenditures.
4 j = the vector of coefficients of interaction terms between
demographic variables and the log of prices
In the case where the OLS is the conditional response models, the
elasticities are multiplied by the probability that a household is in
the market, as discussed in the previous chapter. That will provide
the contribution of the conditional response equation to the overall
elasticity (see Appendix E, Tables 1 and 2).
In addition, from the entry equations it is possible to compute
aPROBABILITY/aPARAMETER. Since the income and price parameters are in
logs, this derivative is multiplied by LnQ to estimate the contribu-
tion of households entering the market to the overall elasticity, also
as discussed in Chapter VI (see Appendix E, Tables 1 and 2).
In addition, the compensated price elasticities are computed from
the Slutsky equation where:
Cij = Eiaj + eij
The results of the expenditure, own-price, and compensated own-price
elasticities are found in Table 48. There are some consistent pat-
terns which are in accordance with what is expected. First is that
expenditure elasticities and the absolute value of the uncompensated
price elasticities decline as income rises. The poor are considerably
more responsive to income and price changes, regardless of the com-
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Table 48 -- Expenditure Elasticities. Uncompensated and Compensated Own-Price Elasticities. and Budget Share, by
Expenditure Group and Sector
Expenditure Elasticities Uncompensated Own Price
Highc Low Middle High(Mean)
Budget Share
Low Middle High(Mean)
Compensated Own Price
Low Middle High(Mean)
1.79 1.30
2.17 1.68
2.17 1.68
.59
.65
.65
.121 -1.68 -1.28 -.35
.501 -1.68 -1.28 -.35
.501 -1.68 -1.28 -. 35
.286 -. 55 -. 450 -. 25
.346 -. 665 -. 570 -. 37
.346 -. 665 -. 570 -. 37
1.023 .82 .337 -. 897 -. 819 -. 633
1.089 .89 .403 -. 837 -. 759 -. 573
1.257 1.06 .571 -. 669 -. 591 -. 405
.616 .43 .078 -. 615 -. 58 -. 58
.685 .50 .147 -. 703 -. 67 -. 67
.685 .50 .147 -. 703 -. 67 -. 67
Vetables
Urban- .99
Rural .96
Estate .82
Condiments
rban .99
Rural 1.06
Estate 1.06
.826 .356 -. 791 -. 729 -. 568
.788 .318 -. 791 -. 729 -. 568
.65 .181 -. 627 -. 566 -. 404
.842 .434 -. 57 -. 57 -. 57
.904 .496 -. 51 -. 51 -. 51
.904 .496 -. 51 -. 51 -. 51
.465 .361
.896 .792
2.392 2.294
.207 -. 326 -. 326 -. 326
.643 -. 806 -. 806 -. 806
2.140 -. 806 -. 806 -. 806
.815 .682 .364 -. 514 -. 514 -. 514
.936 .803 .485 -. 514 -. 514 -. 514
1.097 .964 .646 -. 514 -. 514 -. 514
.89 .712 .249 -1.651 -1.130 -. 759
1.47 1.288 .331 -1.651 -1.130 -. 759
1.47 1.288 .331 -1.651 -1.130 -. 759
.148 .066 -. 152 -. 661 -. 661' -. 661
.148 .066 -. 152 -. 661 -. 661 -. 661
.148 .066 -. 152 -. 661 -. 661 -. 661
1.72 1.643
1.72 1.643
1.72 1.643
1.512 -1.95 -1.57 -1.161
1.512 -1.87 -1.394 -1.244
1.512 -1.87 -1.394 -1.244
.734 .660 -1.127 -1.112 -1.075
.734 .660 -1.127 -1.112 -1.075
.734 .660 -1.127 -1.112 -1.075
1.067 1.126
1.067 1.126
.765 .824
1.267 -1.328 -1.242 -1.242
1.267 -1.328 -1.242 -1.242
.965 -1.328 -1.242 -1.242
5.6 6.4 5.3 -1.58 -1.19 -. 34
4.5 5.4 5.9 -1.58 -1.19 -. 32
2.4 3.7 6.6 -1.62 -1.24 -. 32
6.5 5.0 2.7 -. 51 -. 42 -. 24
7.4 6.6 4.2 -. 612 -. 513 -. 317
6.7 6.1 4.6 -. 62 -. 53 -. 35
6.8 5.7 3.8 -. 83 -. 77 -. 62
6.4 5.9 4.4 -. 77 -. 70 -. 55
5.2 5.5 5.7 -. 60 -. 53 -. 37
Fish
Min
Rural
Estate
Coconuts
Urban
Rural
Estate
Rural
Estate
Rice
72Ein
Rural
Estate
1.95 1.1
1.5 1.3
13.7 8.0
.5
.5
1.7
2.1 2.8 3.1
1.2 1.8 2.3
.8 1.7 3.7
1.3 1.7 2.3
.4 .7 1.2
- .8 .9
.9 .9 .8
1.2 1.2 1.2
.4 .7 .8
-. 47 -. 50 -. 57
-. 418 -. 515 -. 616
-. 52 -. 515 -. 616
-.838 -.693 -.558
-. 734 -. 686 -. 555
-. 581 -. 602 -. 393
-. 51 -. 53 -. 55
-. 44 -. 45 -. 49
-. 45 -. 45 -. 48
-. 213 -. 226 -. 237
-. 831 -. 835 -. 853
-. 854 -. 813 -. 827
-. 499 -. 502 -. 508
-. 409 -. 502 -. 507
-. 494 -. 493 -. 504
-1.641 -1.120 -. 756
-1.627 -1.108 -. 746
-1.610 -1.102 -. 746
-. 655 -. 660 -. 662
-. 656 -. 661 -. 662
-.621 .656 .664
-2.238 -1.520 1.520
-2.078 -1.359 -1.357
-2.087 -1.357 -1.334
-1.117 1.099 1.060
-1.124 1.107 1.067
-1.127 1.106 1.106
1.318 1.232 1.231
1.315 1.228 1.228
1.325 1.236 1.234
a Corresponds to 2nd decline where per capita expenditures a Rs 1587/yearb Corresponds to mean of population where per capita expenditures a Rs 2583/year
c Corresponds to 10th decile where per capita expenditures - Rs 8267/year
Lowa Middleb
(Mean)
.61
.67
.67
23.3 16.8 7.8
30.0 24.7 12.8
26.7 24.2 13.4
4.7 4.3 2.9
5.9 5.5 4.1
5.6 5.6 6.1
6.0 4.6 2.9
6.5 5.7 4.3
5.1 5.7 4.6
8.1 5.3 2.9
3.1 2.9 2.1
.4 1.9 1.4
1.8 1.7 1.7
1.4 1.5 1.4
1.8 2.2 1.6
.9 1.4 1.3
1.4 1.7 1.5
2.4 2.2 1.5
Bread
Rural
Estate
Oil
V5a n
Rural
Estate
Pulses
Urba n
Rural
Estate
Wheat
W9ea t
Rural
Estate
Milk
Fin
Rural
Estate
Meat
Urban
Rural
Estate
Yams
Rural
Estate
.761
.761
.761
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modity. This results in a commodity such as fish being a luxury for
the poor, with an elasticity of around two, while being a necessity
for the rich. Second is that the rate of decline in the uncompensated
own-price elasticities is less precipitious than among the expenditure
elasticities. Third is that the compensated own-price elasticities
(i.e., the pure substitution effect), is also higher for low-income
consumers for all commodities with the exception of rice. The rate of
decline in the compensated price elasticity with rising incomes is
also less rapid than the decline in the income elasticity and, in
fact, parallels closely that for the observed uncompensated price
coefficients. The hypothesized Timmer Curvature in the Slutsky matrix
appears to hold, with the exception of rice and a few other com-
modities for which it was not possible to get income and class speci-
fic price parameters.
The fact that the pure substitution effect of rice behaves dif-
ferently is indeed an anomaly which demands further consideration. It
suggests that the poor do not perceive that there are substitute com-
modities for rice, as their major quest is toward reaching satiety in
rice consumption. At the higher income levels, where rice satiation
has occurred, households will be more likely to substitute for other
commodities given that they remain on the same indifference curve.
Indeed, this is an unusual finding which should be tested for in other
countries.
Tables 49 contains Cournot price elasticities, and Table 50 con-
tains Slutsky elasticities on some important commodities for which it
was possible to estimate income-specific price parameters. By exa-
mining these tables, one gains vital information on consumer behavior.
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Table 49 - btrix of twcompensated *m and Cross Price Elasticities
Rice Coconut Sugar Condiments Vegetables Fish Bread Pul es Oil Weeat Milk Yams ret
-. 70 0 -. 11
-. 67 -. 05 -. 11
-. 67 -. 05 -. 11
-. 06 -. 66 .04
-. 06 -. 57 .04
-. 06 -. 37 .04
- - -. 83
- - -. 76
- - -. 57
-. 02 - -. 15
-. 02 - -. 12
-. 02 - -. 05
-. 001 - -. 05
-. 03 - -. 05
-. 10 - -. 05
-. 03 -. 05 .06
-. 03 -. 05 .06
-. 03 -. 05 .06
.19 -. 53 -
.19 -. 34 -
.19 .10 -
- -. 08 .06
- -. 08 .06
- -. 08 .06
-6 --nq -
-. 06 -. 09 -
-. 06 -. 09 -
- - -. 05
- - -. 23
- - -. 67
Rice
=ow
Middle
High
Coconut
Middle
High
Middle
High
Condiments
Low
Middle
High
Vegetables
Fish
Middle
High
Fish
Tow
Middle
High
Bread
Middle
High
Pulses
Low
Middle
High
Oil
TOW
Middle
High
Wh:eat
Middle
High
Milk
Tow
Middle
High
Yams
Middle
High
meat
Fruiw
Middle
High
Fruits
Low
Middle
High
Other Grains
Low
Piddle
High
-. 21
-. 14
.04
.05
.12
.28
-. 11
-.11
-. 11
-.51
-. 51
-.51
-. 02
-. 02
-. 02
-. 13
-. 13
-. 13
-. 05
-. 05
-. 05
-. 25 .09 -. 48 -. 72
-. 25 .09 -. 48 -. 07
-. 25 .09 -. 48 .16
- -. 37 .27 .30 .41
- -. 37 .22 .30 .41
- -. 37 .11 .30 .41
.02 -. 10 .08 -
.02 .03 .08 -
.02 .31 .06 -
.14 -. 21
.05 -. 21
-. 16 -. 21
- - - .04
- - - .04
- - - .04
.28 .064 .68 .25
.28 .19 .68 .25
.28 .19 .68 .25
- -. 06 .83 -
- -. 27 .86 -
- -. 79 1.3 -
.07
.07
.07
-. 78
-. 72
-. 58
.05
.05
.05
.40
.40
.40
.22 .25 .10 -. 12
.22 .25 .10 -. 12
.22 .25 .10 -. 12
.26 -
.26 -
.26 -
-1.67 -. 05 -
-1.28 -. 05 -
-. 35 -. 05 -
- - -. 34 .04 .57 -
- - -. 34 .04 .57 -
- - -. 34 .04 .57 -
-. 12
-1.26 -. 81 1.10 .9
-1.26 -. 81 1.10 .9
-1.26 -. 81 1.10 .9
- .26 .44 -1.65 -
- .26 .44 -1.39 -
- .26 .44 -0.70 -
- -. 04
- -. 04
- -. 04
-. 11
-. 11
-. 11
-. 16 .37 -. 323 -. 25
-. 16 .37 -. 244 -. 25
-. 16 .37 .244 -. 25
- .77 .27 -
- .77 .27 -
- .77 .27 -
- .48
- .48
- .48
- .23
- -. 10
- -. 10
.52 -1.1 -. 97 -
.52 -1.1 -. 97 -
.52 -1.1 -. 97 -
-. 47 .2 .08 -
-. 47 .2 .08 -
-. 47 .2 .08 -
.05 .18 -. 25 .17
.05 .18 -. 25 .17
.05 .18 -. 25 .17
-. 72 -1.33 -
-. 72 -1.33 -
-. 72 -1.33 -
-. 05 -. 249 -
-. 05 -. 249 -
-. 05 -. 249 -
1.03 -. 67 -. 150 .12 .314 .88
.71 -. 67 -. 072 .12 .73 -
-. 05 -. 67 .144 .12 1.04 -
- .15
- .15
- .15
- -. 95
- -. 95
- -. 95
- - .16 - .03 -
- - .16 - .03 -
- - .16 - .03 -
-. 2 -. 05 .11
-. 2 -. 05 .11
-. 2 -. 05 .11
-. 16
-. 16
-. 16
-. 17
-. 17
-. 17
- 2.2
- 2.2
- 2.2
- .09
- .09
- .09
- .69
- .69
- .69
-. 06 -
-. 06 -
-. 06 -
a *.- signifies that no significant cross-price term ws estimable.
.01 .04 .04
-. 02 .04 .04
-. 09 .04 .04
.17 .24 -. 88
.09 .13 -. 12
-. 08 -. 12 -. 07
.02 .16 - - .14 .20 - - -. 249 -1.65 -2.10
.02 .10 - - .09 .20 - - -. 249 - -1.2
.02 -. 05 - - -. 05 .20 - - -. 249 - -1.2
-a
-
-
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Table 50 -- Slutsky Matrix of Compensated Own and Cross Prices
(Rural Sector)
Rice Coconut Sugar Fish Condiments
Rice
Low
Middle
High
Coconut
Low
Middle
High
Sugar
Low
Mi ddl e
Hi gh
Fi sh
Low
Middle
Hi gh
Condiments
Low
Middle
High
-. 468
-. 548
-. 655
-. 013
-. 027
-. 058
.201
.111
.004
-. 615
-. 534
-.356
.215
.108
-. 060
.120
.098
.057
-. 767
-. 706
-. 555
.112
.111
.087
-. 070
-.060
-. 022
.396
.161
-. 190
-. 214
-. 264
-.354
.081
-. 174
-. 765
-1.573
-1.188
-.313
.359
.313
.239
.109
.091
.114
.118
.170
.299
-. 041
-. 055
-. 087
-. 080
-. 079
-. 098
-. 439
-.456
-. 486
-. 005
-. 002
-. 017
.022a
.007a
-. 15a
-. 019
-. 015
-. 029
.054a
.048a
.025a
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This can and will be used in the next section to examine policy
options for reducing hunger. First, however, a couple of theoretical
considerations are noteworthy.
From Table 50, one can show that negative semi-definiteness holds,
as predicted from utility theory. Concerning the symmetry condition
which follows from the utility maximizing model, this can be tested by
converting the Slutsky elasticities into the actual compensated price
derivatives. That is, the Slutsky equation is:
aqi . Pj aqi . _j aqi
aTj- qiu=u0  - qi ~T
Multiplying both sides by qi/Pj - Y/Y one gets:
(5) aqi aqi aqi
(5) aff u=u0 - J
which is the compensated price derivative. If the symmetry condition
holds, then aqi/aPj = aqj/aPi.1
From examining the compensated demand elasticities in Table 50, it
is amply evident that the symmetry condition does not hold. This is
known because multiplying Slutsky elasticities by qi/Pj * Y/Y will yield
a derivative of the same sign as the elasticities. In many cases, such
as between sugar and fish, Eij and gji have opposite signs. In other
cases, such as between sugar and coconut, Eij is significant and ji
is not. Obviously, in these instances symmetry does not hold.
In cases where Eij and Eji do have the same sign, such as between
coconut and fish, one need only multiply through by qi/Pj - Y/Y as
suggested in (4) and (5) above to determine that aqi/aPj = aqj/aPi.2
1 Op. cit., Deaton and Muellbauer, p.45.
2 In the case of where coconuts is qi and fish qi, aqi/aPj = -6.39 x
10-4, while aqj/aPi = -2.84 x 10-3. Clearly, the derivatives are
not equal.
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Symmetry must then be rejected. This finding once again suggests that
estimating price and income parameters employing restrictions
discussed in Chapter V will lead to solutions which are contrary to
empirical analysis. Given that economics is an empirical, not a
mathematical science, provides further support to those who have
rejected a restrictive systems approach. 1
USING PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR POLICY MAKING
It is possible to calculate the needed growth of income to close
the gap between the required and present level of nutrient intake. In
its simplest form, assuming the price environment remains unchanged,
the following equation can be used to calculate the expected change in
calorie intake for a given increase in real income:
(1) Qci = [(Qci'c(s,k))] (Y1 - Y ) + Qci
1
where:
Qci = calorie consumption of household i at present
1
Qci = calorie consumption of household i at time 1
6c(sk) = expenditure elasticity for calories of household i
which falls in sector s and expenditure group k
1
Yi = per capita expenditure level at time 1
I per capita expenditure level at present
Employing this formula, it is possible to estimate the change in
1 Op. cit., Timmer and Alderman, pp. 912-87, and op. cit., Thomson,
pp. 138-39.
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calorie consumption as a result of increasing expenditures. For
example, in Table 51 the per capita calorie levels before and after
two scenarios are examined. The first involves a 10 percent increase
in real expenditures of each household. The second also involves a 10
percent increase in real expenditures for the economy as a whole;
although the absolute value (as opposed to the percent of a
household's income) of this increase was distributed equally to all
households. Given that the All-Island mean per capita expenditure is
Rs. 3158/year, this translates into an across-the-board increase of
Rs. 316.
From the data one can see that regardless of expenditure group,
any increase in expenditures will raise calorie intakes relatively
more among households in the estate sector. In turn, the change in
intake is larger in the rural than urban sector. This is a reflection
of the higher expenditure elasticities of demand for calories in the
estate than rural, and rural than urban sectors. 1
A second observation is that with a 10 percent increase in house-
hold expenditures, the percentage increase in calorie intake declines
with expenditure group, although the absolute size of the change
actually increases over the first five expenditure groups and tends to
decline thereafter. This reflects that for the higher expenditure
deciles, the rate of decline in the elasticities is precipitous and
1 The calorie demand elasticities, 6c, used in these calculations are
found in Table 1 of Appendix D. They were calculated from the per
capita calorie demand function in Figure 1 of Appendix D. These,
rather than the directly estimated calorie/AEU function in Chapter
III were used, so that equation (1) on page 183 could be expanded to
include price parameters, which have been estimated in this chapter
on the basis of per capita consumption.
Table 51 -- The Effect of a 10 Percent increase in Real Expenditure Levels on Calorie intake
Per Capita Calorie intake
IBAN RURAL ESTATE
After After After
Per Capita After a 10% a Rs. 316 After a 10% a Rs. 316 After a 10% a Rs. 316
Expenditure Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real(Deciles) Present Expenditures Expenditures Present Expenditures Expenditures Present Expenditures Expenditures
1 1138 1231 1390 1239 1350 1544 1222 1378 1579
2 1433 1528 1630 1617 1744 1872 1595 1748 1896 CD
3 1625 1738 1811 1315 1940 2031 1811 2007 2112
4 1785 1902 1955 1977 2118 2184 2047 2222 2297
5 1375 1982 2015 2144 2292 2335 2269 2539 2590
6 2002 2117 2135 2331 2481 2504 2580 2801 2833
7 2139 2252 2253 2586 2738 2739 2691 2894 2896
8 2248 2344 2330 2716 2870 2849 3223 3473 3443
9 2434 2554 2524 3119 3273 3228 3510 3594 3535
10 2765 2819 2786 3595 3703 3647 3754 4236 4153
TOTAL 2096 2191 2212 2257 2393 2441 2400 2582 2634
-186-
more than compensates for the higher level of expenditures when using
(1) on page 183 to calculate the change in calorie intake as a result
of a rise in income.
When the absolute value of incomes is increased by Rs. 316 among
all households, one can see that the per capita calorie intake rises
considerably more dramatically among the poorer expenditure groups.
For example, the rise in per capita energy consumption among the
poorest decile in the rural sector is more than three times greater
when the absolute value, rather than percent of present income, is
raised throughout the population.
A related question concerns how many households which are con-
suming presently less than the required calorie level would no longer
fall in that category if there was an increase in per capita expen-
ditures. In Table 52, the percent of households consuming less than
100 and 80 percent of the FAO/WHO requirement after a 10 and 20 per-
cent rise in income is shown. There are a number of important lessons
worth considering. First is that even a 20 percent increase in real
expenditures will not ameliorate the hunger problem among the poorest
households in Sri Lanka. Take, for example, rural households in the
bottom decile of the population. Only 17 percent of rural households
consume 80 percent of the FAO/WHO standard. After a 10 percent rise
in real expenditures, either through income growth or an across-the-
board moderation in the price level, there is only an 8 percent drop
to 75 percent of households not consuming 80 percent of the standard.
A 20 percent rise in real expenditures will have a bigger, although
still marginal, impact on the number of households consuming less than
80 percent of the requirements. All of this is despite calorie
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Table 52 - Change in Percentage of Households Consuming Inadequate
Diets Before and After a Change in Real Expenditures Per
Household
I Households Consuming <100% Requirements I Households Consuming (80% Requirements
Per Capita Expenditure ATter 10 Rise ATter 20% Rise ATter 10% Rise ATter 20% Rise
Group (Deciles) Sector Present in Real Exp. in Real Exp. Present in Real Exp. in Real Exp.
Urban 100
Rural 98
Estate 100
Urban 95
Rural 89
Estate 97
Urban 89
Rural 73
Estate 56
Urban 70
Rural 49
Estate 33
Urban 66
Rural 40
Estate 28
Urban 53
Rural 22
Estate 3
Urban 44
Rural 15
Estate 7
Urban
Rural
Estate
35
10
3
Urban 16
Rural 4
Estate 0
Urban 19
Rural 6
Estate 0
100 98 95
94 89 83
95 82 77
88 86 68
78 65 48
84 55 42
80 73 44
58 44 26
47 38 16
64 53 30
38 27 15
23 16 12
64 51 25
26 17 7
20 10 8
44 36 16
14 10 5
3 3 3
33 20 6
12 8 2
3 0 0
24 20 11
8 6 2
3 0 0
13 9 3
3 3 0
0 0 0
17 15 6
5 5 3
0 0 0
88
75
73
58
33
35
28
19
13
20
10
7
20
4
5
8
3
0
6
2
0
10
2
0
3
0
0
5
3
0
78
62
55
45
16
13
15
12
13
15
7
5
13
3
3
3
1
0
2
1
0
9
2
0
3
0
0
5
2
0
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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elasticities approaching unity for the households in the lowest
decile.
The effect of a percent rise in real expenditures on the number of
households with inadequate intake is limited by the fact that an equal
rate of growth in income increases, in absolute terms, the expen-
ditures among the relatively better-off households more than the poor.
As a result, while the expenditures of a rural household in the lowest
decile increase by Rs. 160/year due to a 10 percent rise in real
expenditures, those in the fifth and tenth deciles gain Rs. 243/year
and Rs. 781/year additional purchasing power, respectively. Despite
the large absolute increase in expenditures among upper income house-
holds, the low elasticities, especially in the urban area, preclude
them from achieving calorie adequacy. These households either repre-
sent a structural problem in the data and/or are clearly candidates
for nutrition education.
The implication of these findings is clear: even in the face of
rapid economic growth, unless there is a change in income distribu-
tion the poor will remain hungry for years to come. Simply, an equal
and rapid rate of growth across all expenditure groups will not reduce
hunger in the near future.
To reinforce this point, it is assumed once again that there is a
10 percent growth in real expenditures in the economy as a whole.
This time, however, the absolute value of this increase is distributed
equally across all households. As pointed out above, this translates
into an across-the-board increase of Rs. 316. A second set of assump-
tions is that the absolute value of a 20 percent increase in expen-
ditures is distributed equally.
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Table 53 presents the change in the percentage of households con-
suming less than 80 and 100 percent of the FAO/WHO standard before and
after an increase in Rs. 316 and Rs. 632 per capita for all house-
holds. The magnitude of the calorie problem among low-income house-
holds is mitigated by redistributing equally the absolute value of a
10 and 20 percent rise in total expenditures. Nevertheless, the
problem remains for a large portion of the population.
The illustrative findings above are indeed disconcerting and sup-
port the global analysis of Reutlinger and Selowskyl that regardless
of economic performance, malnutrition will remain a serious problem
for many years to come. However, there are some further points worth
considering. They revolve around the data on the average calorie
shortfall (or surplus) of households in various expenditure groups
(see Table 54).
Based on achieving 100 percent of the calorie requirements, the
average shortfall in per capita calorie intake is 722 for the lowest
expenditure group in the rural sector. This figure declines precipi-
tously and is a negligable 16 calories for the fourth decile. When
one uses 80 percent of the requirements as the standard, only the
lowest expenditure group in the rural sector and the lowest two groups
in the estate and urban sectors have, on the average, a calorie gap.
This suggests that even in the lower end of the income distribution,
if calorie consumption levels were distributed equally, the inadequate
intake would be largely resolved. This finding has numerous implica-
tions. Among them is that the deviation around the mean of calorie
1 Op. cit., Reutlinger and Selowsky, p.7.
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Table 53 -- Diets Before and After a Change in Real Expenditures Per Household
Households Consuming <0r1 i Requirements % "ouseholds Consuming <80 Requirements
Per Capita After Rs.316 After Rs.632 After Rs.316 After Rs.632
Expenditure Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real Rise in Real
Group (Deciles) Sector Present Expenditures Expenditures Present Expenditures Expenditures
1
2
3
4
5
6
Urban 100
Rural 98
Estate 100
Urban 95
Rural 89
Estate 97
Urban 89
Rural 73
Estate 56
Urban 70
Rural 49
Estate 33
Urban 66
Rural 40
Estate 28
Urban 53
Rural 22
Estate 3
Urban 44
Rural 15
Estate 7
Urban 35
Rural 10
Estate 3
Urban 16
Rural 4
Estate 0
Urban 19
Rural 6
Estate 0
8
9
10
96
86
77
86
64
48
77
49
38
59
32
19
60
23
20
43
14
3
33
12
3
27
9
3
14
3
0
18
5 -
0
70
56
55
45
16
23
18
14
13
17
7
5
19
4
5
7
3
0
6
2
0
10
2
0
3
0
0
5
3
0
44
27
23
21
7
6
10
6
6
14
4
0
8
2
3
3
1
0
2
1
0
8
2
0
3
0
0
5
3
0
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Table 54 -- Average Per Capita Calorie Gap of All Households by
Expenditure Group and Sector
Based on Achieving 100%
of Requirements
Urban Rural Estate
831
539
360
195
141
21
-110
-202
-441
722
369
202
16
-117
-296
-534
-647
-1022
696
414
144
-87
-358
-611
-635
-1141
-1298
Based on Achieving 80%
of Requirements
Urban Rural Estate
437
146
-38
-202
-261
-385
-516
-610
-844
329
-27
-199
-383
-523
-703
-944
-1062
-1442
306
11
-255
-480
-758
-1011
-1049
-1565
-1718
-1087 -1873 -2227
Expenditure
Group
(Deciles)_
10 -668 -1441 -1763
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intakes is large within an expenditure group. More important,
however, is that targeting programs on the basis of per capita income
or expenditure levels alone will inevitably have some leakages to non-
needy households.
The question remains, however, as to how large of a transfer is
necessary to close the calorie gap among poor households. Setting AQc
equal to the calorie gap, this can be determined as follows:
00(2) Y'(s,k) = A~~~) 0 (~)+ Y (s,k)
Qc(s,k)6c(s,k)
The average increase in income required to close the calorie gap may
be computed on the basis of all the households in a given income
strata and sector, which assumes equal distribution of calories among
households according to their need. This method implies that income
from households with excess consumption, within a population group, is
transferred to a household with inadequate intake.
Alternatively, it is possible to compute the average level of a
transfer or growth in income required to close the gap of only those
households with shortfalls in their calorie intake. This assumes that
households consuming in excess of their need do not lose any income
and simply maintain their level of intake. Although this exercise
will only say something about the "average" household, the numbers in
Table 55 do provide some general guidance on the required size of the
income transfer to reduce energy deficiencies.
These data are only presented for the bottom half of the income
distribution. The reason is three-fold. First is that these groups
are where hunger are concentrated, and thus for whom programs and
-193-
Table 55 -- The Size of the Income Transfer Required to Close the
Calorie Gap, by Sector and Expenditure Level
Expenditure
Group
(Deciles) Sector
Rs. Per Capita/Year to Close the Calorie Gap
(Figures in Parenthesis are Percent of
Present Per Capita Expenditures
Based on Households
with Deficiencies Based on All Households
To Achieve
100% Reqts.
1107
844
754
1030
620
526
(94)
(73)
(62)
(65)
(39)(28)
900 (47)
636 (34)
635 (33)
924 (43)
660 (31)
558 (26)
1172 (48)
567 (23)
567 (23)
To Achieve
80% Reqts.
636 (54)
510 (44)
510 (42)
607 (38)
336 (21)
371 (20)
535 (28)
487 (26)
644 (34)
542 (25)
500 (23)
313 (14)
909 (37)
555 (23)
417 (17)
To Achieve
100% Reqts.
1050
763
689
(89)
(66)
(57)
829 (52)
453 (28)
366 (19)
627 (33)
291 (15)
177 (9)
372 (17)
25 (1.2)
0 (0)
309 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
To Achieve
80% Reqts.
552 (47)
342 (29)
303 (25)
225 (14)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
1
2
3
Urban
Rural
Estate
Urban
Rural
Estate
Urban
Rural
Estate
Urban
Rural
Estate
Urban
Rural
Estate
4
5
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policies to reduce undernutrition should be designed. Second is that
in the upper expenditure deciles, based on the average of all house-
holds, no transfer is required to close the calorie gap, even when
employing an unrealistically high standard of 100 percent of the
requirements. Third is that among the relatively small percentage of
households with inadequate consumption in these groups, the sharply
lower income elasticities for calories results in the size of the
transfer to close the gap being extremely large. It must be assumed
that most of the households in the upper half of the income distribu-
tion who suffer serious deficiencies manifest a low preference (or
need) for food relative to other goods. As such, if they choose to
deal with their inadequate intake given their means, this could be
accomplished.
From Table 55 it is lucidly apparent that in order to raise energy
intake to 100 percent of the FAQ/WHO standards among the poorest
decile of the population, it will require a doubling of the present
income in the urban sector and around a 70 percent increase in the
rural sector. Given that virtually none of the households in this
group achieve calorie adequacy, these figures apply regardless of
whether one computes the necessary income transfer on the basis of all
the households in the lowest income strata, or on the basis of just
those households with inadequate intake. Among these same low-income
households, on the average, an increase of around Rs. 600 per annum
will be required to raise energy levels to achieve a more realistic 80
percent of the requirement.
As one moves up the income distribution into the second and third
deciles, some interesting patterns emerge. These include that if
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households with calorie excesses were to transfer to deficient
households the amount of income that allowed them to consume over and
above 80 percent of their requirement, there would be no energy defi-
ciencies in the second decile of the population in the urban and rural
sectors. In a more realistic scenario, assuming that no income is
taken from households consuming greater than 80 percent of their
energy needs, an average transfer amounting to around 40 percent of
the present income in the urban sector and 20 percent in the rural
sector is required to bring the average households to the 80 percent
cutoff point.
The major lesson of these data is that for low-income households
any serious effort to bring calorie adequacy to near normal levels
will require more than marginal changes in income. Instead, increases
are needed in the range of 25 to 75 percent of real per capita expen-
ditures. Furthermore, although it would be optimal to target programs
to the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution, it is safe to
assume that there will be virtually no leakages if programs are
limited to the lowest 20 to 25 percent of the income distribution.
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VIII. THE EFFECT OF SOURCES OF INCOME AND INCOME EARNERS
ON FOOD AND CALORIE CONSUMPTION
Evidence from developed and developing countries alike has
suggested that the source and form of income may alter the consumer's
perceptions of its value, and thus how it is spent. Other studies
have indicated that to whom the income accrues -- i.e., the income
earner -- conditions household preferences for goods. It is therefore
worthwhile exploring if income source, form, and income earner affect
consumption behavior and the choice of commodities purchased. Doing
so may help explain why households with like levels of income achieve
different levels of calorie adequacy and may suggest cost-effective
means of transferring income to those in greatest need.
In this chapter, the results from previous studies on differences
in marginal propensities to consume will first be presented. This is
followed by an analysis and critical appraisal of the econometric
techniques employed. The third section of this chapter outlines the
specific hypotheses to be tested with the Sri Lanka data. This is
followed by a presentation and discussion of the findings.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
A number of previous studies have attempted to examine the
question of whether the source or form of income affects consumer
behavior. Most of them have concentrated on addressing whether income
received in-kind as a food transfer, income in the form of a consumer
subsidy scheme or the income represented by consumption of home
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produced commodities alters consumer behavior and the marginal propen-
sity to consume food and nutrients.
The expectation that the marginal propensity to consume out of
non-wage or non-cash income is different from wages or a steady salary
stems from a number of possible explanations. First is that the
income is discounted by the household. The possibility arises that
the cash equivalent value assigned to a transfer by the market may not
be the same valuation placed on that commodity by the recipient of the
transfer. To the extent that there are transaction costs involved in
the sale of the in-kind income in the market place, the value of the
non-money income must be discounted accordingly. For example, the
availability of a free home on a plantation or a free lunch at the
work place will carry an intrinsic market value. However, given a
household's budget constraint and preference ordering, it may not have
chosen to expend the amount of resources, represented by the market
value, on the shelter or meal provided. The family can either try to
sell or barter the free lunch or provided shelter, in accordance with
the theory that consumer sovereignty will prevail. There may be,
however, significant transaction costs involved in efforts for resale
or barter. These may be so great as to preclude the household
adjusting its consumption bundle through selling or bartering the non-
money income. In either the case of trading and selling an in-kind
source of income or simply making use of it, the household will have
assigned a lower value to the transfer than that found in the
marketplace.
A second argument for marginal propensities to differ by income
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source stems from Friedman'sl permanent income hypothesis. In such a
case, the transient income source (e.g., from a welfare program,
remittances from abroad, a bumper harvest) may be perceived dif-
ferently than base income. It may be discounted for purposes of con-
sumption or, alternatively, may be spent with greater alacrity.
A third hypothetical reason for the marginal propensity to consume
out of non-wage income being different revolves around the possibility
that consumer tastes and preferences are altered due to participation
in a program, whether it be due to an educational process or some sort
of moral compulsion which accompanies receipt of a transfer.
A variety of recent studies have attempted to determine the extent
to which the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) differs by source of
income. Kumar 2 sets out to examine the extent to which income from a
rationed food subsidy had a different MPC calories than other sources
of earned income in Kerala, India. Similarly, Gavan and Chandrasekera 3
estimated demand equations for rice and cereals in Sri Lanka. They
were concerned with determining whether the MPC differed for subsidy
income as compared to general income. In both the Sri Lankan and
Kerala cases, the authors found that there were significant differen-
ces in MPCs from different income sources.
1 Milton Friedman, Theory of the Consumption Function, (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
2 S. Kumar, Impact of Subsidized Rice on Food Consumption and
Nutrition in Kerala, IFPRI Research Report No. 5 (Washington, D.C.,
1979) pp. 32-42.
3 Op. cit., Gavan and Chandrasekera, pp. 34-46.
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In a similar study, West and Pricel attempted to determine the
effect of food distribution programs, i.e., bonus food stamps and free
school lunches, on food consumption in the United States. In their
work the Engel function included as independent variables income from
all sources, as well as separate variables for the value of food
stamps and the school lunch program. Like the work in India and Sri
Lanka, the empirical evidence from the U.S. indicates that food stamps
have a different MPC than all other income sources. They found the
MPC from fixed food stamps to be lower (0.30) than all income (0.37);
although the MPC for school lunch was 0.598, higher than the other two
sources. Similarly, Kinsey2 used a linear model to estimate whether
working wives had a different MPC food away from home, following the
same basic functional form of listing different income sources as
separate variables in the demand function.
Just as income can enter the household in different forms from
different sources, within a given household one or more individuals
may earn income. The question to be addressed in this regard is: do
households with different numbers of income earners, and households
where the sex and relationship (e.g., husband, wife, and child) of the
income earners differ display different average and marginal propen-
sities to consume food and nutrients? Such a hypothesis grows out of
the contention that there is a relationship between who earns income
1 D. West and D. Price, "The Effects of Income Assets, Food Programs,
and Household Size in Food Consumption," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 58 (1976) pp. 725-30.
2 Op. cit., Kinsey, pp. 10-19.
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and the perception of who controls outlays, 1 and that there is not a
single preference ordering within the household.
Recently, a number of studies have suggested that the budget allo-
cation is partially determined by who controls the income. Kumar 2
intimates that income controlled by women may result in better nutri-
tional status of children than if income is controlled by men.
Another recent study by Guyer 3 examines this issue in West Africa.
She points out that not only do men and women work in different
spheres and have different sources of income, but they often manage
their earnings separately. However, income earned by different house-
hold members are not spent completely independent of each other.
There appear to be customary standards which govern not only patterns
of outlay but interpersonal transfer within the family. The evidence
presented in West Africa by Guyer leads her to suggest that household
budget studies must address sex-specificity explicitly in decision
making. Without doing so, it becomes impossible to determine whether
factors such as households' spending a higher portion of their income
on food is attributable to declining household real income, as
suggested by Engel's law, or to greater control of available income by
women.
1 Martha Roldan, "Intrahousehold Patterns of Money Allocation and
Women's Subordination," prepared for Rockefeller Foundation
Conference on Women and Income Control in Third World (Columbia
University) October 1982.
2 Op. cit., Kumar, pp. 32-42.
3 J. Guyer, "Household Budgets and Women's Income," Boston University
African Studies Center (Mimeograph) 1980; and also B.L. Rogers,
"The Internal Dynamics of Households: A Critical Factor in
Development Policy," Tufts University, Medford MA, (Mimeograph)
1983.
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The perception of the household being a homogenous unit with a
single joint utility function facing a household level budget
constraint has also been the subject of other research. Roger's
extensive review of the literature admonishes planners to "be alert to
the possible consequences of altering the nature of income while
attempting to raise it". 1 The difficulty of defining a household, let
alone assuming it to be a homogenous decisionmaking unit for analysis
is also stressed. This leads to the suggestion proposed by Watts and
Skidone2 that future studies consider the individual as the point of
departure; the household would be considered one of the possible sup-
port networks with which the individual interacts.
Recently Jones 3 has questioned the conditions under which the
household exhibits the rationality of a single consumer. She argues
that individuals within the household maintain independent control
over resources. In such instances, the household is composed of
multiple decision makers. Thus, the concept of a dictator within the
household controlling resources, or that all members of the household
behave perfectly altruistically for the good of all members, is
dismissed.
A household bargaining model which is based on the assumption of
individual members benefitting from an exchange of goods and services,
1 Op. cit., Rogers, p.23.
2 H.W. Watts and F. Skidmore, "Household Structure: Necessary
Changes in Categorization and Data Collection," prepared for con-
ference on Issues in Federal Statistical Needs Relating to Women
(Bethesda, MD, April 27-28, 1978).
3 C. Jones, The Mobilization of Women's Labor for Cash Crop
Production: A Game-Theoretic Approach, Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, 1983).
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with different preferences in regard to the terms of exchange is pro-
posed in such cases. Empirical testing is required to determine the
value and worthiness of the theoretical approach Jones has outlined.
However, the data requirements of the Nash bargaining approach and
problems encountered in previous studies will indeed make such
research difficult.
In this research, the household will be assumed to be a singular
decision unit, as has been done in most recent studies. This approach
will answer the primary question: do households where income accrues
to different household members (e.g., males or females) have different
consumption behavior and what are their nutritional implications?
This study will not define clearly the dynamics of the intra-household
decisionmaking mechanism by which internal consensus or agreements are
achieved. Therefore, this alternative only observes the outcome of
the decisionmaking process. This is considered adequate for
understanding the effects of changing patterns of women's employment
activities and household characteristics. It is also felt to be
appropriate in the more closely knit institutional fabric of a house-
hold in Asia, as compared to Africa. Thus, the model will be deve-
loped based on the assumption that a household's preferences derive
from the weighted shares of preferences of individual income earners,
where the weights are the proportion of income earned by a given indi-
vidual.
Finally, the models described below are based on the assumption
that despite the physical transfer of money between individuals in the
household, it is expended largely in a way which reflects the desires
of the member giving up the physical control of resources. This
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assumption, although unquestionably strong, may not be too far from
the truth. It is reasonable to the extent that individuals within the
household would not transfer sizeable amounts of resources to one
another unless either the preference ordering of the people who are
involved in the exchange are similar or there is implicit control of
the income through exertion of the dictatorial powers of the indivi-
dual who is the provider, as opposed to the recipient, of the
transfer.
ECONOMETRIC CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the importance of the findings of previous studies cited
above that the source and form of income, and to whom it accrues,
effects consumption behavior, the methods employed lead one to
question whether in fact they represent statistical artifacts of
employing a theoretically unsound methodology. Specifically, the
budget constraint for a household receiving income from more than one
source is:
(1) YPiQi = Yw + Ys = V
i
where Yw money income in the form of wages or some other base
Or for
(2)
where
income source
Ys = the value of in-kind income or subsidy income or income
from a specific source such as agricultural production
or food stamps
Y = total household income
households where there are more than one income earner:
lPiQi = YM + YF =
i
YF = income earned by males
Y= income earned by females
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For households where income comes from different sources and
accrues to different members:
(3) 1PiQi = YM(aMYw + (1-aM)ys) + YF(aFYw + (1-aF)ys) = V
where aM = share of income source Yw earned or controlled by males
aF = share of income source Yw earned or controlled by
females.
The work by Kumar, 1 Chandrasekera and Gavin, 2 West and Price, 3 and
others assumes that households distinguish consciously between sources
of income or by income earner so that the demand functions which
correspond to (1), (2), and (3) are as follows:
(1A) Qi = f(Pk,Yw,ys)
(2A) Qi = f(Pk,YM,YF)
(3A) Qi = f(PkaMYw,(l-aM)YsaFYw,(l-aF)Ys)
These forms assume separable utility from goods consumed from dif-
ferent income sources and/or earned by different household members.
But Demousis et. al. 4 point out in the context of their study on
income from cash versus donated food supplements that this is a
misspecified functional form unless income in the form of Ys is not
convertible to cash or goods purchased with Yw through sale, barter,
or displacement of goods otherwise in the expenditure patterns of the
household. Thus, equations (1A), (2A), and (3A) are faulty because
they cannot be derived from utility maximization. They are
1 Op. cit., Kumar, pp. 32-38.
2 Op. cit., Gavan and Chandrasekera, pp. 34-46.
3 Op. cit., West and Price, pp. 725-729.
4 M. Demousis et. al., "Income Effects of Title II Commodities in
Panama," Sigma One Corporation, Raleigh, N.C., 1982 (Mimeograph)
pp. 10-13.
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inconsistent with the fact that consumer sovereignty encourages house-
holds to sell and trade donated or subsidized goods, as well as adjust
their expenditure patterns accordingly.
This can be illustrated by drawing upon the work of Alderman1
using the case of income from two sources or two decision makers.
Concerning the example of income from two different sources (e.g.,
subsidy income and earned income), assuming that there is only
one income earner, the objective function is:
(4) max u = f(XKXL) st. PKXK = Yw
PLXL = L
where PK = the vector of prices for the goods in the household uti-
lity function which can be purchased by Yw
XK = the vector of goods in the household utility function
which can be purchased by Yw
PL = the vector of prices of goods in the utility function
which can be purchased by (or are provided from) Ys
XL = the vector of goods in the utility function which can be
purchased by (or are provided from) Ys
To the extent that any of the goods in XL can be purchased with
Yw, or that YL can be converted to currency to purchase XK, the assump-
tion of separable utility functions do not hold. Therefore, if the
vector of goods XK and XL are composed of completely different com-
modities, there is no substitutability of commodities between vectors
XK and XL, that Yw cannot be used to purchase goods in vector XL and
Ys cannot be used to purchase goods in vector XK, and there is no
potential for trade or bartering between XL and XK, then the func-
tional forms used by previous researchers is appropriate. This is
1 H. Alderman, "Tests for Differences in Marginal Propensity to
Consume by Source of Income," n.p. (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1983)
pp. 1-5.
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considered unlikely in the case of income from agricultural production
or in-kind income in the form of food and housing, which is the sub-
ject of this work.
In a similar vein, if the goods which are in the individual demand
functions of two decision makers are the same, and all one observes is
the joint utility function of the household, it is impossible to
distinguish which proportion of the same good was purchased out of YF
or YM- Therefore, placing YM and YF as separate arguments in a demand
function makes little sense since it supposes separability of demand
without any consideration being given to the purchases of the other
agent in the household who is active in the market.
Demousis et. al., 1 troubled by this problem, applied an alter-
native method to examine whether the MPC from an in-kind income
transfer from a supplementary feeding program in Panama differs from
other income. The approach involved was to divide households into two
groups: those receiving and those not receiving food supplements.
They estimate the MPC, b, for non-participating households, i.e.,
(5) FX = a + b(Yw + Ys) = a + bY = a + bYw
where: FX = food expenditures
and Ys = D.
They then impose a linear restriction on a demand function for par-
ticipating households that the MPC for the value of gift income Ys is
b. Thus, given that the equation for participating households can be
written but not estimated,
(6) FX = a + biYw + b2Ys
1 Op. cit., Demousis, p.8.
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the hypothesis can be formulated and tested as
(7) FX - bYs = a + biYw
The test is then to determine if b differs from bi. The results from
Panama indicated that the MPCs from money income, bi, was no different
than the MPCs from total (i.e., subsidy inclusive) income, b.
This approach, although econometrically more sound than previous
research, is also plagued by a number of problems. Most serious is
that the tastes and preference ordering of recipient and non-recipient
households may not be identical. No attempt was made to show the com-
parability of the two samples. Similarly, their approach is limited
to the linear model. The use of a logarithmic function is precluded
since if (5) were in logs, one could not take blog(YM + Ys) and assume
it equal to blogYM + blogYs which would be necessary for (6).
Unfortunately, a linear model has many properties which are not opti-
mal for Engel curve estimation. These include that the linear form
will result in a constant marginal propensity to consume (when it is
expected to decline) for food expenditures, and that the income elasti-
city tends toward unity with increasing income, which once again is
quite contrary to empirical findings, as shown in Chapter VII. But
most disconcerting is that some of the reported results of this speci-
fication for the Panama data, such as an income elasticity of demand
for calories equalling 0.03,1 are almost too low to be plausible.
This is especially so given the MPCs for specific commodities
reported.
1 Op. cit., Demousis et. al., p.33.
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Another noteworthy empirical investigation is the work by Massell
in Kenya. He undertook a study on 816 households in Kenya to deter-
mine the extent to which the value of income from agricultural com-
modities produced and consumed at home have a different MPC than other
income sources. He estimated a separate coefficient for the ratio of
subsistence to total income (subsistence ratio), in addition to
including total expenditures and other demographic variables in the
model. He found that the demand function for commodities consumed
mainly from home production had high positive coefficients for the
subsistence ratio.
A double log functional form was used. This is considered to be
more appropriate for estimating Engel curves. The basic limitation is
that the form constrains the elasticities to be constant over the
entire range. This is, in fact, plausible for relatively small and
homogenous population groups, which are likely to display similar
tastes and preferences.
Massell's idea of using a ratio of one form of income to total
income is appealing. However, two other issues plague this for-
mulation which are not discussed in the article. The first is the
concept of assuming the value of home consumption is exogenous to the
demand model. This is considered an incorrect assumption. The amount
of home consumption is, like total demand, a reflection of a given
household preference ordering. For households not engaged in
marketing food commodities, the choice of which commodities to grow
for home consumption is given endogenously. For households who both
1 Op. cit., Massell, pp. 136-142.
-209-
produce for the market and home consumption, the amount consumed at
home versus sold is partially a function of market price and marketing
margins; however, the decision on how much to consume at home clearly
is conditioned endogenously by tastes and preferences.
The second problem with Massell's work is that he does not say
anything about the changes expected in consumption of a commodity when
marginal changes in income accrue to the household in one form or the
other. All that can be inferred is that a change in the subsistence
ratio will alter consumption of a given good, although this says
nothing directly about MPCs.
SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
In light of the above discussion, there is a need for further
theoretical development of methods to answer the question regarding
different MPCs. Empirical testing of these approaches is also
required. As a point of departure, one must carefully consider the
precise question being asked and then explore the alternative speci-
fications which are econometrically sound. Below, further con-
sideration is given to the range of models devised to test differences
in the MPC. The question concerning the marginal propensities to con-
sume calories from female versus male earners is first addressed.
Thereafter, models will explore the effects of earnings from different
income sources. This is followed by asking the same questions in
regard to the MPC food rather than calories.
As intimated above, the basis for empirical research should be
clarity in the formulation of questions to be answered. One important
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policy question that can be posed is: what are the consumption con-
sequences of marginal changes in the share of female income to total
income or marginal changes in the share of income from different sour-
ces, while holding total income constant? Note that this question,
like the research of Massell's, does not answer directly the implica-
tions of increasing household income available to the male or female
in the household, or income from a given source. Rather, the inquiry
is to whether changing the ratio of female to total income, or
shifting income sources, while holding total income constant, can be
expected to alter significantly the level of calorie consumption per
adult equivalency unit (CAL) or food expenditures per capita (FX).
The first set of null hypotheses may be formulated as follows:
(8) Ho : aCAL/a(YF/Y) = 0;
(9) H20 : BCAL/a(Ysi/Y) = 0;
where:
CAL = calories per adult equivalency unit
Ysi = non-wage and non-salary income from source i, for which
one hypothesizes that it affects food acquisition beha-
vior differently than wages and salaries
These can be interpreted as stating that the average propensity to
consume calories or food (if FX replaces CAL above) is not a function
of the share of income earned by females or the sources of income.
A second question is focused on marginal changes in the
household's income, and whether additional income accrues to the
female or male, or come from different sources. That is, does the MPC
calories or food differ? Using calories for illustrative purposes,
the second set of hypotheses to be tested is that:
3(10) H0 : aCAL/ayF = aCAL/aYM;
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(11) Ho : aCAL/DYw = aCAL/aYsi = aCAL/aYs2 ... BCAL/aYsk
If (10) and (11) are true, then it can be said that the marginal pro-
pensity to consume calories (or food when FX replaces CAL above) does
not differ between men and women or by source of income. If it is
rejected then the actual MPCs can be computed to determine the
nutritional implications. 1
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
Marginal Propensity to Consume Calories
Female versus Male Income. The basic model specification employed to
test the caloric consumption implications of income accruing to different
household members is as follows:
(12) CAL = a + biLnY + b2(LnY) 2 + C1(YF/Y) + dLZL + eKZK * LnY
where:
LnY = log of income
YF = value of income earner by females
YF/Y = ratio of female to total income = RATIO
ZL = the vector of other independent variables
dL = the vector of coefficients to be estimated
ZK = subset of ZL
eK = the vector of coefficients to be estimated
Before discussing the results of the specific models, some general
1 An underlying assumption must be made explicit before continuing
the discussion. That is, the under-reporting of male and female
income and among various income sources is assumed to be the same.
To the extent that this is not true, the proposed analysis, as with
any other, will lead to spurious conclusions based on poor data.
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comments concerning the functional forms are appropriate since they
apply to all models which follow. First, the semilog quadratic form
was employed because of the goodness of fit for observed data. As
with the commodity-specific functions, sectoral dummy variables are
included as well as variables designed to address structural and
demographic variability among households. These include household
size (HHSIZE), household size times per capita expenditures (HHSX),
the number of income earners (EARNERS), and the ratio of adult equiva-
lency units to household size (AUERAT). In addition, data on educa-
tional achievement of the mother and father, MOMED and DADED, were
included because they differ for households in which different shares
of income are earned by women. The age of the major income earner
(AGE1) to control for life-cycle variations, as well as the amount of
farm land owned (FARMLAND), and a price index (PRINDEX) were also
included. The latter was designed to control for differences in
prices faced by consumers, using a Laspeyres type index:
(13) Price Indexj = .
Pik * qij
where:
Pi = price of commodity i consumed by household j
qi = quantity of commodity i consumed by household j
P = average price of commodity i for all households k.
This will pick up any variance in consumption which might be attribu-
table to the households with female income earners facing different
prices due to geographical or demographic causes, or being engaged in
different occupations.
In order to test the first hypothesis (Ho on page 210) the partial
Table 56 -- Models Used to Estimate the Marginal Propensity to Consume Calories
Independent
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable: Calories/AEU
Model 3 Model 4
-24564.2
5749.50
-223.61
-1693.1
719.79
-95.94
3.65
-2875.01
10.33
-5.42
-26.91
2.77
2877.06
-2263.98
-400.86
324.15
87.91
(16.20)
(10.60)
(65.81)
(11.50)
(11.98)
(5.39)
(24.19)
(0.83)
(0.58)
(3.20)
(0.90)
(9.36)
(3.46)
(10.43)
(83.43)
(2.29)
INTERCEPT
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
PRINDEX
HHSIZE
HHSX
AGE1
AEURAT
EARNERS
MOMED
DADED
FARMLAND
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
FEMINCR
FEMINCRX
FEMINCRZ
RYsi1
RYXsi
RYS2
RYXs2
RYs3
RYXs3
RYs4
RYXs4
RYs5
RYXs5
-24520.6
5741.47
-223.30
-1693.16
717.75
-95.28
3.65
2873.53
10.28
-5.61
-26.80
2.75
2880.80
-2252.67
-401.35
322.75
(16.19)
(10.59)
(25.73)
(11.47)
(11.95)
(5.39)
(24.16)
(0.82)
(0.61)
(3.18)
(0.89)
(9.37)
(3.44)
(10.44)
(3.87)
11.12 (2.29)
-485.12 (4.72)
185.56 (4.49)
-74.45 (1.09)
126.19 (1.31)
7.94 (0.19)
-24570.4
5751.75
-224.06
-1692.77
718.13
-95.20
3.55
-2854.01
4.99
-6.93
-24.90
2.66
2894.76
-2286.16
-403.19
326.10
19.62
-39.73
-484.64
(16.22)
(10.63)
(25.73)
(11.48)
(11.94)
(5.24)
(23.94)
(0.39)
(0.46)
(2.87)
(0.86)
(9.42)
(3.49)
(10.49)
(3.91)
(3.16)
(2.19)
(4.72)
187.94 (4.55)
-83.83 (1.23)
125.03 (0.19)
10.02 (0.81)
0.648 0.648 0.648
Model 5
-25563.6
6002.03
-238.37
-1744.22
727.08
-95.94
3.33
-2871.49
5.19
-11.58
-28.18
7.19
2919.99
-2312.64
-410.42
329.14
76.13
(17.04)
(11.4)
(26.69)
(11.60)
(12.02)
(5.11)
(24.10)
(0.43)
(1.24)
(3.36)
(2.41)
(9.47)(3.52)
(10.65)
(3.94)
(37.55)
-485.11 (4.72)
185.55 (4.49)
-74.76 (1.09)
126.79 (1.32)
7.55 (0.18)
(15.96)
(11.08)
(25.71)
(11.61)
(12.09)
(5.51)
(24.24)
(0.36)
(0.76)
(2.95)
(0.49)
(7.45)
(4.14)
(8.46)
(4.57)
(2.27)
(4.38)
-25283.6
6007.45
-245.26
-1685.1
738.25
-97.86
3.71
-2868.75
11.48
-2.79
-24.83
1.52
2355.06
-2754.82
-334.57
387.05
87.17
-449.39
-3713.51
491.78
1925.50
-251.40
-1754.78
238.39
-315.92
41.55
,
(5.91)
(6.21)
(2.26)
(2.34)
(1.33)
(1.43)
(0.54)
(0.57)
0.6510.644
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Table 57 -- Marginal Propensities to Consume Calories for Men and Women
Low Expenditure Groupa
% Female Income
0 25 80
76.13
1.193
1.241
0.048
87.91
1.171
1.226
0.055
81.94
1.171
1.223
0.052
144.44
1.171
1.262
0.091
76.13
1.181
1.229
0.048
87.91
1.157
1.212
0.055
81.94
1.160
1.212
0.052
124.59
1.155
1.233
0.078
76.13
1.154
1.202
0.048
87.91
1.126
1.181
0.055
81.94
1.135
1.187
0.052
8.92
-1.077
1.128
0.051
Average Expenditure Groupb
% Female Income
0 25 80
76.13
0.681
0.710
0.029
87.91
0.673
0.707
0.034
87.37
0.674
0.708
0.034
153.99
0.674
0.734
0.060
76.13
0.674
0.703
0.029
87.91
0.665
0.699
0.034
87.37
0.666
0.700
0.034
134.14
0.663
0.715
0.052
76.13
0.658
0.687
0.029
87.91
0.646
0.680
0.034
87.37
0.650
0.684
0.034
90.47
0.651
0.686
0.035
High Expenditure Groupc
% Female Income
0 2 80
76.13
0.160
0.169
0.009
87.91
0.162
0.173
0.011
100.12
0.162
0.174
0.012
176.79
0.162
0.183
0.021
76.13
0.157
0.166
0.009
87.91
0.159
0.170
0.011
100.12
0.159
0.171
0.012
156.94
0.158
0.177
0.019
76.13
0.153
0.162
0.009
87.91
0.153
0.164
0.011
100.12
0.153
0.165
0.012
115.39
0.154
0.167
0.013
Corresponds to 2nd decile of population where yearly per capita expenditures
Corresponds to mean of population where yearly per capita expenditures - Rs.
C Corresponds to 10th decile of population where yearly per capita expenditures - Rs. 8267
Derivative
MODEL 1:
aCAL/aRATIO
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
MODEL 2:
aCAL/aRATIO
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
MODEL 3:
aCAL/aRATIO
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
MODEL 4:
aCAL/aRATIO
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
a
b
- Rs. 1587
2583
I
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derivative of the calories per AEU with respect to the ratio (YF/Y),
was taken from Model 1 in Table 56 as follows:
(14) aCAL/aRATIO = Ci
From Model 1, this can be shown to equal 76.13 (see Table 57). The
significant FEMINCR coefficient implies that a one-unit change in
ratio of female to male income will increase daily energy intake by
76.13 calories per adult equivalency unit. To understand the consump-
tion consequences of this finding, assume that women's earnings repre-
sented 20 percent of the total household income. Increasing them to
30 percent will bring about an increase of 7.6 calories per day per
AEU; while raising the share of women's income to 70 percent of the
total will result in an increase of 38 calories. Despite the high
degree of statistical significance of this finding, its nutritional
consequences are minimal for small changes in the share of income
controlled by females.
It is also noteworthy that as a consequence of the functional form
used in Model 1, the derivative aCAL/aRATIO is a constant. It is
invariant to changes in household expenditure levels and the share of
income already being earned by females, an issue which is not intuiti-
vely appealing.
Before expanding upon that issue further, it is appropriate to test
3
the other hypothesis (Ho on page 210) that the marginal propensities do
not differ. This is a more complex issue.
Referring back to Model 1, the derivative of calories with respect
to LnYM is as follows:
(15A) a CAL bi + 2b2LnY - CYF + eKKaLnYm eKZK
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which can be transformed to:
(15B) DLnCAL _ bi + 2b2LnY + C1YF/Y + eKZK
arnYM- ~ CAL
which through some further manipulation becomes:
(15C) aCAL _ aCAL 1 (bi + 2b2LnY - C1YF/Y + eKZK)-
a YM a YF=YFO 7
In (15), one estimates the MPC out of male income. This can be
shown by first rewriting (12) on page 16 as follows:
(16) CAL = a + bi + b2(LnY)2 + C1 f (3) + dLZL + eKZK + LnY
Just limiting the discussion to the quotient of the two functions, for
the meantime,
where:
(17) YF= f(Y) = Y - W
(18) Y = g(Y) = (1-Y)/C1
and:
W = the share of income earned by women.
It is known from the quotient rule that:
(19) a = f'(Y)g(Y) - f(Y)g'(X)
aY g(Y) g2(y)
It is now possible to define aYF/aY or f'(Y) to equal zero; or in
other words, that the change in female income for the change in total
income equals zero. The result is that f'(Y)g(Y) drops out of (19),
and
(20) a ) = f(Y)g'(Y) = (Y-W)/C1 = -C1 Y
aY g(Y) g2 (y) (y2/C1) 2  y2
Therefore, when one adds back the other parts of (16), the derivative
of the change in calories with respect to a change in income earned by
males is defined as in (15C).
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The next step is to determine the MPC out of female income. To do
so, one first takes the partial derivative of calories with respect to
YF, which is:
(21) aCAL/aYF = Cl/Y
This equals the difference between the MPC of females and males. This
is known because, once again using the quotient rule, the total deri-
vative with respect to female income is:
(22) CAL = 1 (bi + 2b2LnY + C1 F) + eKZK)
where aCAL/aYFT is the MPC out of female income.
Calculating these MPCs, one arrives at the findings reported for
Model 1 in Table 57. First, the difference between the male and
female MPC is 0.048 for the lowest expenditure group and declines to
0.009 for the highest group. This decline is in keeping with the fact
that the actual MPCs out of female and male income also decline
rapidly as incomes increase.
The functional form employed in Model 1 implies that the difference
between the MPCs is the same for a given expenditure group, regardless
of the share of female income. However, one can also note a slight
decline in male MPC for a given expenditure group, as the share of
female income increases. This finding will recur in other models to be
discussed below. It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider the plausi-
bility and meaning of such a statistical finding and pose some possible
expl anati ons.
It seems entirely reasonable that as the women control and earn
more income, the men may increasingly perceive that their limited
resource base is for their "personal" use, and assume that the women
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in the household will tend to the basic necessities, especially food.
In addition, as discussed above, households in which women control a
larger share of the income have higher average propensities to consume
calories. Thus, since the family where women control a higher share
of the earnings is already closer to achieving dietary adequacy before
the marginal rupee is provided, it is reasonable to expect that when
women earn a larger share of the income, less of an additional rupee
will be spent on calories. That would also explain why in Table 57
the female MPCs declines slightly with higher female income shares;
these are precisely the households which are already consuming more
calories.
There are a series of possible shortcomings with Model 1 which
suggest the need to push the analysis further. The first is that
there is no effort to control for the source of household incomes.
As intimated previously, if there are different MPCs to consume out of
different forms of income, it becomes necessary to include them in the
equation so as to ensure that the difference in MPCs for males versus
females is not reflecting different income sources in households where
women earn larger income shares. Model 2 in Table 57 addresses this
problem. It includes the percent of income from various non-money
sources, transfers and business enterprises. The share from wages and
salaries is not included but is implicitly controlled for since it is
the remaining income share. The result of this adjustment is to
increase the size of the FEMINCR coefficient (see Table 57), as well as
improve the robustness of the parameter estimate. By improving the
fit for the observed data, aCAL/aRATIO proves to have a higher value of
87.91. Although this is nearly 15 percent higher than Model 1, the
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absolute value of the difference is only 10 calories per AEU per day.
The difference between the MPC calories from male and female incomes
is also greater in Model 2. This reinforces the need to control for
sources of income when testing for differences in the MPCs from income
earned by males and females. The magnitude of the difference remains
small, however, with the MPC for females being around 5 percent higher
than males.
The next step in the analysis involves exploring whether a func-
tional form can be found to test the hypothesis that the change in
calorie consumption as a result of a change in the ratio of female to
total income (i.e., aCAL/aRATIO) increases with income. This is
expected since higher income households consume considerably more
calories. Therefore, the derivative aCAL/aRATIO should have a higher
value at higher income levels. To test that hypothesis, a third model
was employed. It is as follows (see Model 3 in Table 56):
(23) CAL = a + biLnY + b2(LnY) 2 + C2(FY/Y * LnY) + dLZL + eKZK * LnY
The partial derivative of the log of calories with respect to the
ratio (YF/Y) is then:
(24) aCAL/aRATIO = C2 * LnY
In this case, the effect of a marginal change in the share of female
income on the calorie consumption is related to income. In addition,
the marginal propensities to consume can be figured as follows:
(25) a CAL _ ICAL _ 1(bi + 2b2LnY + C2YF(1-LnY) + CKZK)
and:
(26) aCAL C2 * LnY
These parameter estimates for Model 3 are found in Table 56. The
R2 for the equation is only marginally better than Model 2, and the
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t-ratio for C2 is slightly higher than for C1. The derivatives, as
found in Table 57, however, have the hypothesized characteristics.
For low-income households, a change in the ratio from say 0.1 to 0.2,
or 0.3 to 0.4, will bring about an increase of 8.2 calories per AEU.
For high-income households, this increase is equivalent to 10 calories
per day. Once again, although highly statistically significant, these
changes are small. Their policy relevance is in their limited magni-
tude.
Concerning the MPCs, from Model 3 it is again possible to observe
the hypothesized decreases in the differences between MPCs of men and
women as the share of income to the latter rises. This indicates that
in poor households there is greater nutritional importance to be
attributed to who earns income, both due to their at-riskness and
divergence in preference ordering of males and females.
While the results of Model 3 are an improvement, there remains
one further issue which demands attention. That is, for a given
expenditure group, the differences in the marginal propensities to
consume from income earned by males versus females and the difference
in the average propensities to consume with a change in the ratio of
female to total income, in Models 1 through 3, is the same regardless
of the level or share of income earned by women. While this may be
the case, it is intuitively appealing that the lower the income share
of women, the higher the differences between male and female MPCs, and
the greater BCAL/9RATIO should be for a given income level.
To test this, once again consideration was given to a variety of
flexible functional forms. After considerable experimentation, the
following Model 4 was arrived at. It is as follows:
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(27) CAL = a + biLnY + b2(LnY) 2 + C2(YF/Y * LnY) + C3(YF/Y) 2
+ dLZL + eKZK * LnY
where:
(28) BCAL/aRATIO = C2LnY + 2C4(YF/Y)
In addition, the marginal propensities to consume out of male
income can be figured as follows:
(29) aCL =- bi + 2b2LnY + C2YF 
- LnY 2C3YF2 + eKZKa Ln YM YVy
(30) aLnCAL bi + 2b2LnY + C2YF((1-LnY)/Y) - 2C3YF
2/y2 + eKZK
a LnYM- CAL
(31) -A a CA. 1 (bi + 2b2LnY + C2YF (1-LnY) - 2
a YM ay YF=YF0  Y Y
+ eKZK).
Now, to determine the difference in the MPC from female versus male
income, one differentiates the equation as follows:
(32) aCAL C2*LnY 2C3YF 1 +2C3YF(32)F = _ + Yz = _CLY+ Y)
This flexible functional form not only displays the hypothesized
properties but is statistically robust. To amplify, first note from
Table 57 that the derivative aCAL/aRATIO not only has an increasing
value with rising expenditure levels, but that it is higher when the
women's share of income is lower. This supports the hypothesis for-
mulated above that a unit change in the ratio of female to total
income will have greater nutritional consequences the lower the income
being earned by females.
A second exciting aspect about Model 4 concerns the differences in
the MPC to consume calories out of male versus female income. The
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difference between the MPCs is greater when women are earning a
smaller share of the household income. However, the added flexibility
in this form confirms the hypothesized relationship that as income
rises the differences in the marginal propensities, controlling for
the share of female income, declines.
In total, the story is clear that when one discusses differences
between the MPC calories between women and men one must consider not
only the economic well-being of the household but the share of income
already in the possession of the women as well. This is especially
important because if these subtleties are not taken into account one
may draw incorrect inferences from inappropriately specified
equations.
Sources of Income. In the previous section, the hypotheses con-
cerning whether women display a higher MPC calories were examined. In
this section, a similar analysis is undertaken to determine whether
the MPCs are different from different income sources. In this regard,
interest is focused on the hypothesis that three income sources in
particular are likely to display different MPCs from wages, salaries,
or business profits for reasons discussed in the beginning of this
chapter. These are: (1) non-money income which includes housing,
food, clothing, and medical facilities which are over and above those
free goods enjoyed by the community (e.g., education), plus the rental
value of owner-occupied housing; (2) the value of income from agri-
cultural production which includes home consumption, sales, and the
amount retained in storage; and (3) pensions, remittances, and food
stamps which are all received from sources outside the household (and
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which unfortunately are not distinguishable from one another because
of the design of the survey). These are hereafter referred to as Ysi,
Ys2, and Ys3 respectively, and their ratio to total income as RYsi,
RYs2, and RYs3.
As in the previous section, the determination of whether these
income sources have different MPCs than normal cash income will be
performed for calories. In order to test for the nutritional implica-
tions of receiving income from different sources, the first question
is once again to determine if there is a change in calorie consumption
as a result of a change in the share that a given income source
composes of the total household income, holding income constant. Model
2 in Table 56 serves to answer this question. Despite that interest
revolves around the three sources of income discussed above, the share
from other sources as well as from female income is left in the model to
reduce any bias in the parameter estimates of concern.
By taking the partial derivative of calories with respect to the
share of non-money income, aCAL/aRYsi, one can note in Table 58 that
an increase in the share of income from non-money sources will lower
the households' calorie consumption. Increasing the share of income
from agricultural production, aCAL/aRYs2, will in fact increase the
average propensity to consume calories.
The magnitude of these changes are of interest. For example, if a
household receives an average share of seven percent of their income
from the category of non-money income, and that was to rise to 27 per-
cent, the result would be a decrease in daily energy consumption of
nearly 100 calories per AEU. This would indeed be a significant reduc-
tion. In a similar fashion, if the average household which earns
-224-
around 15 percent of their income from agricultural production was to
have their share of income from that source increased to 35 percent of
the total income, the result would be a daily increase of nearly 40
calories per AEU. The magnitude of this change, despite the robust-
ness of the statistics, is of considerably less policy relevance.
The differences in the MPC calories from different income sources
can be computed from Model 2 (and Model 5, discussed below) as follows:
(3) aCAL 1 - (sk'(33) =7 (bi + 2blLnY + EkZk - Mk ( ))
where:
Ysk = vector of income source i for which differences in MPCs
are being tested
Mk = vector of coefficients for income sources with signifi-
cantly different MPCs than wages, salaries and business
profits1
The difference in the MPCs between income from (1) non-monetary
sources, (2) pensions, remittances, food stamps, and (3) agricultural
production, and other income sources is as follows:
(34) aCAL _ Mi
asi Y
The comparable derivatives for Model 5 are as follows:
(35) aCAL (bi + 2biLnY + EkZk - Mkysk+ NkYsk 1  )
aYw Y Y Y
(36) aCAL Mi + Ni * LnY
1 Note that the average percent of income from each income source,
RYsi, by expenditure group, is used to calculate the MPC. If per-
centages were used other than the average values for data, the MPCs
would differ accordingly. In general, if aCAL/aRYsi is positive,
the higher the percent of income from Ysi the lower the MPCs out
of Yw and Ysi. Conversely, if aCAL/aRYsi is negative, the higher
the percent of income from Ysi the higher the MPCs out of Yw and
Ysi. The values of RYsi used to calculate the MPCs is found in
Table 3 in Appendix C.
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where:
Mk = vector of coefficient for RYsk
Nk = vector of coefficients for RYsk * LPCEXP
The results are found in Table 58. First, from Model 2 one finds that
the MPCs from non-money income, Ysi, is consistently lower, while the
MPCs from agricultural income is higher. The absolute differences are
highest for low-income households because the MPCs from all income
sources declines precipitously as incomes rise. For low-income house-
holds, for example, the difference between the MPCs from wages and
non-money income is 0.306. In policy terms, consider the low-income
household which receives an income transfer with a value of around Rs.
250 per capita per year (which is around 15 percent of their expen-
ditures at present). The daily calorie consumption per AEU would be
76.5 lower if that transfer was in terms of non-money sources, as in
the form of wages.
Before examining further the implications of Model 2 in terms of
marginal propensities, there was an attempt in Model 5 to determine if
aCAL/a(Ysi/Y) is variable across expenditure levels and to explore
whether another functional form would be more flexible in estimating
MPCs from difference income sources. Interaction terms between the
ratio of income sources and the log of per capita expenditures (i.e.,
RYsi * LPCEXP = RYXsi) were therefore added to allow for such flexibi-
lity.
In attempting to add the interaction term RYXsl in Model 5, both it
and RYSi became insignificant. This is due apparently to a problem of
multicollinearity. Therefore, the latter was dropped. However, a
significant coefficent for an interaction term with RYs2, (i.e., RYXs2)
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Table 58 -- Marginal Propensity to Consume Calories from Different
Income Sources
CALCULATED
FROM:
MODEL 2:
aCAL/aRYsi
aCAL/RYs2
MPC Yw
MPC Ysi
MPC Ys2
MODEL 5:
aCAL/aRYsi
aCAL/aRYs2
aCAL/aRYs3
MPC Yw
MPC Ysi
MPC Ys2
MPC Ys3
Low
-485.11
185.55
1.169
0.863
1.286
-449.39
-89.14
72.78
1.174
0.862
1.118
1.220
Expenditure Group
Average
-485.11
185.55
0.675
0.487
0.747
-449.39
150.43
-49.68
0.668
0.494
0.726
0.649
High
-485.11
185.55
0.164
0.105
0.186
-449.39
722.37
-324.13
0.147
0.093
0.234
0.106
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was estimated. Of greater interest, however, was that including in the
model an interaction term between expenditures and the ratio of
pensions, remittances and food stamps to total income, RYXs3, resulted
in both it and RYs3 being significant (see Model 5). Before conjec-
turing on the reason for these findings, their implications in terms
of specifying models are worthy of a comment.
There may be considerable curvature in the relationship between
the dependent variable and an independent variable. If one constrains
that relationship to be linear, it may lead to either insignificant
results, as in the case of including RYs3 alone (i.e., without RYXS3)
in the equation. Similarly, such a specification may obscure the fact
that certain income groups distinguish themselves in their consumption
behavior, as with the case of how low-income consumers are affected
differently by the share of income from agricultural production. It
is therefore recommended that whenever the lack of multicollinearity
permits, interaction terms be included with any variable for which one
is concerned with estimating the differences in MPCs. This will
improve the fit for the observed data.
From Model 5 one can then take the derivative of calorie consump-
tion with respect to a change in percent of income from agricultural
production (aCAL/aRYs2) and from pensions, remittances, and food
stamps (aCAL/aRYs3). As seen in Table 58, the former is -89.14 for
low-income groups and rises to 722 for high-income groups. Similarly,
the latter is positive at low expenditure levels and becomes negative
around Rs. 2000/year. This suggests that a change in the share of
income from these sources will have major calorie consumption con-
sequences, although these vary by income source.
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One hypothetical explanation for the findings concerning pensions,
remittances, and food stamps (i.e., aCAL/DRYs3) is that among low-
income consumers the lion's share of income in this group is from food
stamps. Thereafter, as incomes rise, there is a gradual shift toward
remittances and/or pensions representing the largest portion of this
income source. If this be the case, it can be inferred that low-
income consumers will consume more calories if they recieve a larger
income share from food stamps (albeit, small in magnitude); and at
higher incomes, households will consume fewer calories and save more
out of their income which comes from remittances and/or pensions.
Despite that there is an overt need to further test these hypothesized
relationships, they add some credence to the argument that moral
suasion encourages recipients of food stamps to spend more on food and
calories. Concurrently, the data support the permanent income hypothe-
sis that pensions and remittances represent transitory income sources
which are less likely to be used for food outlays and more likely to
be saved or used for other types of expenditures.
The findings concerning how a shift in the percent of income
earned from agricultural production will increase dramatically calorie
consumption at higher income levels, while having a small negative
effect for small producers, is much more difficult to explain. One
possibility is that large farmers who produce more paddy or staple
foods may consume relatively more of these commodities due to the
transaction costs of selling and repurchasing other food or non-food
items. The result would be that, in fact, they face a lower price for
what is produced, which makes rice a relatively better deal. One
therefore observes a shifting in the consumption bundle toward
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calorie-dense staple foods such as paddy or other starchy staples
which the farmer is growing. Further evidence for this theory will be
presented below when the MPC food (as opposed to calories) out of
agricultural income is shown to be the same as other income sources.
The actual estimation of MPCs for different income sources are
also found in Table 58 for three income levels. The MPCs calculated
once again assume that the household receives an average share of
income from each given source (see Appendix C, Table 3).
When the interaction terms RYXs2 and RYXs3 are included (see Model
5), the differences between the MPC calories from wages, salaries, and
business profits and the other income sources remain, but become more
varied than from Model 2. For low-income households, the difference
between the MPC calories out of Yw and Ys2 (i.e., income from agri-
cultural production) has a value of -0.056. This implies that if, for
example, a household with a per capita income of Rs. 1587 increased
income from agricultural production by Rs. 250/year, it would consume
14 calories less per day per AEU than if that income was in the form
of wages, salaries, and business profits. Similarly, if the same
household was to receive that additional income in the form of pen-
sions, remittances, and food stamps, its daily per AEU consumption
would be 11.5 calories more than if that income was received as wages,
salaries, and business profits. Once again, despite the robustness of
the statistics, the source of income has a negligable effect on
calorie consumption.
At the higher end of the income distribution, the sign of the dif-
ferences in the MPCs change, just as they did with the derivatives of
calorie consumption with respect to the ratio of income sources to
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total income. The differences in the MPCs between the three income
sources and that for wages, salaries, and business profits is relati-
vely large in percentage terms. However, since the MPCs among upper
income levels are comparatively much lower than for poor households,
regardless of income source, coupled with the fact that the focus of
attention is on the behavior of the nutritionally at-risk, there is
little policy relevance that can be attached to these findings.
In conclusion, the above analysis has suggested a new approach to
measuring differences in MPC calories based on sound econometric
principles. The robustness of the statistical results were encouraging
and added confidence that the models were appropriately specified.
Nonetheless, the findings are more important for what they did not
find than what they did uncover. Specifically, there appears to be
only minor nutritional consequences as to whether income is earned by
males or females in Sri Lanka. This finding is not surprising con-
sidering the cohesiveness of family life in South Asia. This is
contrasted with many African societies where there may be more conten-
tiousness in how income is spent and how decisions are made at the
household level.
As far as sources of income, the statistical significance and
magnitude of the lower MPC calories out of non-money income is of
importance to the extent that households' receive housing or other
amenities from an employer which they may have otherwise chosen not to
purchase. However, to the extent that the value of non-money income
is composed of the imputed value of their housing, this lower MPC may
be partially endogenous to the model and reflects their preference
for housing over calories.
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Marginal Propensities to Consume Food
Female versus Male Income. In the above analysis, the difference bet-
ween the MPC calories from income earned by males or females was pre-
sented. In this section, results of a similar analysis are presented
in terms of the MPC food. The reason for doing so is to determine
whether any observed difference tends in the same direction as
calories, and if not, conjecture as to why.
The same basic functional form was used to test the hypothesis:
(37) Ho aFX aFX(37) Ho7:F
where:
FX = food expenditures.
The dependent variable in the models is the budget share to food
(FX/PCEXP), which through some algebraic manipulation is easily trans-
formed to determine the marginal propensity to consume food. The
models to test this hypothesis are found in Table 59. The Models 1A
and 2A correspond in form to Models 2 and 3 in Table 56. In searching
for a more flexible form that would allow differences between MPCs to
vary by expenditure group and the percent of income being earned by
females, a number of models were tried. However, a formulation such
as Model 4 in Table 56 resulted in FEMINCR2 and FEMINCRX terms being
insignificant. Instead, it was possible to estimate a Model 3A, which
took the following form:
(38) w = a + blLnY + b2(LnY)2 + C1(YF/Y) + C2(YF/Y) * LnY + dkZk
+ ekZk * LnY
where:
w = the food share.
Table 59 -- Models Used to Estimate the Marginal Propensity to Consume Food
Independent
Variable
INTERCEPT
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
PRINDEX
HHSIZE
HHSX
AGE1
AEURAT
EARNERS
MOMED
DADED
FARMLAND
URB
EST
URBX
ESTX
FEMINCR
FEMINCRX
RYsi
RYs2
RYXs2
RYs3
RYXs3
RYs4
RYXs4
RYs5
RYXss
Model 1A
3.03
1.00687 (19.7)
-0.06634 (21.8)
0.042 (4.5)
0.09 (10.0)
-0.01 (10.3)
0.0003 (3.4)
0.02 (1.2)
-0.001 (0.5)
-0.008 (5.8)
-0.005 (3.9)
-0.0006 (1.4)
0.14 (3.1)
-0.23 (2.5)
-0.02 (3.2)
0.03 (2.7)
-0.0247 (4.5)
-0.154 (10.4)
-0.009 (1.5)
-0.014 (1.4)
-0.006 (1.0)
0.002 (0.1)
Dependent Variable:
Model 2A
3.04
1.0089
-0.0664
0.04
0.09
-0.01
0.0003
-0.02
-0.001
-0.008
-0.005
-0.001
0.14
0.24
0.02
0.03
0.003
-0.154
-0.009
(19.8)
(21.8)
(4.5)
(10.0)
(10.4)
(3.4)
(1.2)
(0.5)
(5.7)
(4.0)
(1.4)
(3.05)
(2.5)
(3.2)
(2.8)
(4.7)(10. 4)
(1.5)
-0.013 (1.3)
-0.006 (1.0)
0.002 (0.1)
P.C. Food Share
Model 3A
3.14
1.02859
-0.06717
0.04
0.10
-0.01
0.0003
0.02
-0.001
-0.01
-0.01
-0.001
0.126
-0.26
-0.02
0.04
0.213
-0.03
-0.154
-0.009
(20.0)
(22.0)
(4.5)
(10.4)
(10.8)
(3.5)
(1.4)
(0.5)
(5.4)
(4.1)
(1.28)
(2.9)
(2.8)
(3.0)
(3.1)
(3.1)
(3.5)
(10.4)
(1.5)
-0.014 (1.4)
-0.007 (1.1)
0.003 (0.2)
0.471 0.472
Model 4A
(A3
N)
3.21
1.04141
-0.06780
0.04
0.09
-0.012
0.0003
-0.02
-0.001
-0.018
-0.005
-0.001
0.11
-0.22
-0.015
0.03
0.025
-0.155
-0.099
0.011
0.31
-0.04
0.11
-0.01
0.14
-0.017
(19.1)
(21.2)
(4.4)
(10.0)
(10.3)
(3.4)
(1.2)
(0.5)
(5.8)
(4.0)
(1.4)
(2.4)
(2.3)
(2.5)
(2.5)
(4.6)
(10.4)
(1.0)
(1.0)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(1.3)
(1.4)
(0.7)
(0.7)
0.4720.471
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To determine the MPC, one takes the derivative of Lnw with respect to
LnY as follows:
(39) aLno = 1 (bi + 2b2 LnY - C1 YF + C2 YF(1-LnY) + ekZk)(39YM w T v
This derivative plus unity equals the expenditure elasticity of demand
for food from male income. 1 Therefore, 1 is added to the right-hand
side, which then is multiplied by w to give the MPC food as follows:
(40) 9FX = aFX = (1 (b, + 2b2 LnY - C1YF + C2YF (1-LnY)
a YM 3 Y IF = Fo W V Y
+ ekZk) + 1) * w
Equation (27) is the marginal propensity to consume food from income
earned by males since YF is being held constant in the derivative.
One determines the difference between male and female MPC food as
follows:
(41) (FX/Y) C1 C2 * LnY(4) 7F a YF Y
multiplying both sides by Y, one gets:
(42) aFX= C1 + C2 * LnY
which is the difference in the MPC to consume food for males and fema-
les.
The results of the three models are presented in Table 60. Like
with the case of calories, despite statistically significant results,
the magnitude of the differences in the MPCs is small. For example,
Model 1A suggests that if the woman rather than the man received a
transfer of Rs. 250, or about 20 percent of the value of the poorest
household's monthly expenditures, it would expend Rs. 6.25 per year
1 Op. cit., Deaton, p.16.
Table 60 -- Marginal Propensities to Consume Food for Men and Women
Low Expenditure Groupa
% Female Income
0 25 80
0.760
0.735
-0.025
0.762
0.738
-0.024
0.764
0.766
-0.008
0.766
0.741
-0.025
0.768
0.744
-0.024
0.758
0.750
-0.008
0.780
0.755
-0.025
0.779
-. 755
-0.024
0.746
0.738
-0.008
Average
0.651
0.626
-0.025
0.655
0.629
-0.026
0.651
0.628
-0.023
Expenditure Groupb
Female Income
0 25 80
0.657
0.632
-0.025
0.662
0.636
-0.026
0.649
0.626
-0.023
0.671
0.656
-0.025
0.674
0.648
-0.026
0.645
0.622
-0.023
High Expenditure Groupc
% Female Income
0 25 80
0.330
0.305
-0.025
0.332
0.302
-0.030
0.329
0.271
-0.058
0.336
0.311
-0.025
0.339
0.309
-0.030
0.336
0.278
-0.058
0.350
0.325
-0.025
Derivative
MODEL 1A:
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
MODEL 2A:
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
MODEL 3A:
MPCM
MPCF
MPCF - MPCM
to 2nd decile of population
to mean of population where
where yearly per capita expenditures
yearly per capita expenditures = Rs.
C Corresponds to 10th decile of population where yearly per capita expenditures = Rs. 8267
0.354
0.324
-0.030
0.351
0.293
-0.058
I'3
(A)
a
b
Corresponds
Corresponds
= Rs. 1587
2583
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per person less on food than if such money went to the man. Given the
estimated calorie.prices in Chapter III, this translated into around
6.5 calories per day per person. Notice, however, despite the small
size of this difference, that it works in the opposite direction than
the case of calories, where income earned by males had lower MPCs to
consume. This strongly suggests that women's purchases are more effi-
cient in terms of the number of calories supplied for a given level of
food expenditures. Although the size of the differences between the MPC
to consume calories and food out of male and female incomes are small,
these findings suggest that future researchers should not conclude that
a higher MPC calories is a corollary of a higher MPC food.
Income Sources. Finally, the results of the MPC food out of different
income sources is found in Table 61. Model 1A and Model 3A capture
the fact that there are differences in the MPC food from different
income sources. As with calories, the marginal propensity to consume
food out of non-money income is lower than for wages, salaries, and
business profits. Interestingly, although there was a significant
difference in the MPC calories out of agricultural income, this was
not the case for the MPC food. This seems to suggest that the reason
income from agricultural production has a higher MPC calories is due
to the composition of the food basket, not its share of total expen-
ditures. This adds some credence to the explanations put forth
earlier that the higher MPC calories from agricultural income is due
to a favoring of rice and other basic staples relative to higher-
priced calorie sources. In any event, it is of interest that the MPC
calories is so much higher while the MPC food is the same out of
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Table 61 -- Marginal Propensity to Consume Food From Different Income
Sources
Low
0.769
0.615
0.770
0.615
0.778
Expenditure Group
Average
0.662
0.508
0.630
0.475
0.619
High
0.344
0.190
0.317
0.162
0.258
MODEL 1A:
MPC Yw
MPC Ysi
MODEL 3A:
MPC Yw
MPC Ysi
MPC Ys3
-237-
agricultural income.
Finally, in Model 1A there was no difference in the MPC food from
pensions, remittances, and food stamps (RYs3) and wages, salaries, and
business profits (Yw). However, significant differences were found in
Model 3A when an interaction term between RYs3 and per capita expen-
ditures, RYXs3, was added. Thus, the MPC food out of pensions, remit-
tances, and food stamps showed the same pattern as the MPC calories.
Undoubtably, the same explanation as the one for calories discussed
above applies.
Conclusions
The results of this chapter are important because despite
extremely robust statistics, the differences in the MPC food and
calories from female earnings as opposed to male earnings and the MPC
to consume calorie and food from different income sources were
generally of a small magnitude. Some qualifications, however, are
noteworthy. For example, although the MPC calories is not much
higher for women, if on the average the women's share of the income
in a poor household is 0.8 instead of 0, from Model 4, that trans-
lates into an increase in the average propensity to consume of 115
calories per AEU per day. This is not a meaningless difference.
On the other hand, other seemingly larger differences in MPCs, such as
those between wage income and non-money income, may be of less prac-
tical significance. The reason is that the average household earns
less than 10 percent of its income from non-wage sources, and the
policy leverage to alter that share by any significant amount is
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limited.
It is further emphasized that the results indicate that examining
differences in the MPC between different income sources, or between
income earned by different household members, will often result in the
MPC food being higher and the MPC calories being lower (or
insignificant), or vice versa. This is especially important when
interpreting the nutritional implications of the findings.
Another important lesson is the need to consider that differences
in the MPC between income sources, or income earned by males or fema-
les, is functionally related not only to income levels but to the per-
cent of total income which the female is earning or which is being
contributed by a given income source. Flexible functional forms should
be used to capture the fact that just as MPCs differ with income, dif-
ferences between the MPCs from male and female income are a function
of the proportion of female to male income in the household.
Similarly, the income source-specific MPCs are functionally related to
the share of income being contributed by a given source.
The results presented in the previous section also point out the
importance of controlling for the source of income when examining the
differences between male and female MPCs. For example, the coef-
ficient for the FEMINCR term in Model 2 is almost 20 percent higher
than for FEMINCR in Model 1. The only difference was that in the
latter the sources of household income were controlled for, so that
the FEMINCR variable was no longer picking up the effects of the form
of income, but rather being limited to who earns it.
There remains a need for further research in this area. This
involves improving the types and quality of data, which thereafter
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will offer greater latitude in terms of the analysis. While this
report expanded upon the theoretical development of how to test MPCs,
more work is needed. Specifically, rather than retrofitting the eco-
nometrics into an available data set, as was done in this paper, some
further theoretical development is needed to guide the collection and
analysis of data.
Finally, in addition to testing the MPCs from different income
sources, and according to whether it is earned by men or women, the
other parameter estimates in the models employed are worthy of brief
comment. To amplify, it appears that the higher the education of the
father, the fewer calories will be consumed. Mother's education is
insignificant in all the models. Similarly, the higher the age of the
major income earners, the greater the calorie intake. Although
ownership of land increased calorie consumption per AEU by a small
amount, as shown in Chapter IV, this effect becomes even smaller and
insignificant in the models which include the sources of income (i.e.
compare the FARMLAND variable in Models 1 and 2). This suggests that
the positive impact of land holdings on calorie consumption is
mediated by the lower infra-marginal prices of commodities from home
consumption whose real value is the opportunity cost of not selling
these at the farmgate.
In reference to the food share models in Table 58, once again the
higher the fathers' education the lower the share of total expen-
ditures on food. A similar finding applies to mother's education.
The older the major income earner, the more he/she will spend on food.
Farm land ownership has no effect on the food share, unlike its effect
on the intake of calories. Of all these findings, perhaps the only
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one of surprise is that regarding the education of the parents. It
may well be that these households are more concerned with outlays on
education, health care or investment in their home environment, at the
expense of food and calories. In any event, the magnitude of these
effects is small and not worthy of great concern from a policy perspec-
tive.
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis was designed to examine food acquisition behavior in
Sri Lanka. In doing so, numerous findings and results are presented
throughout this paper. In addition, specific policy issues are
discussed in the text which will not be recounted at this juncture.
Nevertheless, there are a number of more general considerations which
demand further reflection. These issues can be considered in the spe-
cific context of Sri Lanka or from a global perspective.
To amplify, a number of themes link the analysis in each of the
chapters. The first is the common concern with disaggregation. Food
policy analysis performed at the level of national food availability
or food consumption statistics will preclude formulating enlightened
policies to assist the poor. Therefore, whether it be examining food
expenditure and consumption patterns, estimating parameters, or
analyzing the dual role of food prices in determining incomes,
disaggregation is vital. For example, not only did the share of
expenditures on food decline with rising income, but the nature of the
food basket was shown to vary dramatically across income levels.
Findings such as a declining starchy-staple ratio with rising incomes
and an increase in the percent of protein from animal sources were
typical of those found in other countries. Similarly, the number of
households failing to consume an adequate diet is almost 100 percent
for the lowest expenditure decile and falls dramatically as incomes
rise. Parameter estimates varied dramatically by expenditure. Even
the differences in MPCs between male and female earnings was
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functionally related to expenditure levels.
But income was not the only way to stratify the analysis. For
example, distinction was made throughout between the nature and extent
of the consumption and poverty problem in the rural, urban, and estate
sectors. Findings such as that urban households spend less of their
income on food and purchase more expensive sources of calories (e.g.,
milk and meat) suggest that the poor in the cities are at greater
risk. Policy makers must consider measures to counter the apparent
nutrition problems which will evolve commensurate with urbanization.
Another way of disaggregating the population was to identify those
households consuming less than 80 percent of their dietary require-
ments. Not only were their occupational characteristics examined but
they were dichotomized into households spending greater than, or less
than, 80 percent of their outlays on food. Despite having the same
calorie intake per AEU, the former group, referred to as the
"ultra-poor," were significantly different in many other social and
economic characteristics than the moderately poor who are nutri-
tionally at-risk. The distinction proves useful in that those house-
holds which have inadequate diets and spend a low share of the budget
on food may be good subjects for nutrition education and other efforts
to change their behavior. The households which spend more than 80
percent of their incomes on food and still do not achieve dietary ade-
quacy, on the other hand, are unquestionably caught in the poverty
trap and require economic measures to raise their intakes.
It was also possible to explore the extent to which various occu-
pation groups are not consuming adequate diets. This too can facili-
tate investments and policies to reach out on the basis of such
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information. As expected, non-classified laborers and agricultural
workers are at greatest risk. They also make up the largest groups in
the labor force.
In addition, the data which linked the consumption and production
sides of the food system in Chapter IV amply illustrate that food
prices cut with a double-edged sword. Relating the structure of pro-
duction and farm holdings to consumption patterns emphasized that, at
least in the short and medium terms, the small farmer who is also
likely to be poor and hungry will not be a primary beneficiary of
higher food prices for the major staple commodities, rice and coconut.
Those households with small holdings consume at home most of their
production, and are net consumers in the market.
Despite the wealth of information derived from the descriptive
statistics in Chapters III and IV, a second general focus of this
study was that at some juncture there is a need to resort to econo-
metric analysis. In that regard, some important methodological con-
cerns of consumer demand analysis were explored. Direct estimation
techniques were used, which resulted in estimating a complete set of
income and own-price parameters as well as many cross-price elastici-
ties. Furthermore, an innovative two-step approach which
distinguished the decision whether or not to enter the market for a
commodity (using probit analysis) from the decision of how much to
purchase if already a market participant (using ordinary least squares
on the truncated sample of participants) was used for commodities with
many non-consuming households. In addition, a variety of functional
forms and specifications was experimented with in efforts to observe
differences in income and price elasticities across expenditure
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groups. These efforts proved fruitful and evidenced the importance of
distinguishing among income groups. Interestingly, Engel's law did
not hold for the lowest decile of the population. In addition, the
poor were shown to be more price responsive and increase their food
intake more in the face of rising incomes.
A variety of other methodological issues were also experimented
with and discussed. For example, the symmetry condition was shown not
to hold. On the other hand, the hypothesized curvature in the Slutsky
elasticities was substantiated. In addition, experimentation with
two-stage least squares indicated that potential bias in parameter
estimates due to simultaneity in the demand functions (which results
from feedback between the dependent variable and the expenditure term
on which it is regressed) was of minor importance. The loss in com-
putational efficiency in the two-stage least squares method commends
the use of ordinary least squares to estimate demand functions when
all households are consumers.
Perhaps the most interesting hypotheses tested, where the econo-
metric methods have been most deficient in the past, was in attempting
to estimate marginal propensities to consume food from income earned
by males versus females, and from different income sources. This is
an important issue because there has been much conjecture as to, for
example, the wisdom of transferring income to the women in the house-
hold rather than the men. This research has shown that despite a sta-
tistically significant difference in the MPCs when females rather than
males earn income, these are so small as to be of little policy rele-
vance. Concerning the form in which income is earned, non-money
income in the form of shelter, clothing, medical care, and other
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services had a lower MPC calories and food than wages, salaries and
business profits. This merits concern among policy makers. Other
differences among the MPC calories for poor households were noted, but
these were of a small magnitude with little policy relevance.
Nevertheless, given the data limitations of this study, there remains
the need for further empirical research.
It is possible to continue to recapitulate the individual lessons
learned, be they methodological or substantive. However, as mentioned
above, these are discussed in the individual chapters. There is
remaining, however, an underlying story which has been alluded to
throughout the text and deserves to be the subject of explicit
attention in these concluding remarks. That is the issue of income
growth versus equity. This story is a variation on the classic policy
dilemma of the role of the food sector in fueling the engine of deve-
lopment while not imperiling those most vulnerable in the society.
This theme was contained in some form or the other in all the
chapters of this study. In the second chapter, the success story of
Sri Lanka in the 1960s and early 1970s was extolled. The praise the
country has received for assuring that basic human needs were realized
was indeed convincing. This was followed by Chapter III, which not
only presented a detailed description of food consumption and expen-
diture patterns but included a disconcerting assessment of the magni-
tude of dietary inadequacy in Sri Lanka. Of greater concern, however,
was the fact that a comparison, between 1970 and 1980, of consumption
levels and expenditure patterns among the poor indicated a serious
decline in welfare during the past decade. Further analysis found
that this was e reflection of expenditures not keeping pace with
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prices, coupled with an increased skewing of income. Indeed, it is
troubling how precisely Sri Lanka, a supposed island of equity and
adequate consumption levels, can revert to displaying dietary charac-
teristics found among the most impoverished nations of Asia.
Such findings do not come as a surprise to those who have followed
the economic transformation and liberalization of the late 1970s. A
central tenet of the free market economy was to reduce import restric-
tions, rationalize capital markets, eliminate price controls, and
decrease the budgetary burden of subsidies. Such policies run the
risk of having short-term deleterious consequences. It would be a
gross simplification to conclude from the data in this report,
however, that the process of liberalization was inappropriate, or that
the elimination of the quantity rationing scheme in lieu of the much
smaller and less fiscally burdensome food stamp program is solely
responsible for such a decline. It would be fair to infer, however,
that the major reduction in subsidies concurrent with the process of
economic liberalization represented potentially a double blow to the
welfare in general, and nutritional status in specific, of the poor in
the short-term. What is clear is that at the exact time the subsidies
were reduced, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was when they
were needed most. The short-term consequence for the poor was severe.
This is precisely what could have been predicted if the data on the
structure of land holdings, marketings, and occupational activities
presented in Chapter IV, or the parameter estimates and simulations in
Chapter VII, were available to and used by policy makers.
Therefore, the findings of a decline in welfare, which result par-
tially from trying to "get prices right," do not militate against
-247-
liberalization. Nor do they argue against fiscal responsibility
through the reduction in subsidies. The move toward a free market
economy and maintaining high producer prices as an incentive to
increase domestic production and promote rice self-sufficiency may
indeed represent a step in the right direction. In fact, one could
contend that during the next decade a liberalized economy in a country
like Sri Lanka will result in rapid economic growth, thereby off-
setting rising prices and short-term dislocations. This process may
in fact be taking hold in Sri Lanka at the time of this writing. This
is clearly the subject for further research. Nevertheless, it is evi-
dent that removing controls from an economy, even if advantageous in
the long-term, must be accompanied by equally strong short-term
measures to protect the poor. As intimated previously, the long-run
is far off for those going to bed hungry in the present.
Simply, the promotion of the free market is designed to spur
investment and generate long-term economic growth. If the theoretical
basis for fueling development through the process of liberalization is
sound, borrowing in the short-term to protect the quality of human
capital and basic human needs should be all the more acceptable given
the expectation of rapid economic growth in the future. There is a
manifest need to de-couple the process of getting prices right from
the process of ending efforts to protect the people from severe
hardships through targeted subsidies. In fact, they should go hand in
hand. Donor and developing countries who promote liberalization
should stand by their conviction that the process will promote long-
term growth. This can be accomplished by rewarding countries which
promote structural change with further suppport for targeted efforts
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to insulate the nutritionally vulnerable households from short-term
dislocation.
There remains a need for research in the area of improving the
targeting of food subsidies and income transfers, both in Sri Lanka
and globally. Consideration should be given to subsidizing the price
of inferior commodities which are self-targeting. Options in this
regard include low-quality wheat flour, as opposed to the high quality
which is only available at present in Sri Lanka, and promoting produc-
tion and consumption of roots, tubers, and coarse grains through
driving a wedge between producer and consumer prices. The decline in
the area planted to roots like cassava, as well as high market prices
for secondary starchy staples, has precluded these foods contributing
in a meaningful way to the diets of the poor.
The importance of indexing the value of the food stamp program to
either the price of rice or the cost of living index is also com-
mended. In addition, there must be consideration to enrolling new
households which are at high risk but who cannot participate due to
bureaucratic impediments. New targeting mechanisms also need to be
explored. These include the possibility of using the health
infrastructure to target stamps on the basis of nutritional status.
This provides an impetus for households to make use of health services
while employing a creative targeting criteria such as anthropometry.
No matter what subsidy scheme is adapted and no matter how well it
is targeted, there are no easy answers to the hunger problem in Sri
Lanka, like anywhere else. This was amply illustrated in the last
section of Chapter VII, which showed that even if targeting was abso-
lutely perfect with no leakages, the cost of closing the calorie gap
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among the entire population would be great; and that even if the
economy as a whole grows rapidly during the next few years, unless a
relatively larger share of the increased wealth accrues to the poor
they will remain hungry. Thus, it is apparent that the platitudes
given Sri Lanka by researchers in the past have led many to assume
wrongly that they found a simple solution to poverty and malnutrition.
This is not the case, witnessed by the data presented in previous
chapters.
Regardless of the extent to which the change in development stra-
tegy during the late 1970s was politically motivated or economically
necessitated, the primary goal of food policy in Sri Lanka is no
longer to protect the short-term welfare of the poor. The type of
analysis in this paper provides the foundation and emphasizes the
need for future policies to be both enlightened and creative. Pro-
moting economic growth while not further disenfranchising the poor is
clearly the challenge for policy makers in the years to come.
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APPENDIX A
Calorie and Protein Conversion Factors
Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwise) otherwise)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
Rice
Wheat Flour
Kurakkan
Sorghum
Other Cereals
Bread
Buns
Cakes
Other Bakery
Pappadam
Noodles
Hoppers
String Hoppers
Thosai
Pittu
0/Cere Prep.
Dried Chil. Coop
Dried Chil. O/M
Red Onions Coop.
Red Onions O/M
Bombay Onions
Garlic Coop.
Garlic 0/M
Cumin Coop.
Cumin 0/M
Fennel Coop.
Fennel O/M
Mathe Coop.
Mathe O/M
Coriander Coop.
Coriander O/M
Mal. Fish Coop.
Mal. Fish 0/M
Raw Ginger
Turmeric
Mustard
Tamarind
Goraka
Green Chil.
Salt
Pepper
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
.5
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
No.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
No.
No.
No.
No.
.Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
Oz.
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.235
285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
.285
285
.285
.285
.285
.285
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
346
348
328
349
362
245
300
100
435
82
0
120/
49/
83/
0
0
246
246
59
59
50
145
145
356
356
0
0
437
437
288
288
204
204
67
349
541
283
0
29
0
304
unit
unit
unit
7.5
11
7.3
10.4
9.5
7.8
6.5
2.1
7.4
5.4
0
2/unit
1.4/unit
3/unit
0
0
15.9
15.9
1.8
1.8
1.2
6.3
6.3
18.7
18.7
0
0
6.5
6.5
14.1
14.1
42
42
2.3
6.3
20
3.1
0
2.9
0
11.5
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Appendix A -- Calorie and Protein Conversion Factors
Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwise) otherwise)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
L imes
Vinegar
Sauce
Cinnamon
Other Condim.
Mysoor Dhall
Cowpea Dhall
Lanka Dhall
Other Dhall
Green Gram
Soya Beans
Gram Whole
Cowpea Gram
Other Gram
Gotukola
Kankun
Mukunuwenna
Nivithi
Thampala
Sarana
Kohila Leaves
Katurumurunga
Cabbage Leaf
Other Leafy
Ash Pumpkin
Ash Plantain
Brinjals
Bandakka
Bitter Gourd
Cucumber
Drumstick
Kohila Yams
Long Beans
Snake Gourd
Vatakolu
Wattakka
Jak
Bread Fruit
Other Fruit
Beans
Carrot
No.
Bot.
Bot.
Va.
Val.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
Val.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
lb.
Val.
No.
No.
lb.
lb.
.23
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
4.54
9.088
2
4.54
4.54
77
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
00
80
80
80
70
80
80
80
59
0
0
0
0
335
335
335
335
334
432
321
323
347
37/unit
28/unit
73/unit
21/unit
85/unit
21/unit
34/unit
94/unit
27/unit
0/unit
35
34
24
0
25
13
26
53
48
108
26
0
88/unit
113
116
26
48
1.5
0
0
0
0
22.3
22.3
22.3
22.3
24
43.2
22
24
24
2.1/unit
2.9/unit
5/unit
1.7/unit
8.3/unit
2.1/unit
4/unit
8.4/unit
1.8/unit
0/unit
1.2
1.7
1.4
0
1.6
.4
2.5
1.7
3.8
.5
2
0
1.9/unit
1.5
1
1.7
.9
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Appendix A -- Calorie and Protein Conversion Factors
Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwise) otherwise)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
Beetroot lb. 4.54 80 43 1.7
Cabbage lb. 4.54 80 27 1.8
Knolkhol lb. 4.54 80 21 1.1
Tomato Salad lb. 4.54 80 23 1.9
Tomato Curry lb. 4.54 80 0 0
Leeks lb. 4.54 80 77 1.8
Capsic. Chil. lb. 4.54 80 26 2
Raddish lb. 4.54 80 17 .7
Other Veget. lb. 4.54 80 35 1.9
Potatoes lb. 4.54 95 97 1.6
Sweet Pot. lb. 4.54 85 120 1.2
Manioc lb. 4.54 85 157 1.3
Other Yams lb. 4.54 85 110 2.5
Plantains No. .426 74 64 1.4
Papaws No. 9.088 75 27 .7
Pineapple No. 13.632 60 46 .4
Mangoes No. 1.704 85 74 .6
Oranges No. 1.704 66 48 .7
Avocado No. 4.544 80 215 1.7
Young Cocon. No. 3.408 100 430 3.4
Other Fruit No. 4.54 100 0 0
Dates lb. 4.54 100 317 2.5
Cashew Nut lb. 4.54 100 596 21.2
Ground Nut lb. 4.54 100 567 25.3
Dried Fruit lb. 4.54 100 213 3.4
Can Pineapple lb. 4.54 100 46 .4
Can Mango lb. 4.54 100 74 .6
Other Can Frt. lb. 4.54 100 213 3.4
Coconuts 1b. 3.408 100 444 4.5
Beef lb. 4.54 100 114 22.6
Beef Liver lb. 4.54 100 136 20
Mutton lb. 4.54 100 118 21.4
Pork lb. 4.54 100 371 14
Poultry lb. 4.54 100 109 25.9
Other Meat lb. 4.54 100 362 14
Seer Large lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Paraw Large lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Mullet lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Balaya Large lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Shark Large lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Talapath lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
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Appendix A -- Calorie and Protein Conversion Factors
Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwise) otherwise)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
0/Fish Large lb. 4.54 70 116 18.9
Sprats lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
Hurulla lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
Karalla lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
Kumbalawa lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
Paraw Small lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
0/Fish Small lb. 4.54 70 273 21.8
Prawns lb. 4.54 70 89 19.1
Crabs lb. 4.54 70 169 11.2
0/Fish Shell lb. 4.54 70 89 19.1
Seer Dried lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Katta lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Koduwa lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Balaya Dried lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Mora Dried lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Anguluwa D'D lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Paraw D'D lb. 4.54 70 242 43.4
Sprats D'D lb. 4.54 70 242 43.4
Prawns D'D lb. 4.54 70 242 43.4
0/Fish D'D lb. 4.54 70 242 43.4
Jadi lb. 4.54 70 242 43.4
0/Fish Salted lb. 4.54 70 204 42
Fish Tinned lb. 4.54 70 309 20
Milk Fresh Bot. 7.388 100 67 3.2
Milk Board Pts. 5.541 100 67 3.2
Goat Milk Bot. 7.388 100 72 3.3
Curd Val. - 100 60 3.1
Yoghurt Val. - 100 60 3.1
Cond'D Milk Tin 3.976 100 317 7.3
Milk Powder lb. 4.54 100 357 38
Infant Milk Fd. lb. 4.54 100 496 25.8
Inf't Cere. Fd. lb. 4.54 100 496 25.8
Cheese Oz. .285 100 348 24.1
0/Milk Food lb. 4.54 100 117 .4.3
Coco Oil Bot. 7.455 100 900 0
Gingelly Oil Bot. 7.455 100 900 0
Ghee Animal Bot. 7.455 100 900 0
Ghee Veget. Bot. 7.455 100 900 0
Butter Imp'd Oz. .285 100 729 0
Butter Local Oz. .285 100 729 0
Margarine Oz. .285 100 729 0
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Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwi se) otherwi se)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
O/Oil - Fat lb. 4.54 100 900 0
Hen Egg No. .426 95 181 13.5
0/Egg No. .426 95 350 16.2
Tea Packet Oz. .285 100 40 10
Tea Dust Oz. .285 100 40 10
Coffee Seed Oz. .285 100 56 8
Coffee Powd. Oz. .285 100 56 8
Areated Wat. Bot. 10 100 0 0
Bev. Cocoa Oz. .285 100 429 20
Bev. Other Oz. 10 100 0 0
Drink Cordial Bot. 10 100 0 0
Drink Juice Val. - 100 0 0
0/Bever. Val. - 100 0 0
Sugar Oz. .285 100 400 0
Jaggery-Kitul Oz. .285 100 340 1
Jag. Coco Oz. .285 100 340 1
Jag. Sug. Cane Oz. .285 100 340 1
Treacle Bot. .285 100 0 0
Bees Honey Bot. 7.455 100 319 .3
0/Sugar Val. - 100 400 0
Jams-Jellies Oz. .285 100 260 .4
Ice Cream Val. - 100 59 1.1
Chocolate Val. - 100 429 20
Toff-Sweets Val. - 100 429 2
Biscuits No. 0.5 100 435 7.4
0/Confect. Val. - 100 435 7.4
Marmite Oz. 0.285 100 6 1.4
Oxo Oz. 0.285 100 6 1.4
Sauces Bot. 7.455 100 6 1.4
Pick-Chutney Bot. 7.455 100 6 1.4
0/Food Val. - 100 0 0
Tea/Jagg No. - 100 0 0
Tea/Sug No. - 100 0 0
Tea/Mlk/Sug No. - 100 0 0
0/Prep Tea No. - 100 0 0
Cof/Sug No. - 100 0 0
Cof/Mlk/Sug No. - 100 0 0
0/Prep Cof No. - 100 0 0
Soft Drk-Bot No. 100 42 0
Soft Not-Bot No. - 100 0 0
Toddy Bot. 7.455 100 59 .1
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Calories Portion
Orig. Conversion (per 100 (per 100
Units Factor Edible grams un- grams un-
Food From (to 100 gms) Portion less marked less marked
Item Survey otherwise) otherwise)
Vi Ei Ci Pi
Arrack/Coco
Arrack/Molas
Beer/Stour
Betel
Arecanut
Betel Chew
Tobacco
Bot.
Bot.
Bot.
Val.
No.
No.
No.
7.455
7.455
7.455
0.355
0.061
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
210
210
35
44
248
44
0
0
0
.3
3.1
4.9
3.1
*0
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APPENDIX B
Variable Definitions
= natural log of per capita expenditures
= (LPCEXP)2
= natural log of calories/AEU
= natural log of calories/number of persons in the
household
= natural log of per capita rice consumption
LPCEXP
LPCEXP2
LPCCAL
LPCCALII
LRICEQ
LCOCOQ
LSUGARQ
LFISHQ
LVEGQ
LCONDMTQ
LOILQ
LWHEATQ
LMILKQ
LYAMQ
LMEATQ
LGRAINQ
LPULSEQ
LBREADQ
LRICEP
LCOCOP
LSUGARP
log of per capita coconut consumption
log of per capita sugar consumption
log of per capita fish consumption
log of per capita vegetable consumption
log of per capita condiment consumption
log of per capita oil consumption
log of per capita wheat consumption
log of per capita milk consumption
log of per capita roots and tubers consump-
log of per capita meat consumption
log of per capita consumption of other
(including maize, millet, and sorghum)
log of per capita pulses consumption
log of per capita bread consumption
log of the price of rice
log of the price of coconut
log of the price of sugar
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
tion
= natural
= natural
grains
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
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Appendix B -- Definition of Variables
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
= natural
1 og
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
of the
price
price
price
price
price
price
price
price
price
price
price
of fish
of bread
of wheat
of condiments
of cooking oil
of vegetables
of milk
of roots and tubers
of meat
of other grains
of pulses
LFISHP
LBREADP
LWHEATP
LCONDMTP
LOILP
LVEGP
LMILKP
LYAMP
LMEATP
LGRAINP
LPULSEP
MOMED
DADED
HHSIZE
HHSX
AGE1
AEURAT
EARNERS
D1
D2
URB
EST
= mother's education
= father's education
= number of persons in the household
= HHSIZE * LPCEXP
= age of major income earner
= adult equivalency units/HHSIZE
= number of household members who are income receivers
= dummy variable which equals 1 when a household
member is a farmer or cultivator, and 0 otherwise
= dummy variable which equals 1 when a household mem-
ber is a fisherman, and 0 otherwise
= dummy variable which equals 1 when a household resi-
des in the urban sector, and 0 otherwise
= dummy variable which equals 1 when a household resi-
des in the estate sector, and 0 otherwise
= URB * LPCEXPURB X
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ESTX
DUM
RICEDUM
RICEPURB
RICEEST
BREADUM
BREADURB
FISHDUM
COCOURB
CONDMURB
COCODUM
OILDUM
SUGPES
SUGPURB
MILKDUM
FISHPURB
YAMDUM
WHTDUM
WHTEST
VEGEST
LCOCOPX
LFISHPX
LVEGPX
LMEATPX
LYAMPX
= EST * LPCEXP
= dummy variable when PCEXP is less than Rs. 2000/year
= LRICEP * DUM
= LRICEP * URB
= LRICEP * EST
= LBREADP * DUM
= LBREADP * URB
= LFISHP * DUM
= LCOCOP * URB
= LCONDMTP * URB
= LCOCOP * DUM
= LOILP * DUM
= LSUGARP * EST
= LSUGARP * URB
= LMILKP * DUM
= LFISHP * URB
= LYAMP * DUM
= LWHEATQ * DUM
= LWHEATP * EST
= LVEGP * EST
= LCOCOP * LPCEXP
= LFISHP * LPCEXP
= LVEGP * LPCEXP
= LMEATP * LPCEXP
= LYAMP * LPCEXP
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LMILKPX
LBREADPX
LWHEATPX
LCNDMTPX
PRINDEX
FEMINCR
FEMINCR2
FEMINCRX
FARMLAND
PADDYLAND
HIGHLAND
Yw
Ysi
Ys2
Ys3
RYsi
RYs2
RYs3
RYs4
RYs5
RYXsi
RYXs2
= LMILKP * LPCEXP
= LBREADP * LPCEXP
= LWHEATP * LPCEXP
= LCNDMTP * LPCEXP
= Price Index
= ratio of income earned by females to total income
= FEMINCR * FEMINCR
= FEMINCR * LPCEXP
= acres of farm land
= acres of paddy land
= acres of high land
= income from wages and salaries and interest payments
= income from non-money sources
= income from agricultural sales plus home consumption
= income from pensions, remittances, and food stamps
= ratio of income from non-money sources to total
income
= ratio of income from agricultural sources to total
income
= ratio of income from pensions, remittances, and food
stamps to total income
= ratio of income from periodic cash payments to total
income
= ratio of income from business profits to total
income
= RYsi * LPCEXP
= RYs2 * LPCEXP
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RYXs3 = RYs3 * LPCEXP
MILLS = Inverse of the Mill's Ratio
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Table 1 -- Per Capita Calorie Intake by
Expenditure Deciles and Sector
Per Capita
Expenditures
(Deciles)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Urban
1138
1433
1625
1785
1875
2002
2139
2248
2434
2765
Calories/Capita
Rural Estate
1239 1222
1617 1595
1815 1811
1977 2047
2144 2269
2331 2580
2586 2691
2716 3223
3119 3510
3595 3754
2400 2240
Total
1221
1590
1788
1964
2113
2303
2519
2666
2971
3261
Total 2095 2257
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Table 2
Imputed Prices of Major Calorie Sources
By Sector
Commodity
Rice (Rs/lb)
Wheat (Rs/lb)
Bread (Rs/lb)
Coconuts (Rs/Item)
Sugar (Rs/oz)
Urban
2.57
2.42
2.17
2.00
0.47
Rural
2.50
2.38
2.19
1.78
0.47
Estate
2.55
2.39
2.20
2.00
0.49
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Table 3
Income Shares Used to Compute MPCs in Tables 58 and 61
Expenditure Level
Low Average High
RYsi 0.064 0.074 0.094
RYs2 0.170 0.167 0.147
RYs3 0.150 0.108 0.076
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Figure 1
Per Capita Calorie Demand Function
Independent Dependent
Variables Variable
LPCCALII
INTERCEPT -8.21
LPCEXP 3.41 (28.8)*
LPCEXP2 -0.17 (24.1)
AEURAT 0.29 ( 7.8)
URB 0.46 ( 4.4)
EST -0.69 C 3.1)
URBX -0.07 ( 5.7)
ESTX 0.10 ( 3.5)
HHSIZE 0.14 ( 6.5)
HHSX -0.02 ( 6.8)
EARNERS -0.0003 ( 0.1)
D1 -0.02 ( 1.6)
PRINDEX -0.64 (28.8)
R2 = 0.70
* T-ratios are in parentheses
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Table 1 -- Per Capita Expenditure Elasticity of Demand
Expenditure
Group
(Decile)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.82
0.72
0.67
0.63
0.59
0.56
0.51
0.46
0.41
0.20
0.57
For Per Capita Calories
Rural
0.90
0.80
0.75
0.71
0.67
0.64
0.59
0.54
0.48
0.28
0.65 0.75
-Es tat e
1.00
0.9
0.85
0.71
0.77
0.74
0.69
0.64
0.58
0.38
Urban
Average
Appendix E
Table 1 -- Weighted Entry and Response Elasticities for Computing Expenditure and Own-Price Elasticities
EXPENDITURE ELASTICITY OWN-PRICE ELASTICITY
Low
Entry Response
0.024
0.404
1.906
0.108
0.229
0.229
0.335
0.911
0.911
Bread
UrbFa~n
Rural
Estate
Oil
Wbran
Rural
Estate
Pulses
W5~
Rural
Estate
Wheat
Rural
Estate
Milk
WrEan
Rural
Estate
Meat
Whran
Rural
Estate
Yams
Wr~a-n
Rural
Estate
0.441
0.492
0.492
0.707
0.707
0.868
0.554
0.554
0.554
0.148
0.148
0.148
0.405
0.405
0.405
0.203
0.203
0.203
-0.084
-0.084
0.084
Average
Entry Response
0.024
0.404
1.906
0.108
0.229
0.229
0.302
0.878
0.878
1.318
1.318
1.318
0.558
0.558
0.558
1.151
1.151
0.681
0.337
0.388
0.388
0.574
0.574
0.735
0.410
0.410
0.410
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.325
0.325
0.325
0.176
0.176
0.176
-0.025
-0.025
0.143
0.024
0.409
1.906
0.108
0.229
0.229
-0.049
0.583
0.583
1.318
1.318
1.318
0.558
0.558
0.558
1.151
1.151
0.681
-0.183
0.234
0.234
0.256
0.256
0.417
0.298
0.298
0.298
-0.152
-0.152
-0.152
0.194
0.194
0.194
0.102
0.102
0.102
0.116
0.116
0.284
Low
Entry Response
- -0.326
- -0.806
- -0.806
-0.261
-0.261
-0.261
-1.036
-1.036
-1.036
-0.567
-0.567
-0.567
-1.69
-1.69
-1.69
-0.953
-0.953
-0.953
-0.980
-0.980
-0.980
-0.253
-0.253
-0.253
-0.615
-0.615
-0.615
-0.094
-0.094
-0.094
-0.260
-0.183
-0.183
-0.174
-0.174
-0.174
-0.348
-0.348
-0.348
Average
Et Response
- -0.326
- -0.806
- -0.806
-0.261
-0.261
-0.261
-0.773
-0.773
-0.773
-0.567
-0.567
-0.567
-0.839
-0.839
-0.839
-0.953
-0.953
-0.953
-0.980
-0.980
-0.980
-0.253
-0.253
-0.253
-0.615
-0.615
-0.615
-0.094
-0.094
-0.094
-0.322
-0.244
-0.244
-0.159
-0.159
-0.159
-0.262
-0.262
-0.262
Hi gh
Entry Response
- -0.326
- -0.806
- -0.806
-0.261
-0.261
-0.261
-0.144
-0.144
-0.144
-0.567
-0.567
-0.567
-0.839
-0.839
-0.839
-0.953
-0.953
-0.953
-0.980
-0.980
-0.980
-0.253
-0.253
-0.253
-0.615
-0.615
-0.615
-0.094
-0.094
-0.094
-0.322
-0.244
-0.244
-0.122
-0.122
-0.122
-0.262
-0.262
-0.262
1.318
1.318
1.318
0.558
0.558
0.558
1.151
1.151
0.681
Hi gn
Entry Response
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Table 2 -- Weighted Entry and Response Elasticities for Computing Cross-Price Elasticities
Bread 011 Pulses
Entry Response Entry Response Entry Response
- .085 - -.176 -.543 .060
- .085 - -.071 -.543 .060
- .085 - .156 -.543 .060
Wheat Milk Meat Yams
Entry Response Entry Response Entry Response Entry Response
- - - - - .038 - -
- - - - - .038 - -
- - - - - .038 - -
.254 .016 .165 .242 .206 .060 .393 .116 .186 -. 122 .252 -
.254 -. 032 .165 .242 .206 .060 .393 .116 .186 - .252 -
.254 -. 143 .165 .242 .206 .060 .393 .116 .186 - .252 -
- .068
- .068
- .068
-. 349 -. 476 - -
-. 349 -. 514 - -
-. 349 -. 942 - -
.196 .051 -. 123 - - .098 - - - - - - - -
.196 .051 -. 123 - - .098 - - - - - - - -
.196 .051 -. 123 - - .098 - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -.415 .072 - .041 - - .691 -. 12
- - - - - - -.415 .072 - .041 - - .691 -. 12
- - - - - - -.415 .072 - .041 - - .691 -. 12
- -.054 - -. 115 - - - - .445 .036 -.178 -.051 - -
- -.054 - - - - - - .445 .036 -.100 - - -
- -.054 - - - - - - .445 .036 -.100 - - -
- -. 806 - .895 1.101 -
- -.806 - .895 1.101 -
- -.806 - .895 1.101 -
.329 .115
.329 .115
.329 .115
- .519 -1.145 -
- .519 -1.145 -
- .519 -1.14b -
- - -1.036 -. 615 -. 567 .094 .197 -
- - -0.773 -. 61S -. S67 .094 .197 -
- - -0.144 -. 615 -. 567 .094 .197 -
Rice
Medi um
High
Coconut
low-
Medium
High
ugr
Medium
High
Condiments
Low
Medium
High
Vegetable
Low
Medium
High
Fish
Medium
High
Bread
To-w
Medium
High
Pulses
Low
Medi um
High
Oil
MediuLm
ligh
Wheat
Medi
High
Milk
Medium
High
Yams
Med iLm
High
Meats
Medium
High
Fruit
Tow
Medium
High
Other Grains
low
Medium
High
1
- - -1.86 .891
- - -1.86 .891
- - -1.86 .891
- - - .082
- - - .082
- - - .082
- .047 .182 - .165 - -. 368 .120
- .047 .182 - .165 - -. 368 .120
- .047 .182 - .165 - -. 368 .120
- .290 - -. 724 - - -1.230 -. 104 - - - - - -
- .290 - -. 724 - - -1.009 -. 104 - - - - - -
- .290 - -. 724 - - -1.009 -. 104 - - - - - -
- - -. 162 -. 087
- - -. 162 -. 087
- - -. 162 -. 087
- .081 -. 046 -
- .081 -. 046 -
- .081 -. 046 -
- - -1.649 - -1.93 -. 183 - - - -
- - - - -. 957 -. 244 - - - -
- - - - -.957 -.244 - - - -
- - -. 249 -
- - -. 249 -
- - -. 249 -
-. 501 -. 173 -. 103 .117 -. 369 -. 150
-. 501 -. 173 -. 103 .117 -. 369 -. 072
-.501 -.173 -.103 .117 -.369 .114
.110 .054 .031 - -.122 -
.110 .054 .031 - -.122 -
.110 .054 .031 - -.122 -
1.829 .333
1.829 .333
1.829 .333
.087 -
.087 -
.087 -
.452 .065
.701 .031
1.28 -. 236
- - .153 -
- - .153 -
- - .153 -
.884 - -. 953 -
- - -. 953 -
- - -. 953 -
- - - - .694 .114
- - - - .694 .114
- - - - .694 .114
- - - -. 055
- - - -. 055
- - - -.055
.263 .078 - -.253 -.262 -.061
.263 .078 - -.253 -.177 -.067
.263 .078 - -.253 -.177 -.067
